

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST

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QUOTATION

A fact is like a sack -- it won't
stand up till you've put something in
it.

- H. A. Carr (1961)

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of Interbehavioral Psychology

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The Interbehaviorist is a quarterly publication of news, information, discussion, journal and book notes, book reviews, comments, and brief articles pertaining to interbehavioral psychology -- a contextualistic, integrated-field approach to the natural science of behavior.

The newsletter publishes professional communications that fall between informal correspondence and colloquia, and formal archival publication. As such, the newsletter supplements contemporary journals dedicated to basic and applied research, to the history and philosophy of the behavioral sciences, and to professional issues in the field. The newsletter strongly encourages submission of notes about current professional activities of its subscribers, news and observations about interbehavioral psychology and related perspectives, comments on journal articles and books of interest, more extended book reviews, and brief articles. All submissions should be sent in triplicate to the editor and should conform to the style described in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (3rd edition).

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
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THE AGORA

This issue of the newsletter has been delayed not for lack of material, but for the temporary lack of an editor. As for the newsletter, although the submission rate has not been high, we continue to have a sufficient amount of material for publication. We welcome of course -- even encourage -- additional material of the sort suitable to our broadly stated purposes.

As for the editor, his bicycle suffered an accident and, as a consequence, so did he. The bike underwent cycle-analysis, but the cycle-analyst pronounced the breakdown complete and irreparable. In contrast, the editor received more of an interbehavioral diagnosis and treatment, and is a field factor once again.

The ABA Convention

Interbehavioral participation at the May, 1988 meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA) was strongly reinforced, if such a thing may be said in these pages.

The two interbehavioral symposia -- "An Introduction to Interbehavioral Psychology" and "Psychological Linguistics: Examples of Research and Theory" -- were well attended, to the point of standing-room-only in the case of the former. Audience members at the "Introduction" symposium suggested that those papers be published in the newsletter, and we are pleased to do so in reverse serial order, beginning in this issue with Linda J. Hayes's contribution, "An Introduction to Interbehavioral Psychology: Interbehavioral Philosophy." The other papers, which provide (a) an introduction to the interbehavioral field, (b) a biographical sketch of J. R. Kantor, and (c) commentary on all of the preceding, will be published in subsequent issues of the newsletter.

About a dozen people attended the ABA Interbehavioral Special Interest Group business meeting, chaired by Linda. Among the issues discussed were next year's interbehavioral program at ABA and means for encouraging further student participation. Two symposia were tentatively planned, entitled "Recent Advances in Interbehavioral Psychology: Research, Application, and Theory" and "Research and Application with Multiple Response Methodologies." In addition to

these discussions, Linda announced that she and Emilio Ribes-Inesta will edit the Fall issue of APA Division 25's newsletter, Behavior Analysis, which will be a celebratory issue in honor of the 100th year of J. R. Kantor's birth.

Next year's ABA convention will be held in Milwaukee, WI from May 25 to 28. If you are interested in attending, presenting, or registering, please contact: Shery Chamberlain, ABA/SABA, Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008 (616-387-4495)

Mexican Congress on Behavior Analysis

The 10th annual Mexican Congress on Behavior Analysis will be held in Hermosillo, March 15-17, 1989. The meeting will cover basic and applied research with humans and nonhumans, and conceptual and theoretical analyses of behavior.

Submissions should be sent to Elisa E. Corrales Vargas, the Congress coordinator, by December 15. Her address is: Congress Organizing Committee, Apartado Postal 794, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico (Phone: 621-2-69-96). Papers to be delivered in English should be submitted in their final version so that a brief translation can be prepared ahead of time. Presentations should not exceed 20 minutes in length.

Additional information about the Congress may be obtained from Victor Corral Verdugo, Universidad de Sonora, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico (Phone: 621-7-31-81, Ext. 104).

A Query from the Field

Noel Smith (SUNY-Plattsburgh) writes that, while working on a new project, he prepared some material that left him concerned. He would welcome responses to the following passage and to the questions that follow.

The psychological field consists solely of concrete things and events, consisting of the organism, response and response functions, stimulus object and stimulus functions, setting, interactional history, and media of contact. These apparently exhaust the relevant categories, but if others can be identified, they could be added.

One possibility is the reinforcement principle. But this may be a special case of stimulus function/response function and interactional history. Another possibility is Kuo's "behavior gradient" -- Kuo's concepts being fully compatible with interbehaviorism, though limited to nonhumans. The behavior gradient is the extent to which any particular biological component participates in a given interaction.

With the field factors, it is possible to develop a functional description of all psychological events on a metatheoretical level. This does not, of course, replace empirical research that can provide information for augmenting the functional descriptions. Interbehaviorism, in turn, can guide research to investigate multiplex factors and to keep interpretations consistent with observations.

1. Can reinforcement be subsumed as stimulus function/response function?
2. Is it appropriate to refer to interbehavioral accounts of psychological events as "functional descriptions"?
3. Are the field factors sufficient to account for all psychological events, even metatheoretically? If so, how could this be demonstrated other than by dealing with them one by one?
4. Is interbehavioral psychology a metatheory? Metaprogram? Metadescription? Metaconstruct? Meta-anything?

Delprato on Powers

Dennis J. Delprato (Eastern Michigan University) writes that that one reason for interbehavioral psychologists to examine W. T. Powers' control system theory is that the theory may provide a framework for empirical work to be done within the context of the abstract double-headed arrow (RS-MS).

To introduce Powers' views, the Comments section of this issue presents Powers' elaboration of this idea, which he has agreed to share with readers of this

newsletter. Following that, a brief sketch is offered of Powers' feedback analysis of the question of the relationship between organism and environment; the latter is an abstract of a paper Powers presented at the Annual Meeting of the Control System Group, Kenosha, WI (October, 1987).

For some key references to Powers' Control System Theory, see:

Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago: Aldine.

Powers, W. T. (1978). Quantitative analysis of purposive systems: Some spadework at the foundations of scientific psychology.

Psychological Review, 85, 417-435.

Powers, W. T. (1979). The nature of robots. Part 2: Simulated control system. Byte, 4(7), 134-152.

New Subscribers

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Quotation

This issue's quotation is from H. A. Carr (1961, p. 9), who himself quotes from one of Pirandello's characters. The quotation was found in R. Schafer's (1976, p. 5), A New Language for Psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University Press. Schafer's views, by the way, are interbehavioral in orientation. For a review of the book, see Vicki Lee's (1988) comments in the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 49, 429-436. For a review of Schafer's book and some of his other work, see Dennis Delprato's (1981) earlier comments in the newsletter (Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 3-6).

BOOK AND JOURNAL NOTES

Anastasi, A. (1972). Reminiscences of a differential psychologist. In T. S. Krawiec (Ed.), The psychologists (Vol 1, pp. 3-37). New York: Oxford University Press.

Anne Anastasi (1972, p. 8) characterizes J. R. Kantor's work and recollects about his influence on her as follows:

Another influence that I consider to be of primary importance was more indirect. It is the influence of J. R. Kantor of Indiana University. In some ways, Kantor resembles Hollingworth. He, too, is one of the last of the generalists in psychology, with a remarkable breadth of knowledge extending over psychology and related fields. He, too, formulated a comprehensive theoretical system for psychology. And he, too, pursued his interests with vigor and independence. It is, however, his emphasis on the role of environment and his explication of the specific operation of environmental factors in individual development that I recognize as the predominant influence on my own work.

Kantor's influence on Anastasi stemmed not just from her study of his work, but also from contacts with his views through John Foley Porter, Jr., of Bloomington, Indiana, whom she married in 1933. Porter had been one of Kantor's students at Indiana University.

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Hillner, K. P. (1984). History and systems of modern psychology: A conceptual approach. New York: Gardner Press.

Hillner discusses J. R. Kantor's interbehaviorism (pp. 294-295) in a chapter entitled "Dialectical Psychology." His brief commentary reads as follows:

Jacob Kantor (1888-) is an American behaviorist who developed an overall system of psychology that is reminiscent of Riegelian dialectics (see Riegel, 1975, 1976a, 1976b). Kantor's system is more philosophical than actual: It is empirical, but has

not served as an impetus to actual experimental research. Kantor has no formal concept of dialectical interaction; however, he does stress an explicit environmental x organismic interaction. Unlike the typical behaviorist, Kantor places equal stress on the stimulus and response such that they constitute an emergent entity: Behavior exists in space and time and should be analyzed in terms of segments that are related to functional stimulus events. The conceptual correspondence between Kantor's system and Riegel's dialectics is so pervasive that the former even includes the notion of implicit interactions, such as thinking, reasoning, and imagining, that involve invisible substitute stimuli: The concept of an implicit interaction is analogous to that of an internal dialogue.

Riegel, K. F. (1975). Toward a dialectical theory of development. Human Development, 18, 50-64.

Riegel, K. F. (1976a). The dialectics of human development. American Psychologist, 31, 689-700.

Riegel, K. F. (1976b). Psychology in development and history. New York: Plenum.

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Kidd, R. V., & Natalicio, L. (1982). Toward a radical interbehaviorism. Interamerican Journal of Psychology, 15, 123-131.

Readers interested in parallels and anti-parallels between interbehavioral psychology and radical behaviorism might consult this brief article. The abstract reads as follows:

A rapprochement between interbehavioral psychology as described by J. R. Kantor and the experimental analysis of behavior as described by B. F. Skinner is proposed. The extant similarities and differences between these two approaches to the scientific study of behavior are identified and an analytic field approach is described as paradigmatic for their reconciliation.

COMMENTS

From the Standpoint of Control System Theory


William T. Powers

On $R \leftrightarrow S$

The double-headed arrow joining $R \leftrightarrow S$ should really be drawn like this:



The two paths are not simply the same path taken in reverse: One is the link from S through the organism to R, the other from R through the environment to S. This gives you two equations with two unknowns, hence you can solve for both unknowns. Add a disturbance and a reference signal, and spell out the connecting functions (f and g), and you have a control system:




$$R = g(S - S^*) \text{ and } S = f(R + D)$$

The Asymmetry of Control

The circular relationship between organisms and environments is well known: Behavior affects the environment and the environment affects behavior. On superficial consideration, we apparently have no choice: The organism controls its environment or, equally well, the environment controls the organism, but this is not true.

To see that there is asymmetry in this relationship we can boil the situation down to its simplest elements. The figure below depicts two triangles representing agencies. The points are the outputs. The side opposite each point is the input surface, which receives two input effects. One effect is constant -- the inputs labeled r and d. The other effect is simply the outputs of the other triangle, labeled respectively p and a. The output a is some constant K times the sum of inputs r and p, and the output p is another constant E times the sum of inputs a and d.



If $a = K(r + p)$ and $p = E(a + d)$, then we have a feedback situation. For this combination to be stable, the feedback must be negative, so K and E must have opposite signs. That is not, however, the asymmetry of which I speak, as either one can be negative. To see the asymmetry, we must solve the system equations as a simultaneous pair, to get

$$a = \frac{KE}{1 - KE} (d + r/E), \text{ and}$$

$$p = \frac{KE}{1 - KE} (r + d/K).$$

If K and E are both very large numbers, one negative, then $a = d$ and $p = r$. Each agency makes the other's output match the "loose" input -- the reference signal. Thus, each agency controls the output of the other, and symmetry exists. But if K is a large number and E around unity, the agency with K in it will make the other's output match its own reference signal, r, but the other agency will not be able to maintain the same relationship. The agency with K in it is the organism. Organisms are highly sensitive to inputs, but environments do not correspondingly amplify the inputs that affect them. Normally there is a loss of effect: E is generally less than unity. The organism's reference signal, r, thus does affect the environment, while the environment's "reference signal" -- the disturbance d -- does not have a corresponding amount of effect on the organism. Organisms control environments, but not vice versa.

Philosophical Implications of the Interbehavioral Field

Linda J. Hayes

University of Nevada-Reno

Kantor's philosophy is articulated as a relatively large set of postulates concerning issues ranging in scope from the very broad to the very narrow. They appear in one form or another in numerous articles and in several books, among the latter: Interbehavioral Philosophy (Kantor, 1981), Interbehavioral Psychology (Kantor, 1958), and Psychology and Logic, Vol. I & II (Kantor, 1945, 1950). It is not my plan to reiterate these postulates. Instead, I will try to elucidate interbehaviorism by drawing attention to only a few of the most unusual implications of the field concept in interbehavioral psychology. It is my intention to be true to the system as proposed by Kantor in making this abstraction; however, some issues are necessarily featured at the expense of others in the process of abstraction. With that apology, let me begin by examining the concept of the integrated field.

The Interbehavioral Field

The psychological field, depicted as an organization of participating factors, is a verbal construction that is not assumed to represent or otherwise correspond to the psychological event, ontologically considered. The psychological events themselves exist as evolving functions having no substantive structure and no parts -- at least this is how the interbehaviorist conceptualizes such events. In fact, from an interbehavioral perspective, there are no psychological events as distinguishable from the whole of nature. That is, the concept of the psychological event is also a construction. It is just what we say about events.

While no correspondence with events may be assumed, regardless of what we say about them, different ways of speaking suit different analytical purposes, and the field construction suits the purposes of the interbehavioral psychologist. So let us consider the integrated field construction in relation to those purposes.

The field construction depicts a psychological event at a particular point

in time, specifically, the present moment. All factors depicted as participants in an interbehavioral field participate in the present moment -- no one participating to a greater or lesser extent than another, and no one's participation preceding or following that of another. An interbehavioral field is conceptualized as a simultaneous interaction of all co-present factors. This conceptualization has a number of implications of which we shall consider three: the uniqueness of psychological events, their ever-present character, and their indetermination.

Uniqueness. A psychological event is a unique event, occurring only once, never to be repeated again. This is not a matter of probabilities. It is not a comment on the improbability of a precise reconfiguration of all of the relevant factors at some future moment. The recurrence of a psychological event is not improbable, it is impossible.

This impossibility is owing to the evolutionary character of psychological events. More specifically, a psychological event is a function -- an interaction of stimulating and responding -- occurring in a context of other participating factors. As such, a given event is but a point in the evolution of a function wherein each current manifestation includes all previous manifestations. The "second" occurrence of a psychological event thereby includes the first occurrence of that event, a factor not present in the first occurrence. But a psychological event is an organization of factors -- all factors no one any more or less important than another. Consequently, the "second" occurrence, by including factors not present in the first occurrence, is not a second occurrence of that event. It is a different event, comprised of different factors. To reiterate the point, a psychological event is a unique event.

Time. A second implication of the field as a simultaneous interaction of factors concerns the concept of time itself. Time, like weight or height or length, is a metric -- not an event. As such, it occupies no place in the

interbehavioral field, when conceptualized from an event standpoint.

This is not a happenstance of graphic portrayal of the interbehavioral field -- it is not a matter of how many fields you can draw on the same sheet of paper. There are no other fields to draw. There are no past fields, no future fields. There is only one field -- the field existing in the present moment.

It is in the continuously evolving present moment that we find the past and future. From an interbehavioral standpoint, they exist as facts of substitute stimulation -- implicit interaction.

Causality. A third implication of the field construction has to do with the issue of causality. While causal systems vary in detail, all modern systems share certain characteristics. For instance, causal postulation always involves a dichotomization of events into those that cause and those that are caused. Further, causal constructions are typically articulated over time. They are ways of accounting for events occurring at one point in time by reference to events occurring at another point. For example, a stimulus occurring at time X is held to be responsible for the occurrence of a response at time Y.

Causal constructions are also ways of accounting for contemporaneous events articulated at one level of analysis by reference to events articulated at another level. For example, an organism's psychological interaction is held to be caused by biological factors participating in the organization of the organismic structure involved in the psychological interaction. As such, behavior is said to be caused by inherited susceptibilities, genes, instincts, and so on.

Finally, causal knowledge -- as the ability to predict and control the occurrence of events -- depends on the possibility of event recurrence.

None of this is applicable to the field construction of interbehavioral psychology. In the first place, from an interbehavioral perspective, all factors present in a given field of interaction participate in that field, including those isolated for study by different disciplines and articulated at different levels of analysis, and no factor participates in any special way with respect to the other factors. There are

no causes and no effects, only participating factors. Temporal causal constructions likewise are ill-suited to the field construction of interbehavioral psychology since there is no point in time other than the present moment from which putative causes may be said to exert their powers. Second, psychological events are nonrecurring. Each is a unique event -- and one neither predicts nor controls the unique event.

From an interbehavioral perspective, a psychological field is a unified field -- an interactive whole. It is not caused from within -- to suggest as much would be to argue that the field causes itself. And it is not caused from without -- there is no without. The field is not caused. It just is.

I should like to point out before going on that the interbehavioral position on this issue has nothing to do with contentions of capriciousness, nor of randomness in the universe.

The former contention emerges, actually, out of causal not noncausal thinking. The causal agent in such cases is just an inscrutable one -- usually the mind. This sort of argument has its origins in cultural traditions, particularly those of a theological sort. God is the ultimate and most inscrutable causal agent. The interbehavioral perspective on causality bears no similarity to this position.

The argument in support of randomness in the universe is a more sophisticated argument articulated in the face of an inability to produce certain sorts of occurrences, particularly those presenting problems of observation by virtue of their size. The concept of causality under such conditions comes to be understood as probability. It is suggested in the context of this argument that something other than what occurred might have occurred, because causality is probabilistic not absolute. This argument is made on practical, not philosophical grounds, and has its sources in scientific thinking.

Despite the scientific origins of probabilistic causal notions, the interbehaviorist does not hold to a position of randomness in the universe. The interbehaviorists' argument, though, is made on philosophical, not practical grounds. It goes something like this: An event is a unique configuration of

participating factors. It is what it is. Just as there is no past apart from the present, there is no other condition of this event. It could not have been otherwise: There is no otherwise for this event. We cannot speak of what "might have been" when confronting what is because what is is a point in the evolution of what has been. Had it been otherwise, it would be otherwise. But it is not otherwise -- it is as it is.

Moreover, if an event exists as a present event, it has no probability of occurrence. It just is. If it doesn't exist as a present event, it has no probability of occurrence. It just isn't.

Analytical Purposes

Now what does all of this have to say about the analytical purposes of the interbehaviorist? What is accomplished by conceptualizing the psychological event in this way?

Kantor would argue that the goal of basic science and scientific philosophy is systematic functional description. The scientist's goal is to construct a description of nature that is continuous with our observations of nature. The goal is to describe our observations of events in such a way that no reference is made to factors not found among the events themselves; to cleave to our observations; to avoid the impositions of cultural tradition. From such description will come a better understanding of our world.

These suggestions are problematic for a number of reasons. They seem to imply a correspondence between events and what we say about them. There appear to be right and wrong, accurate and inaccurate ways of describing events, the criterion being whether or not the events actually include the factors mentioned in our descriptions of them. But what about the fact that a field is supposed to be a verbal construction -- one that is not assumed to represent or otherwise correspond to the events themselves? What about the fact that psychological events are supposed to exist as evolving functions, having no substantive structure and no parts. Are there or are there not factors among the events that we can include in our descriptions of those events? What, exactly, does description amount to? And by what criterion, if not correspondence with nature, can its accuracy be judged?

In addition to this issue of correspondence, Kantor leaves us with the

assertion that systematic descriptions of nature -- however we are to achieve them -- will somehow enable us to understand our world better. But how will they do so? And how will we know when this has happened? Both issues deserve comment. I will begin with correspondence, then move on to the issue of understanding.

Correspondence. Correspondence of descriptions with the events described is really an issue of reference for Kantor. The point he is making in this regard is that descriptive or linguistic action, like any action, is action with respect to stimulation. Stimulation inheres in a source of one sort or another. Some of those sources are themselves products of linguistic actions -- they are words. Some are not. Sometimes when words serve as sources of current stimulation they were themselves once products of linguistic acts with respect to other words, and those with respect to other words, and so on.

If, in the final analysis, the stimulation for a descriptive act arose from a linguistic source, the description is not continuous with the events described. Such discontinuity is believed to distort our understanding of nature.

Alternatively, if the ultimate source of stimulation for a descriptive act is nonlinguistic -- at least from the standpoint of the linguistic community, if not the individual -- the descriptive action of the individual may be considered continuous with the events described. Continuity of this sort Kantor regards as necessary if the goal of greater understanding of our world is to be achieved.

Truth. Whether or not this distinction between sources of stimulation for descriptive acts can be sustained given the ever increasing difficulty of sustaining the distinction between verbal and nonverbal events in the human realm (L. J. Hayes & S. C. Hayes, 1988) is not known. Whether or not the distinction has been or is a valuable one is another matter. From Kantor's perspective, the value, adequacy, or truth of a construction or analytical strategy is to be found in how well it works in the achievement of a goal. It is a pragmatic criterion, although not of the ordinary sort, in part because the goal is considerably broader in scope than is typical of pragmatic thinking, and also

because the assessment of workability is made across a much greater span of time than is required when more limited goals are involved.

For Kantor, the goal of system building in psychology is progress in the development of psychology as a science. Progress is measured in the extent to which psychology has passed or is passing through recognizable stages in the development of other basic sciences, as observed throughout the course of their historical developments. Four specific stages of scientific system development are mentioned by Kantor (1953, pp. 71-72) in this regard, including: thing systems, knowledge systems, operational systems, and postulational systems. (The details of this classification are not pertinent to the present discussion.)

The value or truth of a construction or analytical strategy is assessed by observing the participation of such factors in the historical development of scientific systems showing progress. To whatever extent particular sorts of constructions and strategies are involved, and continuously so in progressive system building efforts, that is the extent to which they have value.

It is on the basis of this criterion that discontinuous constructions are eschewed by Kantor. More specifically, constructions making reference in the final analysis only to other constructions have not been maintained in progressive scientific system building enterprises. Over the course of system development in other sciences, constructions of this type have been replaced by others having their sources in nonlinguistic things and events. If psychology is to register progress, it too must abandon unproductive constructions and analytical strategies. Much of Kantor's energy was spent identifying factors of this sort and illustrating their debilitating influence on the development of psychology as a science.

Understanding. In addition to this issue of referential description and the rationale for the perpetuation of only certain kinds of descriptive constructs, Kantor contends that systemic description will eventuate in a better understanding of psychological events (and the world at large) than will other sorts of system products. As such, the following questions arise: What is meant by

understanding in this context? How will systemic description improve our understanding of the world? And how will we know when it has, in fact, done so?

Kantor's response takes the following form: Understanding the world means being precisely oriented with respect to it. Orientation involves psychological contact with the world. Some of that contact is direct; most is achieved indirectly. Description and its products are the means of such indirect interaction. Some forms of description are valuable, others are not. The sort of systemic description Kantor advocates has participated in the development of other scientific understandings and may, thereby, be expected to contribute to a greater understanding of events peculiar to the science of psychology. We will know that our understanding of the world is improved when we are better oriented with respect to it.

This response is not entirely satisfactory, as it is still not clear what Kantor means by "orientation." It appears to refer, in part, to the number of stimulatory functions having some potential of arising from a given source. To put it another way, the larger the number of responses we are able to make with respect to some aspect of our world, the better we are oriented with respect to that aspect. For example, we are better oriented with respect to the biological process of reproduction now than in the past: We are able both to prevent its natural occurrence and to produce it in artificial ways, neither of which we were able to do or to do as successfully in the past. We might say that we "understand" this process better today than in the past. This is the sense in which Kantor uses these terms.

There is also a sense in which to be better oriented means to derive greater practical benefit. Kantor (1953) argues that the sciences may be distinguished from the nonsciences on the basis of certain characteristics of the products of these two enterprises. The products of scientific activity are said to be novel and useful, unlike those of the nonsciences. The novelty aspect makes contact with orientation as described above: Science enables us to respond in new ways with respect to our world.

Emphasis on the useful character of scientific products, including ways of

speaking about events, implies a conditionality with respect to the character of novelty. It is not just new ways of responding to events that are of value, but rather, new ways that have as their outcome benefits of a practical nature. As such, to be better oriented with respect to our world means to derive greater benefits from it. What those benefits may be vary with the circumstances in which they are anticipated. Consequently, it is only in the context of such circumstances that a judgment as to whether or not particular ways of speaking about events improve our orientation with respect to them.

Summary

Interbehavioral philosophy is of a nonparochial pragmatic sort. Its aim is the progress of psychology as a science, to be achieved by way of historically tested constructional practices and analytical strategies. It takes a highly unconventional stand with respect to the central issues of event character, time, and causality. And it is for this reason that interbehaviorism remains the philosophy of the few.

As a psychological enterprise, interbehaviorism has been slow to develop a vigorous applied subsystem. This, I believe, has been a result of the apparent incompatibility of Kantor's philosophical system with the constructional categories and practices typical of applied science. How can there be an applied science of ever-present, uncaused, unique events? Obviously, an applied science of events construed in this way cannot develop.

If this is a problem, the solution lies in our understanding of the interbehavioral field and its implications as verbal constructions. The ever-present, uncaused, unique event is a way of speaking about events that suits a particular analytic purpose. If there be other purposes to fulfill, other ways of speaking will have to be adopted.

But does this mean that the categories and postulates and practices of interbehavioral philosophy will be completely abandoned, replaced by those better suited to applied purposes? This could happen, of course. If it did, old ways of thinking and proceeding would be the outcome. The alternative is to keep before us the view that changes in any aspect of a scientific system are a function of changes in other aspects of

that system, the implication being that the relation between the philosophical and applied branches of a science is one of mutual influence.

Operating from this perspective will not be easy: We will be forced to address some difficult questions, and our identity and integrity will depend on the answers we are able to provide. Among them will be the following: How can applied science benefit from contact with a synthetic philosophy like interbehaviorism? And, conversely, how can interbehaviorism benefit from contact with an analytic enterprise?

Footnotes

1. This article is based on a paper entitled "Interbehavioral Philosophy," presented at the 1988 meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Philadelphia.
2. Linda J. Hayes is the former Linda J. Parrott. Please address correspondence to her at the Department of Psychology, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, NV 89557-0062.

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