

The Roman-Christian Period.

The philosophy of the later days of Rome shows a decided tendency toward the unqualified assumption of the importance and necessity to place one's all in God. In this period philosophy may be said to have fallen upon evil days. Philosophy as a critical attempt to evaluation ^e ~~the~~ experiences has all but disappeared. The decline ^{is measured} from the attitude in which experience was investigated in a fearless and energetic way to the situation in which the whole of experience was ^{covered} ~~carried~~ by the impenetrable cloak of a God. The decline passed through the stages of the practical and mildly religious attitudes. In the Hellenistic period philosophy became subject to the outlook of a practical life. The attitude toward experience of this period was dominated by the accepted dogma of the exclusive ethical values. This attitude still had room for some independence of outlook, There was still the influence of the philosopher visible in the descriptions and determinations of experience. This independence was yielded gradually to an almost uncritically accepted religious viewpoint. In the period we are now discussing philosophy in the sense we speak of it above had well-nigh disappeared. Philosophy does actually disappear and is lost entirely from the cultural history of the Middle Ages in Europe. We shall find in this period no avowedly philosophical position. The work in science and in philosophy indicates the decline of an entire social structure. An entirely new social experience is in process of development. It is becoming of more and more importance to give oneself a place in the world. There is not possible now the attitude of evaluating experience with calm and deliberate criticisms. The times cry for a fervent clinging to some solid rock. There can be no self-reliance

on the part of the individual in giving values to experience. The strength of the individual has been entirely sapped and dissolved. The individual of this period stands helpless before the stirring events of life, and for preservation's sake must throw himself unreservedly into the arms of God. We should not expect then to find a formulation of a doctrine of categories until such a time as the attitude toward experience becomes self-conscious, and fully aware to the thinker. And so it is. Not until we come to Kant will we find an original doctrine of categories but with Kant the whole attitude toward categories is different. It might be said with genuine propriety that the period we are now examining and the attitudes here developed are preparatory stages for the viewpoint we will find in Kant. The inherent continuity of the periods, however, should not be too far stressed.

As an expression of the attitude of this period we have the words of St. Augustine. For Augustine knowledge and reality is in God and of God. God for Augustine is the sole source of truth and being just as the New-Platonists ^o ~~thought~~ ^{taught}, and with whom Augustine was acquainted. We must bring out at once, however, that unlike the New-Platonists Augustine believed in a God who was an absolute personality. We find that more and more the experience of absolute isolation and helplessness of the individual reflected in a viewpoint which stresses personality. Man must cast his lot unquestioning with God as the sole and safe support but that God must not be an external world soul but a personal being suffusing warmth and tenderness to those who nestle at his bosom. The emanation pantheism of New-Platonism is sorely insufficient for this period. Such an attitude would not at all express the experience of this time.

Considering God as a personality Augustine made him the center of all experience. God is the all embracing source of man and his

surroundings. There is only to be excluded from God non-being and evil. God is the creator of all things out of nothing. Augustine is careful to point out that God created things out of nothing, not out of his own essence. This obviates the pantheistic and consequent loss of personality, conception which had been the accepted attitude in previous times.

The extreme personalistic attitude of Augustine comes out in the starting point which he adopts for philosophical knowledge. Augustine makes doubt his starting point. He intrenches himself strongly in the position that to doubt is to at least be. To give up all belief in things is still to retain a strong hold on the reality of the conscious being. The viewpoint expressed in this doctrine indicates the great store that is placed in the individual. The philosophy of Augustine revolves around this conception of the importance of the individual. To make safe the existence of the conscious being is to guarantee the reality of the remembering, knowing and willing individual. The act of doubting is intimately tied up with these aspects of the individual. When one doubts one must refer to the truths and ideas conserved in the memory. For Augustine the mental processes were constitutive of the totality of the personality. This indicates again the avowed belief in an extreme individuality.

Another conception in Augustine which argues for an individualistic attitude is that of the primacy of the will. The will is the guiding force of all actions. It is the directing power of the intellect; judging and reasoning as well as the simplest sense perceptions are controlled by it. This standpoint of the will indicates another fundamental attitude of Augustine. The power of will and all its consequences are derived from the relationship of man to God. It is from God that man derives his powers and capacities. Augustine is an indiv-

idualist but an individualist who requires much support from some power who indeed grants and maintains this individualism. The individualism of this period must needs find some foundation outside itself. There was too little solidity in the general and specific experiences to give a self-sufficient individuality. The same conditions which made a man stake all upon himself made it imperative for the man to have some external support for himself. Man is free and capable of doing that which he wills but ultimately this freedom and capacity is limited by the restrictions of God upon the individual. The individuality turns out to be a turning within oneself, an attempt to find oneself in one's own inner spirit, since the objective social conditions do not yield a habitation and a resting place for the weary and tormented individual. The individuality of Augustine is incomplete since there is for every one an absolute need of redemption. This absolute need of redemption indicates that man of his own nature cannot possibly act in such a way as to be deserving of grace. The freedom of the will, it turns out, was possessed only by the original man. With the fall from grace of Adam all humans are born with sin, nor can they save themselves with good works. To attain redemption and the good, man must have recourse directly to God. The absolute dependence of man upon God is then apparent and the freedom which was suggested as the lot of man has lost its potency. The entire doctrine of man in Augustine places him in a struggle which is constant and even unavailing to attain the blessedness of the spiritual life. The need for salvation which is the burden of man's eternal wailing indicates the present ^{Augustine's} ~~present~~ ^{condition} of his general position and condition.

The determinations of experience for Augustine have their source and end in the uncritical religious attitude. The experience of the time

was such that it brought out expressions of attitudes toward experience which indicate the unreserved acceptance of an attitude imposed by a feeling of weakness and dependence. The period of which Augustine may be taken as a representative was one that had its full quota of terrors and defeats for the individual. It was a time when even the formal artificial social structure was being torn ^a sunder. The inroads of the Barbarians augured for the speedy dissolution of the Roman order. So inevitable was its destruction as to make the attacks by the Barbarians a matter of common occurrence. We have in this period a peculiar situation. On the one hand the contemplation of Rome destroyed, struck terror and awe into the souls of both Roman and barbarian. It is said that Alaric while bent upon the sack of Rome trembled at his own success.¹ When the end of the Eternal City was approaching in actuality, the calamity was considered inevitable. Augustine and his christian compeers believed it due to the inherent vices of Pagan life and actions. The Romans were convinced that it was the damnable deed of the Christians. This attempt to place the blame for the calamity with all the conditions that it involved indicates the severe poignancy with which Rome's destruction was felt. This was no sentimental regard for Rome which was expressed. It was the experience of a genuine loss which was echoed in the despair of Romans and Barbarians, of Pagans and Christians. The fall of Rome is a symptom of the social decay which was characteristic of those times, it was an indication of the bonds and burdens which the man of the period was suffered to endure. The conditions of man in the period was an entirely unenviable one. The severe demands of such an organization as the Roman one was, brought a hard economic lot to the mass of the people.

¹Dill, Roman Society, p. 61, 1899.

The people of the Empire were literally besieged by an army of tax gatherers. Every possible pretense was invoked by means of which to gather more and more money. There were direct taxes gathered from the country people and from commerce and industry in the towns.¹ The burden of taxation was an extremely staggering one. The luxury and comfort of the ruling class brought hardship and privation to the middle class. The social condition which may at best be called very bad, extended to the moral and religious phases of the time's experiences. The moral conditions which became the province of the Church called for many very badly needed remedies. Conditions in the Church were appalling and caused condemnatory expressions that were deep and far reaching. The thinkers of the period were not hesitant in declaring the need for great improvement in the moral order.

The realization of the misery and the decay which was taking its place in the social order is eloquently expressed in the attempts to flee the present temporal order and to find refuge in the city of God. The great emphasis that was placed by this period upon the glories to be attained in the spiritual home to which every one looked forward was the result of a genuine need for a general amelioration of the social conditions. As an example of this striving for salvation the *De Civitas Dei* of Augustine points out an extreme condition of social wrong and suffering. The *De Civitas*, though written as a defence of the Christians from the indictment as destroyers of Rome is of course an attempt to picture what a spiritual commonwealth should be like. The *De Civitas* brings out with all force the leanings toward another world. The present world is unsatisfactory and unsound. In it is vice, misery, and despair. To the city of God the heart and soul of a pious Christian should be turned. It is there and only there that one may seek salva-

¹Duruy, *History of Middle Ages*, N.Y. 1891. Book I, Chap. I.

tion with some assurance of success. To the men of this period there was one place to look for the better things that one is absolutely denied in this world. That place was the heavenly city. It is of extreme importance to note the special characteristic of this city. For ideal commonwealths have been devised before, and each has been designed to remedy a particular defect. To see just what sort of city this was to be is to appreciate what particular defects the society in question seemed to suffer from. The ideal city is always an expression of the longing of a particular society.

The consideration of the conditions existing in this period gives us a very substantial basis for the examination of the attitudes that the people of the period took toward their experience. One would not expect a strong individualism to be developed. This period is especially ripe for the development of a mystical and subjective attitude. The subjectivism would be more mystical than solipsistic for the individuals at this time lack that confidence in themselves which is necessary for the development of that attitude. The tendency in this condition would be rather to place one's faith in a power beyond oneself. We find in the Roman-Christian period the development of the concept of an individual God with whom one can get into a close personal relation. Much of the thought of the periods is devoted to the formulation of the best statements of how it is possible for man to get into a satisfactory relationship with God. One of the most serious problems of the early Christian period was to show the relationship of the present world to God. This is all a quite definite attempt to evaluate the experiences in the best terms than available. God was the centre of all hope and of all relief. What misery this world could inflict was controlled and directed by God. This was the consolation of philosophy that whatever.

suffering this world affords is intended by God for our ultimate good.¹ We find in Boethius a very decided indication of the transformations that are made in the philosophies which come to this period from former times. The Stoic and Neo-Platonic viewpoints are remodeled and revised to give adequate expression to the experiences which are peculiar to the present period. Whatever elements of Greek theory are brought into this period are revised and remodeled to suit the changed conditions. The entire realm external to man which was interpreted as objective nature now is made to consist of the creation of God. The experience of the time calls out new interpretations of this experience, it is impossible to conceive of different experiences influencing thinkers to adopt the same attitudes toward these experiences.

¹Cf. Boethius - De Consolatione Philosophiae

Early Scholastic Period.

The ninth century in Europe is a period of change and novelty. There are developed events of a marvellous nature on a magnificent scale. There is in short an attempt to rehabilitate the civilization and the culture of ancient Rome. The political history of Europe in the ninth century records the attempt to unite Europe in a single empire under the leadership of Charlemagne. This movement might be taken to be the last phase in the old order of things and the transition point between the old and the new worlds. The Carolingian empire and its attempted recovery of the old civilization had a very brief existence. The newer motives in the development of Europe's history which it represents persisted into the period which marks the beginning of the modern world. The deterioration of the Carolingian Empire gave origin to the national organizations of modern times.

The Carolingian Empire had only a brief career and disappeared in a century. It was followed by an almost as hopeless a confusion as preceded it. The end of the empire was the beginning of the feudal period which persisted in Europe for centuries until the kingdoms were fairly established. There were other events of a magnificent character in the period which we call the Early Scholastic. We have the struggle between the Church and the revived empire in the eleventh century. No more stirring times can be imagined than those Europe experienced in this period. In the eleventh century the crusades began, these events which are symptomatic of a restlessness and a transformation of the world such as is scarcely to be found again in history. There seemed to be in Europe in this time a seething fermentation which was to result in some new product. This time of con-

fusion and of change was a preparation for a civilization based upon a more stable evaluation of an individual human being than was ever the case in the previous history of the world. The speculations of this period had as their primary motive the attempt to arrive at a definite attitude with respect to the evaluations that should be given the individual. As against the previous periods we have discussed there is an advance in that the determination of the value of an individual becomes a problem and is not accepted as an uncritical acquiescence in a hopeless imposition.

The early Scholastic period is replete with a changing, striving human experience. This period ^{consists of} ~~includes~~ the ninth to twelfth centuries inclusive. The second half of this period appears as the record of an awakening of man to his powers and surroundings. In many ways we might consider that this growing importance of the individual man was due to the purity of action from the ^{humane} ~~nominals~~ of traditions and theory. The constitution of society in this period of the natural tribes with their vigor and freedom was a marked contrast to the society of decadent Rome when the center of society was a superimposed governmental structure. With the Germans there came an organization of society on a basis of personal relationship of man to man. The individuals were related by personal ties, and the centralization of power was brought about by a minute organization of the hierarchy of persons. The feudal system is a symptom of the emphasis of individuality in the ages succeeding the dismemberment of the Roman Empire. This spirit of personal independence was the probable cause of the fleeting existence of Charlemagne's rehabilitation of the empire. It was this same spirit that kept alive the empire as an ideal sometime to be attained. One might ask whether it was not this growth and development of the ideal empire which made it possible for the spiritual

kingdom to be fostered by the popes until it competed for and achieved a decisive temporal power. The ideal empire gained and grew in power when the changing feudal conditions strongly compassed the individual power and hope. When the feudal conditions made the economic and social relations unbearable for those in the lower ranks of the hierarchy, the people turned their eyes toward the spiritual realm. In time it was the Church which represented that spiritual kingdom which became the guardian and control of the men of the middle ages. And in time it was the Church that stood with its great development and final solidification as the complete power and authority dominating all men, their works, and their condition.

In the eleventh century the importance of individual existence was maintained by the confused social condition. In this century we find the popes and particularly Gregory VII engaged in mortal combat with the Emperors of Germany for supremacy of temporal power. The contest resulted in a draw illustrating the power it was possible to wield on the pretense of representing the spiritual world. The attitude of the people of this time was such that human experience was not a safe criterion for reality. The humiliation of an emperor and the strength of the papal power could not be a genuine situation where the belief in and fear of the beyond is not an overwhelming characteristic of men's attitudes. The period under discussion was one in which fear of future results was not a powerful influence in men's lives.

The developing and growing personality in Europe is manifest in the Crusades. This is a phenomenon in which the surging components of individuality seek expression. The wonderful transformation of experiences which was brought about by the crusades is a matter of historic record. The crusades were followed by a civilization in the twelfth century which was a marvellous change and great in its own

right. There were breaths of new life infused into industry, commerce, and in fact every human activity. The soaring *apocalyptic* spirit of the wonderful cathedrals made their appearance in the twelfth century. The cathedrals represent a high style of development of European culture and civilization. The universities too began to mean something in the life of the men of the pre-modern period. The universities indicate the blossoming period of a rapidly growing consciousness. The universities mark a period of standardization in society. The universities are symptoms of the growing control and system that is coming to be a feature of *the* social structure.

The experiences of the period show some gradual transformations which take place. The innate need for some connection with the world shows itself admirably in the experience of the period and the attitudes taken toward this experience. We have seen that after the destruction of the Empire a serious confusion prevailed in European society. The souls of the people then cried out for some attachment. This brought out the strength of the spiritual kingdom which grew and grew in power and influence. The creed of Christ which was taken as the guiding star gave a great impetus to the Church. The doctrine that each one was entitled to a place in the kingdom of grace appealed to the people and grew out of the extreme need for such a kingdom. It was absolutely necessary to have some such concept developed to give solace to the striving souls of the period. The development of the Church was inevitable then since it represented this kingdom on earth. By the thirteenth century the organization of the Church was complete and it had already reaped the full advantages of its being. The strength and confidence which came as a result of the organization of the Church and the concomitant beginning of national existence

made for a clearer appreciation of man and led to a growing interest in his experience. This was a preparation for the revolt that was made against the stern authority of the Church, and finally to a development of science and a general full expression of man's newly acquired individuality.

The expressions of attitudes toward experience in this period is directly indicative of the experience of the period. The developing attitude of individuality begins to show itself in Eringina. The Sect takes over to a great extent the philosophy of Augustine but there appears already a new emphasis. The problem of emanation which Augustine took over from Neo-Plat^{on} becomes a problem of the greater importance of the universal. The absolute placing of all reality and knowledge in God is giving way here to a somewhat other doctrine. The problem of realism comes out again. In essence the problem may be taken to be that of investigating whether or not knowledge has some objective existence or not. The emanation doctrine takes the form with Eringina that the particulars emanate from the universal. The universal is prior and is productive of the particular. A middle stage is that of the species.

In this doctrine of emanation we must observe that while the original absolutely universal is stressed the real purpose is to make some place for the particular. This is brought out in the fact that there is a regressus in which the particular can find its way back again to the most universal. Again the emphasis on universals as having Being indicates an eager longing of the men of this period to have something stable and real in the world upon which one can rely.

With Saint Anselm the desire to have some external dependable object comes to the doctrine that the mere fact that one can think the highest reality guarantees its existence. The celebrated ontological

argument indicates a much closer relationship between the individual and reality than we have had in philosophy since the Greeks. The individual is becoming more and more important in experience. We ^{are} ~~are~~ a difference between this period and the Roman-Christian period. In the Christian period the effort was entirely to state the world in Theistic terms. The effort was to attain some immediate guarantee for the human experiences. That represented an attempt to place man in some immediate fixed relation. The time of Anselm aims to show the relation of God to man. ^{Our Deus Homo} Our Davies Home reflects the attitude now. What particular relation does God bear to man?

The problem of universals takes a more definite shape with the schoolmen in the next century. The twelfth century shows a development of schools and of doctrines which indicate the better organization of society in that period. The center for the discussions are the schools in France and particularly the University of Paris. The discussion of universals in the twelfth century indicates a strong degree of personality developing. The arguments are symptomatic of a strong sense of security on the part of individuals. There is greater freedom of interpretation and definition. There is much store to be set upon the fact that the century indicates a great interest in the problems of an intellectual kind. Dialectic is fostered in the schools. Experience has taken on an entirely different significance. The interest in intellectual problems gives us some notion of the changed conditions. The twelfth century is one of relative security. The crusades resulted in an increase in commerce and industry. Towns were established and the civilization seemed to be fairly permanently established. In the twelfth century the sum-

mos were becoming established as authoritative source books. The problem of universals seemed in place then to attempt to specify the precise importance of the individual.

The problem of universals is really the problem of individuals. The importance of the particular was the topic of chief interest in this period. The problem of universals took its particular form because of the impetus given such study by the presence of the Aristotelian De Categorie and De Interpretatione in the translations of Boethius. An excellent illustration of the type of philosophizing concerning universals is the handling of the problem by William of Champeaux, Roscellinus and Abelard. William taught that the universal is in each individual thing, that the individuals were accidents of the universal which is substance. This extreme position which Abelard attacked with the criticism that the substance would have mutually contradicting accidents was given up and a milder realism adapted. William modified his view so that the universal, identical essence is found in each particular in a particular substantial form.

William was opposed by Roscellinus who taught that universals could not at all be substances. The only real things are particulars. Universals are according to Roscellinus merely sounds which serve as symbols of substance or accidents. They are not realities in themselves, no matter how real the things which they represent.

In Abelard is found the mediator and the critic of both viewpoints. Abelard taught that both his previous teachers were wrong. Universals could not be things nor are they mere words. The universals he taught were predicates given to things by thought. The universals are the indispensable forms of all knowledge because they contain in themselves the likenesses of things. No universals exist in nature as a multiplicity with like qualities. The likeness be-

tween things is owing to the fact that they are created after an archetype in the mind of God. Abelard described a threefold existence of the universals. As *conceptus mentis* they exist *ante rem* in the mind of God. As likenesses of the essential characteristics of things they exist *in rem*. In the human mind they exist as concepts and predicates which are acquired by comparative thought.

The formal doctrines developed and the arguments to support them are reflections of genuine attitudes which the men of the twelfth century developed toward experience. The doctrines thus developed in a formal way had their application in those theological discussions which formed the most congenial atmosphere of the Scholastic intellect. The Early Scholastic period is one in which the growing worth of the individual was beginning to be realized. The entire experience of man was taking on a new significance. The emphasis previously placed upon the inner consciousness was merely an attempt to indicate the attachment to God. Now the value of the individual for himself is receiving determination. The individual looms up as an appreciable factor in human experience. The most important aspect of this is that it presages an attitude which will place a high degree of confidence in the experiences of the individual such as it assumed in the modern period. In the Early Scholastic period this attitude is still in germ, and complete development is yet to be attained. In this period the worth of the individual was still a function of his relation to God, but this relation was assuming precision and systematic statement. With Abelard the particular is as important as the universal or at least the universal is no more clearly defined than the particular. The universal is not God from whom the particulars derive their existence, the universal is in its highest phase an idea or pattern in the mind of God.

The full significance of Abelard and his position is that he represents a critical attitude which is directed toward the teachings of the Church Fathers. Abelard points towards the ideal of a free investigation of what was then taken to be experience. Abelard is combating the *crede ut intelligis* of Augustine and Anselm. Abelard is insisting upon a right to decide upon the basis of evidence and not to decide as authority dictates upon a preconceived basis.

The end of the twelfth century is characterized by a growing attitude of humanism and of a growing sense of tolerance. There is developing an interest in past literatures and thoughts which indicates an increasing sense of appreciation of human experience. We find such names in this century as John of Salisbury and Alan of Lille, both of these philosophers deprecated the submission to the formalism of logic. They both advocated a study of the intimately human subjects. John was a staunch defender of The Trivium from the attacks made upon it. He was in general an alert guard of culture and was interested in attacking all those who attacked it.