

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST

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QUOTATIONS

It has become too easy to see that luckless men of the past lived by mistaken, even absurd beliefs; so we may fail in a decent respect for them, and forget that the historians of the future will point out that we too lived by myths.

-Herbert J. Muller

When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions.

-Ludwig Wittgenstein

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The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly publication of news, information, discussion, journal and book notes, book reviews, comments, and brief articles pertaining to interbehavioral psychology -- a contextualistic, integrated-field approach to the natural science of behavior.

The newsletter publishes professional communications that fall between informal correspondence and colloquia, and formal archival publication. As such, the newsletter supplements contemporary journals dedicated to basic and applied research, to the history and philosophy of the behavioral sciences, and to professional issues in the field. The newsletter strongly encourages submission of notes about current professional activities of its subscribers, news and observations about interbehavioral psychology and related perspectives, comments on journal articles and books of interest, more extended book reviews, and brief articles. All submissions should be sent in triplicate to the editor and should conform to the style described in the publication manual of the American Psychological Association (3rd edition).


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NOTES FROM THE FIELD

The Winter, 1985, issue of The Psychological Record saw a flurry of articles by 1984 newsletter subscribers. Alphabetically, the authors and their articles were: STEPHEN T. HIGGINS and EDWARD K. MORRIS, "A Comment on Contemporary Definitions of Reinforcement as a Behavioral Process"; JAY MOORE, "Choice and the Conditioned Reinforcing Strength of Informative Stimuli"; PAUL T. MOUNTJOY and DOUGLAS H. RUBEN, "Historical Note: On Validity Measurement of Hannibal's Crossing the Alps"; RICHARD PISACRETA and Kevin Witt, "Movement as the Discriminative Stimulus in Several Conditional Discriminations"; and WILLIAM STEPHENSON, "Perspectives in Psychology: Integration in Clinical Psychology."

As most readers know, the annual meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA) has been receptive to interbehavioral psychologists through the years, and this year's convention in Columbus (May 24-27) is no exception: 46 of this newsletter's 1984 subscribers are listed in the program -- AMADO, BAER, BICKEL, BIJOU, BRADY, BRYSON-BROCKMAN, BURGIO, BUSKIST, DAURELLE, DELPRATO, EPSTEIN, FOX, GARDNER, GLENN, GOLA, HANSOR, HAWKINS, HEMINGWAY, HIGGINS, HINELINE, HOLMES, ISREAL, IVANIC, IVERSEN, JOHNSON, KIRBY, LARSEN, KOHLENBERG, LEFRANCOIS, MOORE, MORRIS, MOUNTJOY, MULICK, PANIAGUA, PARROTT, POWELL, RAY, ROSALES-RUIZ, RUBEN, STEVENSON, TODD, ULMAN, WEBER, WHITLEY, WRUBLE, and WYATT. We will list those papers that are particularly interbehavioral in the summer issue of the newsletter. See THE AGORA for further interbehavioral news at ABA.



THE AGORA

We apologize for the delay in sending out the Winter issue, but we had just switched over to another word processing system. The new system -- the Editor and his Personal Computer -- will be more flexible and efficient, evidence for which is the mailing of the Spring issue more closely on time. The publication cycle in the future will be January 1 (Winter), April 1 (Spring), July 1 (Summer), and October 1 (Fall).

In the present issue, we highlight news of a possible interbehavioral organization, interbehavioral activity at the upcoming meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Journal and Book Notes, and an article by Noel W. Smith, "A Double or a Single World?"

If we could ask one thing of the subscribers it would be that you submit journal and book notes. Many readers have commented on the value of these notes; in addition we would like to have a more diverse authorship than to date. Also, whenever you have news for "Notes from the Field," please send that information on to us. Brief articles and book reviews are always welcome. Now to the news.

An Interbehavioral Organization

As noted in the last issue of the newsletter, Dennis Delprato will chair a meeting for interested subscribers of the newsletter, and others with interbehavioral views, in Columbus, Ohio, following the Association for Behavior Analysis convention. The meeting is scheduled for Monday, May 27, at 4:00 in the Champagne Room of the Hyatt Regency. This meeting is being held to discuss possible interest in an interbehavioral organization, and the form and function such an organization might take. The nature of any eventual organization has implications for a number of important matters, ranging from publications (newsletters, journals, and books), to various financial considerations, and to an annual meeting. We urge all interested readers to attend.

The Association for Behavior Analysis

In addition to the list of subscribers presenting papers at the ABA convention, we should also mention several other items related to the upcoming meeting.

First, Linda Parrott and Rick Amado will

co-chair the Interbehavioral Psychology Special Interest Group (SIG) meeting, to be held on Sunday at 1:00. The meeting is an important one -- SIG officers will be elected and plans made for future ABA programs and activities.

Second, the Interbehavioral SIG will join the other ABA SIG's for poster displays beginning with the ABA Social Hour on Friday evening, May 24, from 7:00-9:00. Please drop by.

Third, Linda Parrott will be conducting an ABA seminar entitled "Introduction to Interbehaviorism and Interbehavioral Psychology." The description of the course is as follows:

The object of this seminar is to provide participants with an introduction to the Philosophy of Interbehaviorism and Interbehavioral Psychology.

Philosophical topics will include the nature of philosophy, specificity logic, and the role of philosophy in scientific system building. Psychological topics will include the system of

Interbehavioral Psychology and the analysis of complex human behaviors, such as perceptual activity, imagining, linguistic activity, and remembering, from an interbehavioral perspective.

Participants will have opportunities to identify the assumptions underlying common descriptions of psychological events with the aim of assessing their compatibility with the postulates of Interbehaviorism, and will practice analyzing psychological events from an interbehavioral perspective.

Recommended Education/Experience:

Enrolled in graduate school or post-graduate. Level: Introductory. Seminar fee: \$20; materials fee: \$2.

For information on enrollment in this seminar, or about registration for the convention in general, contact the Society for the Advancement of Behavior Analysis, Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008 (616-383-0452, 9:00am-3:00pm, EST).

Subscriptions

We are always interested in new (and renewed) subscribers. Please promote subscriptions as best you can, especially those from institutions. Subscription information is listed inside the front cover of the newsletter.

Although we have acquired 21 new subscribers to this volume of the

newsletter, we have acquired but one since the last issue -- Rocio Hernandez Pozo. Potentially more troublesome is that --- subscribers have not renewed. Some of these individuals were holdovers from Volume 11 whose subscription status was never settled, but some were new subscribers last year. If you know of someone who would be an interested reader but who is not a subscriber, please urge them to consider entering a subscription. As for more active measures, we will soon have available new subscription forms for subscribers to post, distribute, and send out with reprint requests. More about this in the next issue.

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BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES

- Goldfield, E. C. (1983). The ecological approach to perceiving as a foundation for understanding and development of knowing in infancy. Developmental Review, 3, 371-404.
- Horowitz, F. D. (1983). A behavioral alternative to an ecological approach to understanding the development of knowing in infancy: A commentary. Developmental Review, 3, 405-409.
- Goldfield, E. C., & Shaw, R. (1984). Affordances and infant learning: A reply to Horowitz. Developmental Review, 4, 378-386.

An interesting exchange has recently taken place between "ecological" and "behavioral" views on infant knowing. The exchange makes clear the current attempts of both the ecological (Goldfield) and behavioral psychology (Horowitz) to adopt a truly contextualistic metatheory. In both cases, these moves are in the right direction, but both miss the mark, and hence both miss what is good in the other, at least in part. Goldfield's ecological perspective is offered as an alternative to behavioral and cognitive (representational) views, yet cannot seem to shake the mentalism of information-processing accounts in its analysis of "affordances" and related ecological constraints. Horowitz's behavioral perspective properly analyzes knowing as behavior, yet restricts the analysis of constraints to biological limitations on conditioning.

This brief summary does injustice to the

arguments actually presented by Goldfield and by Horowitz. The interested reader is urged to consult the primary sources. (Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)

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- Wooley, S. C., Blackwell, B., & Winget, C. (1978). A learning theory model of chronic illness behavior: Theory, treatment, and research. Psychosomatic Medicine, 40, 379-401.
- Blackwell, B. (1981). Biofeedback in a comprehensive behavioral medicine program. Biofeedback and Self-Regulation, 6, 445-472.

In 1978, Wooley et al. published a pioneering paper describing their work at the Psychosomatic Unit of the Cincinnati General Hospital. Their approach was innovative because of the "learning theory" framework within which they operated.

Blackwell (1981) has since provided a brief account of the evolution of the Psychosomatic Unit. First, Blackwell notes the demise of the psychoanalytic orientation of the Unit that once was "supported by one of the strongest psychoanalytic facilities in the United States." Psychoanalysis was replaced because it failed -- "benefits seldom persisted in the face of real-life situations outside the hospital." Clearly, the events at the Psychosomatic Unit are an ominous warning for those who might still hold to psychoanalysis as the wave of the future.

Second, Blackwell's account suggests a humble hypothesis for those interested in an evolutionary approach, especially as it relates to the delivery of behavioral services. The hypothesis is that J. R. Kantor's efforts participated, in part, in the evolution of modern behavioral medicine. The basis of this hypothesis is Blackwell's clear mention of the role of Dr. Fred Kanfer in the change that went on at the Psychosomatic Unit. In Blackwell's words:

I was eager to expand in this new direction [a behavioral "learning theory model"] and fortunate to find one of the country's leading cognitive psychologists in Cincinnati, Dr. Fred Kanfer, who was willing to consult with the unit and help us retrain our psychoanalytically oriented nursing

staff. (p. 454)

Kanfer has elsewhere acknowledged the influence of Kantor's work on his innovative contributions to clinical behavior therapy. It is worthwhile to note that despite Kanfer's being labeled a cognitive psychologist in the passage above, he is not a traditional "cognitive" psychologist or an advocate of "cognitive behaviorism." (Dennis J. Delprato, Eastern Michigan University).

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Zuriff, G. E. (1985). Behaviorism: A conceptual reconstruction. New York: Columbia University Press.

Zuriff's recent book serves up a feast of scholarship, erudition, and some scientific behaviorism. All the proper entrees are available, and most readers will find a little something suitable to their palates.

Interbehavioral psychology, though, was served up as a side-dish, at best, and the treatment was unappetizing. Although Zuriff offers references to 15 of Professor Kantor's papers (no books) throughout the text, Professor Kantor received just a single one-page listing in the index, and interbehavioral psychology received but a single three-page listing. Both were indexed to a brief section ostensibly devoted to interbehavioral psychology (pp. 108-111), but which actually merely focused on the argument that "the environment is...not a static independent force outside behavior" (p. 108).

Two aspects of this section were particularly odd tasting. First, Zuriff seems to regard "interaction" as no more than mechanical give-and-take, which is not at all the meaning of the interbehavioral perspective on strong reciprocal interaction within a contextualistic framework.

Second, Professor Kantor's views are said to be similar to those of Bandura's social learning theory and of Skinner's operant theory. Zuriff's insight into the (implicit) interactionism of operant theory is quite nice, but to equate Bandura's mind-body interactionism with interbehaviorism is to misconstrue the natural science approach to interactionism. This misconstrual is further displayed in the mix of citations

Zuriff provides in a footnote to this section:

The classic formulation of this argument is by Dewey (1896), and it recurs in various versions in Bode (1914, 1917, 1922), Tawney (1915), Davies (1926), Bentley (1941), Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960, p. 30), Bowers (1973), Bandura (1977a, ch. 1; 1978), and Bijou (1979). (p. 297)

Interbehavioral psychology did not receive its just desserts. (Edward K. Morris, University of Kansas)

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We strongly encourage readers to submit brief journal and book notes for this section of the newsletter. When you do submit material, please include the full address of the author(s), for we have begun the practice of sending out copies of the newsletter.

* * *

ARTICLE

A Double or a Single World?

Noel W. Smith

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It is a widespread view in traditional circles of western thought that the world of reality is known only by transformation through some inscrutable mind or consciousness. This view is expressed by the British empiricist assertion that we receive sense data from the world and must then interpret it in the mind. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant went further, and held that the world is forever unknowable: We know only the mental phenomena that result from input from the world. The two German physiologists, Johannes Muller and Herman Helmholtz, gave this position a physiological form by declaring that we respond only to our nerve endings as they interpret the world. That is, we know only the world of our nervous system.

This physiologized Kantian view is prevalent in psychology today. Writing in the American Psychologist, Attneave (1974) stated that it is naive to assume that we experience the world, for all we actually

experience is what comes through our senses and gets transformed by it. This same viewpoint is maintained in the now highly fashionable cognitive and information processing models in psychology. According to these models, the organism perceives sense data on the basis of computer mechanisms and constructs an internal representation of the world. Sampson (1981), also writing in the American Psychologist, tells us that there is "disparity between what is 'out there' and its internal representation," for "behavior is a function of the subjective world as transformed and represented internally" (p. 730).

This view may be called the doctrine of the double world. It assumes that there are two worlds -- one that is independent of the organism and another that is created inside the organism. This doctrine is not based on any observation of the two worlds, but on the theological heritage we have received from the Church Fathers, such as Tertullian, Origin, and Gregory, who verbally constructed the transcendental soul. Through the further word-magic of Muller and Helmholtz, and others who followed, the soul became the brain, which gave this theological construct a pseudo-legitimacy in the realm of science. This homunculean brain is said to interpret the world; to excrete colors, intelligence, and thoughts; and to direct our every activity.

There is, however, an alternative to this double world doctrine of theology and pseudo-science. The alternative existed prior to the invention of the Church Fathers, and is well expressed in Aristotle. In his analysis of perception, Aristotle held that seeing does not occur in the organism, but involves the joint activity of two potentials. The eye has the potential to see, and the flower has the potential to be seen. The actualization of the two potentials together is the seeing event or act of seeing. Thus, for Aristotle, seeing is an interaction or interrelationship -- it is not a transformation. A transformation or representation inside the organism would require a seer (sic) for that representation, and so on in an infinite regression.

In recent times, some phenomenologists have taken a position similar to that of Aristotle. For example, Giorgi (1975)

argues that the sleekness of an airplane is not in the plane or in the observer, but is a relationship between the two. Kvale and Grenness (1967) argue that "the necessity of an 'inner man' to guide behavior falls away when behavior is conceived as man's meaningful relatedness to the world. Behavior is the relation between man and the world, neither can be defined independent of the other" (p. 137). Skinner (1963), too, opposes the double world doctrine. He calls it the "copy theory" and states, "At some point the organism must do more than create duplicates. It must see, hear, smell, and so on, and the seeing, hearing and smelling must be forms of actions rather than reproductions" (p. 954).

A well developed systematic approach within psychology that also rejects the theologically derived double world and that insists on beginning with observable events is J. R. Kantor's interbehavioral psychology, which began about 1920. Interbehavioral psychology starts with an organism and an object in interaction. This interaction is in continuity with previous interactions, that is, the history of experiences, and occurs in a setting or context. Objects have meanings developed from, and constituted by, those previous interactions. The psychological event is not localized in the brain, or in the heart, or in the endocrine system, or even in the entire organism. Neither is it in the object, or in its meaning, or in the setting, or in the past history of interactions. The psychological event is constituted by the entire field of events, and that field cannot be reduced to any one element. The psychological event is the way in which an organism evolves historical relationships with its surroundings. It cannot be reduced to physics, biology, culture, or any other factors in the field. It has its own principles of operation that are different from any of the components.

If one wants to speak of mind and consciousness, they are to be defined, not in terms of invisible entities or internal agents, but rather concretely in terms of this interbehavioral field of relationships or, more specifically, as cognitive consummatory reaction systems that are not closely tied to precurrent reaction systems as are habits (see Kantor, 1924, pp. 444-445). Such terms as mind and consciousness with their unsavory

load of historical meanings are, however, best discarded. Just as a hypothetical mind or homunculean brain becomes superfluous when a field of relationships is identified, so too is a second world contained in them superfluous. The organism and its functional inseparability from its surrounding objects is the only world that has any concrete referent. The field system does not need, and has no room for, a second world, the one of verbal construction.

But are not thinking, believing, feeling, etc. a different world, a mental world? Such an assumption is unnecessary. Interbehavioral psychology deals with all human activities as concrete interactions in a field. For example, there is no difference in principle between reading aloud and reading silently. Likewise, there is no difference in principle in doing arithmetic aloud or doing it silently, despite the fact that we refer to the latter as "mental arithmetic." It is curious that we refer to silent reading, but to mental arithmetic. Orientals who learn to do arithmetic on an abacus involving patterns of finger movements use the same finger movements when doing arithmetic without the abacus. Is this mental arithmetic? Finger arithmetic? It is clear that various parts of the body such as lips, tongue, and fingers can be functional components in reading or arithmetic; their degree of activation is the degree of overtness or covertness of the activity. There is no evidence for such a dichotomy as mental and physical.

But is not an image mental? Is it not devoid of physical properties? As Sartre, the French radical phenomenologist, has indicated, an image is not a thing, but an act. It is a certain way of relating. To interbehavioral psychology, similarly, there is no image, but rather an act of imaging. It is subtle or covert activity of the organism in interaction with a substitute stimulus (Kantor, 1929). If I ask you to imagine eating cherry pie, you can to some extent taste the pie. You are interacting not directly with cherry pie, but with my suggestion about substitutes for it. On the organism side of the interaction, there may be some covert activity such as taste bud responses and increased salivation. The interaction also involves your past history with cherry pie and other events in the field.

There is no inner man or inner woman (homunculean brain) who tastes the pie and interprets it for you, and who constitutes a separate world or separate reality from the "real world" of you in the act of actually eating the cherry pie. There is just the one-and-the-same-you-and-your-actions, however subtle, complex, and rich they may be.

The claim for a double world has often rested on individual differences and on illusions. If we do not all see, hear, taste, and smell the same thing, does this not indicate the unknowability of the "real" world? On the contrary, it indicates only that interactions differ from person to person, and even change with the same individual as successive contacts are made with objects. Individuality is true for other characteristics of the world as well. Snowflakes, ocean waves, oak trees, and other things come in infinite varieties, and so do their interactions with still other objects. All of nature consists of constantly changing events and relationships, and the sciences must deal with these changes whether they occur in stars, physiological processes, or human behavior.

But if the perceiving involves knowing, and it keeps changing for a given individual, and is different for different individuals, then how can we ever know with certainty? Probably there is much that we can never know. But as we continue to engage in such interactions as perceiving, thinking, judging, and reasoning, we improve our knowledge. We make errors and correct them. We also develop instrumentation and refined methods of observation as, for example, interjudgmental reliability. The contention here is that the world is quite knowable, even if imperfectly. Once again, we can fall back on Aristotle: The joint activity of a knowing organism and a knowable world is the actualization of knowing.

Is the world illusory and unknowable? If so, there would be no point to science. It would be a mere compounding of illusions. With our eyes, we perceive a tree. With a microscope, we perceive its cellular structure. Neither is illusory. From my position, I may perceive a tree as pointed at the top, and from your position you may perceive it as rounded. Again, neither is illusory -- merely incomplete.

The rattlesnake perceives its victim because of its sensitivity to infrared radiation produced by the warm-blooded rodent. My world is not distorted or erroneous or illusory because I am insensitive to infrared radiation as a medium of contact; it is merely incomplete. And illusions do exist. Psychologists are fond of experimenting with them. But illusions are not misperceptions so much as perceptions under unusual or misleading conditions. The very fact that we can recognize illusions as such, and take the necessary steps to differentiate them from what is actual, indicates that we are not forever the dupes of illusion.

Individual differences and illusions are all part of the same single world. They provide no support for the contention of a double world. We may never fully know the reality of anything, but we can be reasonably sure that we know some aspects of it, for it is the double world that is an illusion.

Footnote

This paper was presented at Local Conversations in the Disciplines, State University of New York, Plattsburgh, April 24, 1982. References have been added here, along with slight editing, to accommodate them. A few parts of the paper were taken from a subsequent chapter by Smith (1983).

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