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

INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
NEWSLETTER

Volume 1
Number 4
August 1970

Salviati: I shall say that that which makes the earth move is a virtue like that by which Mars and Jupiter are moved. . . .

Simplicius: The cause of this is most manifest, and everyone knows that it is gravity.

Salviati: You are out, Simplicius; you should say that everyone knows that it is called gravity, and I do not question about the name but about the essence (essenza) of the thing. Of this you know not a tittle more than you know the essence of the mover of the stars in gyration, unless it be the name that has been put to the former and made familiar and domestic by the many experiences that we have of it every hour of the day.

--Galileo

There is no word in modern philosophy repeated more often than this one (force), none which is defined so inexactly. Its obscurity makes it so handy, that one finds its usage is not restricted to bodies with which we are familiar; an entire school of philosophy today attributes to beings which have never been seen a force which does not manifest itself in any phenomenon.

--Maupertius

THE AGORA

NSF did not regard the Second Interbehavioral Conference favorably enough to grant any funds. This plus the fact that very few people could break away from other commitments and responsibilities forced a cancellation. We hope to carry on the planned projects by correspondence.

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Harry Mahan replies to the criticism of the Newsletter that appeared in issue # 2: "It is not the purpose of any of us, I am sure, to perpetuate any distinction, but rather to eliminate it. The distinction is there already, and though behaviorism should be merging into interbehavioral psychology, it is not doing so. I fear that the author of the quotation must be just a little bit naive. Distinctness is certainly no myth, and there is nothing "straw manish" about it whatsoever. One has only to take a cursory glance at some of the most recent elementary textbooks to see that this is true."

In the May 1970 American Psychologist Bevan makes a couple of comments that intimate a recognition of factors that have long been advocated by interbehaviorists: "I reviewed data demonstrating the influence of context on such things as sensory and perceptual judgment, expectancy and response latency, effective reinforcement magnitude, and free recall. I might also have included reference to affect and motivation and to social judgment....Nowhere is the handicap of the classical physical model clearer than in our failure, until recently, to recognize the significance of the fact that the psychological experiment itself is a case of interactive behavior" (p.443). In the July issue Lachenmeyer states: "As Nagel and Kaplan point out...the reality of human behavior is the interaction between a multiplicity of variables. The most theoretically meaningful questions in the social sciences will probably deal with these interactions." (p.622).

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T.X. Barber has published a new book to be out this month: LSD, MARIJUANA, YOGA, AND HYPNOSIS, Aldine Publishing Company, 529 S. Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60605. He writes "The book is harmonious with the interbehavioral viewpoint." It looks as if he has successfully despooked another traditionally spooky topic. Here is an excerpt from the flyer:"The book differs from previous work on these subjects in that it treats "psychedelics," yoga, and hypnosis as continuous with other known psychological phenomena and as part of social psychology. Moreover, it questions the substance of beliefs--widespread even among psychologists--that "psychedelics," yoga, and hypnosis can bring out unused mental or physical capacities, can heighten awareness or give rise to enhanced creativity, or can produce an altered state of consciousness, a suspension of conventional reality-orientation, changes in "body-image," or changes in perception. These long-held assumptions are critically analyzed in the light of available empirical data and accepted only if they are clearly supported by this data. Complete bibliographies of literature on each subject are included at the conclusion of each chapter. The results of these studies are twofold. First, they show that few of the alleged dangers or enhanced psychological effects of LSD and marijuana exist when carefully studied in the light of empirical data, and the feats and other phenomena associated with so-called yoga and hypnotism can be explained by other factors. Second, the studies illustrate the method of analysis that can most effectively be employed when studying other similar psychological phenomena.

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Some reviews of Kantor's THE SCIENTIFIC EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.2 are beginning to appear. In Science, May 1970 Richard Lowry presents a very confused analysis. He spends much space on the metaphysical status of a toothache, assets that Kantor would consider it a theoretical construction, then declares that it does not have spatial dimensions like a chair. He makes the common erroneous assumption that Kantor is to be identified with John Watson. Finally, he contends that "transpatial" and "fictitious" are not synonymous. In the April 1970 Journal of

the History of the Behavioral Sciences Kenneth Gibson offers a review that indicates a good grasp of what Kantor is saying. He has some reservations about some of his assumptions but is quite fair in the overall appraisal. Robert Weyant has a review of both volumes in the July 1970 issue of Contemporary Psychology. He believes that the work follows the usual path of history of psychology texts rather than that of the stated intent of the author. He considers a major weakness to lie in his rebuke of mentalism as a statement of fact rather than a hypothesis. He finds the work meticulously scholarly, evidencing a great breadth of knowledge, and distinctive in relying on primary sources.

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Harry Mahan will have a notice in the American Psychologist to the following effect: Available to graduate students and psychology majors only: two 1970 publications, "A Primer of Interactional Psychology" (list $1.95) and "A Primer of Interactional Psychology, Part II, Socratic Workbook" (list $1.75) for $2.00 plus 24¢ postage plus sales tax to California addressees. Project Socrates: Department of Psychology, Palomar College, San Marcos, Calif. 92069. Offer expires December 31, 1970. This offer will be good for all readers of the Newsletter.

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The subscription list to the Newsletter has grown a bit. It is now 129.

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So far only two indications have been received of areas of interest for purposes of correspondence and exchange of information. Jot it on a postcard and send to Newsletter so that we can compile a list.

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For features in this issue of the Newsletter we are printing the statement to Dr. Kantor on the conferring of the Doctor of Letters degree to him by The University of Akron and an excerpt from a new book by Rollo Handy: THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUE, Warren H. Green, expected date summer 1970.

DOCTOR OF LETTERS

Presented June 14, 1970

to J. R. KANTOR by

The University of Akron

The author of numerous books, and the founder of the widely respected journal, The Psychological Record, JACOB ROBERT KANTOR, Professor Emeritus of Indiana University, has been active for five decades.

Structuralist psychologists, in ascendence when he began his work, saw the advent of Watsonian Behaviorism and soon thereafter the emergence of Gestalt psychology. Both without and within the academy questions were repeatedly asked, "What is psychology about?", "What is its major concern?" and - in all candor - "How can psychology become a science?"

Winds of doctrine blew heavily from all directions. Professor Kantor withstood these gales and maintained a victorious immunity to the mandates of tradition, ever seeking to match the label "scientific" to the fact of scientific psychology. His endeavors have promoted man's directorship of man.

Hence, it is fitting to honor this Nestor among psychologists

JACOB ROBERT KANTOR

a personage of impressive academic accomplishments whose seminal ideas may well yield the richest harvests in the years ahead.

C. TRANSACTIONALISM

Discussions of the most fruitful way to approach the subject matter of scientific inquiry have generated an extensive literature; many of those issues were mentioned in Chapter I. The topic of concern in the present section is related to a host of issues discussed under such headings as "atomism vs. holism," "reductionism," "reality of societal laws," "methodological individualism," etc. Of immediate concern are questions relating to the unit of analysis chosen for inquiry (especially in the behavioral sciences,) and on the structure and dynamics of that unit. The view taken here is closely related to the transactionalism of John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, to Norman Cameron's biosocial approach, and to J.R. Kantor's interactionism.12 For present purposes, using the Dewey-Bentley terminology seems desirable.

Dewey and Bentley differentiate sharply between self-action, interaction, and transaction. Their preliminary account follows:

> "Self-action: where things are viewed as acting under their own powers.
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> Inter-action: where thing is balanced against thing in casual interconnection.

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12. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known, Boston, Beacon Press, 1949, paperback ed., 1960. Norman Cameron, The Psychology of Behavior Disorders: A Biosocial Interpretation, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947, J.R. Kantor, Psychology and Logic, Bloomington, Principia Press, Vol. I, 1945, Vol. II, 1950. Although Dewey and Bentley differentiate sharply between a transactional and an interactional approach, there is a strong family resemblance between Kantor's interaction and their transaction. The complex of issues discussed in this section is discussed in much more detail in my Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences, Ch.3.

> Trans-action: where systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to 'elements' or other presumptively detachable or independent 'entities,' 'essences,' or 'realities,' and without isolation of presumptively detachable 'relations' from such detachable 'elements.' "13

They argue that a self-actional approach dominated early physics, and is illustrated by the belief that rain is caused by Jupiter Pluvius. 'Substance,' 'essence,' 'actor,' 'creator,' etc., are terms often made heavy use of in self-actional approaches. Galileo's inquiries marked the overthrow of that approach in physics. In the behavioral science areas, those who put primary emphasis on motives, intentions and purposes often use a self-actional framework. Interactionism tended to dominate in scientific inquiry until recently, and is typified by Newtonian mechanics. Many such interactional framework still work efficiently in that warranted assertions emerge. On the other hand, in many areas of inquiry the use of that framework produces problems that are primarily methodogenic (i.e., artifacts of the method), as is illustrated by epistemological systems which generate problems as to how mind and matter, assumed to exist in separate ontological realms, can interact.14

In many situations transactionalism seems a more appropriate framework for inquiry. Take the case of a man hunting a rabbit:

> "No one would be able successfully to speak of the hunter and the hunted as isolated with respect to hunting. Yet it is just as absurd to set up hunting as an event in isolation from the spatio-temporal connections of all the components."

Dewey and Bentley go on to compare a billiard game with a loan:

> "If we confine ourselves to the problem of the balls on the billiard table, they can profitably be presented and studied interactionally. But a cultural account of the game in its full spread of social growth and human adaptations is already transactional. And if one player loses money to another we cannot even find words in which to organize a fully interactional account by assembling together primarily separate items. Borrower cannot borrow without lender to lend, nor lender lend without borrower to borrow, the loan being a transaction that is identifiable only in the wider transaction of the full legal-commercial system in which it is present as occurrence."15.

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13. Dewey and Bentley, op. cit., p.108.
14. Ibid., pp.108-112. I have borrowed the term 'methodogenic' from Marvin Farber, Basic Issues of Philosophy, New York, Harper & Row, 1968, pp.83 ff.
15. Dewey and Bentley, op. cit., p.133.

In the investigation of many processes, the inquirer himself in common process with what is being inquired into. For present purposes, then, 'transaction' designates the full ongoing process in a field in which the inquirer may be in reciprocal relation with many aspects and phases of that field. No mysticism should be attached to 'field'; it names the cluster of connected things and events found in mutual (reciprocal) relation. In many situations, a methodological emphasis on presumed self-actors, or on presumed separates interacting, does not seem as fruitful in facilitating prediction as does an emphasis on the transactional system as a whole.

The holistic emphasis on a field or system in which the aspects and phases are in common process is sometimes associated with a "tender-minded" or "hard-science" approach of more atomistic emphases. The view chosen here combines a hard-science, skeptical, tough-minded outlook with a holistic frame of reference, because such an approach seems the most fruitful for inquiry. For example, I see nothing at all mystical or tender-minded about viewing loans, borrowers, and lenders as aspects of a common transactional framework. Indeed, leaving out the "system" in which the behavior occurs is surely to make unnecessary problems and difficulties. Separating the borrower from the loaning transaction does not make inquiry more scientific; it tends to obscure some important relations.

As applied to measurement, a transactional framework leads one to emphasize what often is ignored by philosophers: the methodological and other problems of the data-collector or person who is trying to measure something. Viewed transactionally, many aspects or phases of the whole transaction have their importance, including not only questions about the formal structure of the scale used and related problems, but the problems of calibrating the instruments used, controlling the observation of the results, etc. This issue will be discussed further in the context of fundamental vs. derived measurement; for the present I will only point out that having a scale characterized by an impressively neat and tidy set of formal properties may be of no use at all to an investigator if the conditions encountered make it impossible for him to exercise adequate control over the observations necessary for the use of that scale.