


Noel W. Smith, Editor
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INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY NEWSLETTER

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It is clear that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere of those actions for the sake of something which involve purpose. Intelligent reflection, then, and chance are in the same sphere, for purpose implies intelligent reflection. It is necessary, no doubt, that the causes of what comes to pass by chance be indefinite; and that is why chance is supposed to belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man, and why it might be thought that, in a way nothing occurs by chance. For all these statements are correct, because they are well grounded. Things do in a way, occur by chance, for they occur incidentally and chance is an incidental cause. But strictly it is not the cause--without qualification--of anything; for instance, a housebuilder is the cause of a house; incidentally, a flute-player may be so. (197a, 5-14)

Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents that are capable of good fortune and of moral action generally. Therefore necessarily chance is in the sphere of moral actions. (197b, 1-3)

The spontaneous on the other hand is found both in the lower animals and in many inanimate objects. We say, for example, that the horse came 'spontaneously', because, though his coming saved him, he did not come for the sake of safety. Again, the tripod fell 'of itself', because, though when it fell it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall for the sake of that. Hence it is clear that events which (1) belong to the general class of thing that may come to pass for the sake of something, (2) do not come to pass for the sake of what actually results, and (3) have an external cause, may be described by the phrase 'from chance' if they have the further characteristics of being the objects of deliberate intention and due to agents capable of that mode of action. (197b, 14-23)

--Aristotle: THE PHYSICS

THE AGORA

In January 1971 we described an article by Sarbin and Mancuso on some problems with the concept of "mental illness". Jim Mancuso now writes that "Sarbin and I are writing a piece on the failure of the disease model in 'schizophrenia' and are arguing that the failure is the result of applying mechanism at points where a mechanistic paradigm is inappropriate. We recommend that the appropriate paradigm would be a contextualist paradigm, which would regard the judge and the subject's response to the judge as being as important to the 'diagnosis' as is any condition in the past of the subject. Thus, the quotations you have on the first page [Winter 1972]--from Kantor and Randall--could not have been more appropriate to what we are doing..."

In the fall of 1972 the editor will teach a senior seminar in interbehavioral psychology. Are there other courses currently offered somewhere that are devoted exclusively to this approach?

Charles Maddox is looking for a new position in college teaching and counseling or community psychological services. Prefers West coast. Box 202, Monterey Park, Calif. 91754

Paul Mountjoy is working on a review of Kantor's recent AIM AND PROGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES which will appear in the Journal of the Scientific Laboratories of Denison University.

Steven Brown of the Political Science Department of Kent State sent an offprint authored by himself and Thomas Ungs entitled "Representativeness and the study of political behavior: an application of Q technique to reactions to the Kent State Incident" and published in Social Science Quarterly, Dec. 1970. It was influenced by the position advanced by Egon Brunswik and later elaborated by Kenneth Hammond that the stimulus population should receive the same representative sampling as does the respondents. (Although he is referring to a somewhat different research arrangement we might note that in vol. 2 of SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY Kantor writes "The interbehaviorist rejects the conventional organocentric formula $R = f(S)$ and urges that, since the events consist of a great complex of equally important factors of which the acts of the organism are only some, the investigative procedure of varying one or a few factors at a time applies equally well to responses, stimuli, media, and setting factors" (p. 380).) The approach attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the Fisher-type systematic design. Also of influence on the paper was William Stevenson who wrote in THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR: Q-TECHNIQUE AND ITS METHODOLOGY that "Kantor's principles lie behind the main thesis of the chapters, in a grass-roots matter."

The feature article is by Henry Pronko of Wichita State University. He is a long-time interbehaviorist and is now working on the second edition of his excellent PANORAMA OF PSYCHOLOGY. We are also including in this issue a statement requesting information for inclusion in an Inventory of Drug-Abuse Research Instruments.

NOTES FOR A FRESHMAN:
ON THE FREE WILL VERSUS DETERMINISM CONTROVERSY
N. H. Pronko

To assert that every notion stems from a certain frame of discourse appears to be a self-evident truth too obvious to require mention. Yet the history of science is replete with common-sense truisms that have bedeviled and confounded intellectual progress. I believe that the concept of "free-will versus determinism" is such a concept. Certainly, an extensive literature has generated much heat but little light on a topic which, in its usual form, demand a "lady-or-the-tiger" type of choice. The conventional "either-or" straight jacket states that either there is free will or there isn't,--behavior is either strictly determined or it isn't. Take your choice. You can't have both.

It is my contention that the traditional question of "free will versus determinism" derives only from the traditional psychic orientation prevalent in our culture down through the ages. According to this view, man's thinking, feeling, desiring, tasting, seeing, and creating transpire inside the body in a psychic theater with a "pseudo-location" somewhere within the brain. Such a formulation is, essentially, a one-variable theory according to which only grudging acknowledgement is ascribed to "external stimuli." Heavy stress is given to the drama as it unfolds within "autonomous man" (Skinner). The mind within the body is a kind of deus ex machina which carries the bulk of the theoretical burden in explaining psychological happenings. For example, the female rat simply triggers a "sex drive" within the male rat and it is the internal drive which really gets the credit for propelling (or driving) the male toward the female. Similarly, according to the conventional view, it is the child's "I.Q.", an entity residing somewhere in the child's head, that either facilitates or prevents his answers on an intelligence test. The "I.Q." is the prime mover, the power behind the throne.

According to Handy's (1964) acceptance of the Dewey-Bentley definition of self-action, self-action is found "where things are viewed as acting under their own powers" (p. 55) In extension of their definition, I should also mention such terms as "motives", "intention", "capacity", "talent", "thoughts", "sensations" and "feelings" and "instincts" as still other reification. An older faculty psychology has its "Will." However, whether old or contemporary, all of the above agents that initiate, influence, or cause particular psychological responses have one thing in common,--they are self-actional.

By contrast, the interbehavioral approach views psychological happenings as events. Certainly, the organism and stimulus object hold a nuclear position in the event, as do the participating anatomical and physiological factors of the organism but the media of contact and setting factors and prior interrelated events are also necessary conditions. Since all factors play a role, it is not possible to glorify one factor above another and assign it a special role. As William James somewhere puts it with a prophetic insight, when (in customary phraseology) "a person is reading a book," it can also be stated that "a book is being read by a person." The second statement shows the need for developing a language that will keep all the participating variables of an event in neutral perspective. None has a special or causal significance in the total situation under behavioral observation, because each and every one is essential. Let the reader look at a photo of a galaxy rotating once around its axis every 210 million years in order to experience the futility of ascribing causality to any of the component bodies of the astronomical system. No prime mover or power behind the throne can be detected. It appears to be a field event.

An Interbehavioral orientation, then, would view psychological occurrences as events in which the role of all the component factors would be assessed. Their relationship and the interrelationship of the flow of events is the focus of such an orientation. There is no glorification of the organism over the stimulus object.¹ Consequently, there is no place for a prime mover. In other words, in an interbehavioral approach, the question of free will never comes up any more than it does in explaining the rotation. The free will-determinism controversy is an artefact of a self-actional procedure. If and where, in the distant future, such procedures should be superceded by a field or interbehavioral type of theory, then the question: "does man have a free will or is behavior strictly determined?" will be a philosophical and linguistic fossil. It can only be nurtured by a self-actional approach in which it is embedded. The question never arises in field theory.

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¹In his laudable attempt to displace "autonomous man" Skinner (Beyond Freedom and Dignity) seems to attribute the same autonomy to the environment when he asserts that "environmental contingencies now take over functions once attributed to autonomous man" (p. 215). If it is invalid to attribute autonomy to the organism, is it any more valid to attribute it to the environment? Why the reaction formation? To make the environment too powerful is equivalent to ascribing too much power to the organism as when it is said to "emit behavior."

²The above bibliography was contributed by my colleague, Grant Kenyou, in whose seminar I participated when "Free Will vs. Determinism" was discussed.



Cause and causal relations...may simply be regarded as the interrelations of field components. Certainly, causation can be formulated as correlation. At first, correlations were primarily interested in organizing two-factor systems. Later, the development of partial and multiple correlation techniques amplified the original view. The above paradox is easily resolved by indicating that cause is, after all, only a type of correlation. (p. 156)

According to our hypothesis that causal processes and relations constitute factors in event fields, causal elements consist of objects, their combinations and relations in particular systems. All things existing as parts or features of a certain pattern of happenings may be said to participate as factors in that particular causal field. In some causal events there are few factors, in others many. In case there are many we find great variations in the proportion of those factors that appear more prominent than the remainder. Again, in some events there may be no outstanding factors at all. Whether there are many or few, the factors may be either sequential or coordinate in time. Causal situations must further be differentiated on the basis of the relative availability of the factors for observation and experimental manipulation. In some instances the factors can only be hypothetically named and enumerated. (p. 158)

--J. R. Kantor: PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC, VOL 2

As far as science is concerned, its object is not to discover the ultimate nature of reality, but rather to explore empirical relations and derive useful generalizations from them. The question of what sort of causation is involved in explanation is an unnecessary impediment, a philosophical encumbrance, to the conduct of science. It is futile for the scientist to be concerned with whether an event occurred because some other event compelled it to occur; much more to the point is that an event occurs and its occurrence can be correlated with certain sets of conditions. (p. 7)

--Robert C. Bolles: THEORY OF MOTIVATION

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An Inventory of Drug-Abuse Research Instruments (similar to the Research Reference Files in Alcoholism maintained by Ralph Connor, Eastern Washington State College, Cheney, Washington) has been formed by the undersigned. Those using such instruments are invited to submit a copy of them, as well as pertinent bibliographies and citations of relevant references (articles, reports, and books), for notice in the Inventory. The Inventory serves as an archival source for the collection, storage, duplication, and issuance of pertinent research instruments and related material (e.g., bibliographies) to aid in drug-abuse research and in the development of more such instruments. A copy of the Inventory will be sent to those who do submit such material. Others will be sent a copy of the Inventory upon their request. Requests for instruments contained in the Inventory will be promptly filled. The Inventory is now more than six months old, and includes some fifty items in the areas of: attitudes, access and extent, measurement of subjective effects of drugs, differentiation of abusers, education and knowledge, and program-related evaluation.

Organizations and individuals submitting material to the Inventory will later find that referring all future instrument requests received by them, to the Inventory will save them much time, waste, and expense -- as has been the experience of those utilizing the Research Reference Files. In the same way, they should also help to keep the Inventory up-dated with references, "spin-offs", etc. Second- and subsequent- generation instruments should be promptly filed with the Inventory. Such refinements are of particular value to those in the field.

Since the Inventory exists solely as a service to aid individuals and agencies undertaking research in the area of drug abuse, it is very important that the Inventory's existence and policy be as widely known as possible in order that interested individuals and agencies can avail themselves of the service that the Inventory offers. We would, therefore, especially request those individuals and agencies responsible for communication media in the field (newsletters, bulletins, agency publications) if they would be kind enough to insert notices in their publications of the existence and operation of the Inventory so that others may learn of it. Individuals and agencies may wish to put a copy of this notice on their bulletin boards. Of course, we would be grateful if this announcement would be passed on in as many ways as possible, and that we be notified of others to inform of this archive.

Comments and suggestions will be gratefully received.

Copies of reprints of this notice in journals, bulletins, etc. will also be welcomed.

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Custodian