

The Athenian Period.

Anaxagoras may be considered as representing a transition point between the pre-Athenian philosophy and the philosophy of Athens proper. This period represents a changing point for entire attitudes. So far as attitude is concerned the pre-Athenian period is directed toward nature, toward the object of the attitude. The experience is taken directly and immediately, the investigations of experience are based upon assumption taken over from an unreflective standpoint. The thinkers of the Athenian period are interested in the attitudes themselves and question the assumption made. The underlying motive for this change in philosophical perspective is the change that is to be noted in the experience of this period which is different from that of the preceding time. The development of individualism and the interest in personal experiences forced a more critical examination of the attitudes toward experience. The determination of experience began to involve the problem of knowledge.

A question comes up in this connection as to the relation between the experience of a period and the philosophic attitudes of that time. It is inappropriate to say that the philosophical attitude is a mere reflection of the experience of a period. It is just as true that experience or the ordinary affairs of men are reflections of some philosophical attitude. An instance of this would be the actions of a judicial body with its interacting commercial and industrial facts, which are dictated by some particular political or social philosophical attitude. It is safer to assume that both the actions and the abstract attitude are phases of experience, and usually in a ratio which give

one or the other predominance. The philosophical attitude itself ⁴⁴ is a phase of human experience and under normal conditions it never transcends the particular experience in which it is formulated. Philosophy is the experience which has become conscious.

The problem of One and Many takes on an almost entirely new complexion in the Athenian period. The Sophists projected with emphasis the viewpoint that the determination of reality was dependent upon the relative importance of perception ~~as~~ thought in knowledge. After the influence of the Sophists, it becomes with Plato a problem of Dialectic and not one of immediate experience. On the formal side the problem seemd to have become exhausted in its possibilities, in the Pre-Athenian period. The problem finally came to be one of motion and change with respect to the stuff of reality. Even with Parmenides and Zeno the standpoint of the knowledge process as an essential factor in the description of experience did not become established. It is quite apparent that only under the conditions which prevailed in Athens could the importance of knowledge become realized. There is thus much to support the view of Zeller that Plato and not Zeno is the founder of Dialectic.¹ From the beginning practically of the Athenian period the determination of experience will be made with a fairly critical view to the validity of the categories. After passing through the stages of inquiry as to the nature of knowledge there is an attempt to determine a list of categories representative of reality. From Socrates on may be traced a series of such determinations which result finally in the Aristotelian table of categories and which symbolizes the culmination of the Greek conception of reality

¹Zeller, Plato and the Phil. Academy.

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The experience of the Greeks of the fifth century brought out a decidedly different attitude than the one of the previous period. The interests of the thinkers become centered in more intimate human experience than had previously been the case. The problem of human behavior against the behavior of cosmic affairs took the important places in the attention of the thinkers. The problem of morality or conduct became of greater interest than the ultimate reality of the stuff of the world. This attitude is illustrated in the statement of Socrates implying that men, not nature, are his teachers.¹

The problem of conduct and its criterion leads very readily to a consideration of the validity of knowledge. How to determine the criterion for moral conduct becomes a prominent question when moral conduct is a problem. The Athenian period in philosophy brings out not only the problem of knowledge as a basis for the speculations concerning the reality of the world, but also a new series of determinations of experience. These are the categories of an ethical sort. The "good" becomes an expression for some fundamental types of experience. Without the ethical categories no adequate expression for the experience of the time can be made. There is in fact a close connection between the ethical and reality categories up to the point of identity. The good is thought of as the ultimate expression of reality. The good is made the highest essence of reality, a process which is possible by the close relation in Greek thought of Idea and Being. There seems to be good evidence for believing that much of the difficulty and argumentation in the Greek philosophy of Plato's

¹Phaedrus, 230.

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Time was due to a lack of recognition of the true relations between the two. The temper of all Greek thought was to erect into metaphysical being all ideas and principles. The Platonic ideas are eloquent illustrations of the truth of this fact. The formulation of a set of categories of strictly logical content to represent reality as Plato did in the Theaetetus and Sophist indicates also the complete objectivism that actuated the Greek mind. The categories that the Greek philosophers adopt to represent reality seem to be very far removed from actual experience. Reality for the Greeks always seemed to be located beyond the everyday happenings and objects. The dialectic of the Greek world was in great measure made possible by this fact that categories of reality had so little in common with experience. It was this tendency of the Greek mind to be objective and metaphysical that led to a formulation of a series of categories at all. The scheme of categories is developed merely because there is this impulse to reduce reality to ~~the~~ convenient ultimate units. The beginnings of a selfconscious attitude toward a doctrine of categories among the Greeks is located in a dialectical source. The criticism of this attitude arises from the fact that the Greeks always aimed to locate reality in a realm beyond their own experience or tended to deny it altogether. We will see that until we reach a stage in philosophical thinking in which we have an interest in experience that the category doctrines won't be in any way representative of experience. There will be a hopeless inadequacy of categories in the lists drawn up with respect to quality and quantity. The completely functional categories of that experience

¹See Burnet, Greek Philosophy.

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won't be found in the consciously expressed tables, but must be found distributed in the complete philosophical viewpoint. Considering Plato as an example we will find that he has not in his list the good which really was the prime category of his experience. The Platonic doctrine of categories had in common with other doctrines of categories, which consciously attempt to represent experience, the tendency to admit as categories only knowledge factors. It is true then that while for Plato conduct is of extreme importance as an element of experience yet it plays no part in the avowed categories. Of course, in the fundamental philosophical categories of Plato as viewed from our standpoint, the ethical categories find their deserved place. The ideas of Plato really culminate in the idea of the good. In tracing out the complete development of the Platonic ideas we can discover something of the true function of categories. This is a fact although we can find in Plato only a remote approach to an enumeration of categories on a basis of an understanding of what categories are.

In the entire period of Greek philosophy as also in modern philosophy the categories are metaphysical and not methodological. There is an attempt made to determine what are the ultimate and eternal principles of reality. This attempt is correlated with the prevalent attitude that reality is an ultimate immutable essence. In modern philosophy when the attitude is more epistemological than metaphysical the categories are taken to be the ground principles of thought.¹ The categories, even when not metaphysical entities, are really logical ultimates. The attempt to set up tables of categories in the Greek period was an indication of change of attitude in the direction of knowledge process but this was no considerable change away from the external standpoint.

1. Kant's Categories for example.

The Sophists represent the change in attitude from the consid-48
erations of nature to considerations of conduct. This change of
attitude grew out of the increasing importance of the individual.
The age of Pericles is the age of achievement, of confidence, in the
powers of the individual. ^{In this period} ~~The age~~ man attained to remarkable
heights of mastery of self and of nature. This was the age in which
the penetrating light of the intellect was brought away from playing
upon external nature and focused upon the individual and upon man.
The entire history of Athens at this time is eloquent in its testi-
mony of the new importance of man. The entire social, political
and intellectual history bears witness to the truth of this. The ora-
tions of Pericles attest the value which was set upon an Athenian
citizen. Indeed man becomes the measure of all things. Sophocles
gives expression to this attitude in his superb chorus in the
Antigone, " Much is there passing strange,
Nothing surpassing mankind."

The success of Athens in the carrying on of her imperial am-
bitions is a prime factor in bringing out this intimacy of the ex-
perience of a period with the attitude taken toward it.

The philosophical problems of this period are mostly ethical
and political. The absorbing interest in man and his conduct set
aside for the time the more remote speculations as to nature. The
problem as to whether this more remote knowledge is avoidable becomes
itself a question. The Sophists are sceptics with respect to the
reality of the world. This must be taken to mean that a criticism
is made of the attempt to reach out beyond the direct and immediate
experience. The Sophists may be considered in a way as returning
to a direct contact with perceptual experience. The statement of
Gorgias as to non-existence of the world may be taken as an ex-
pression of this idea. The fact that the Sophists ^{occupied} acquired themselves

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more and more with rhetoric is evidence of the prevalence of the idea that in practical pursuits could be found more profitable employment. The unsettled social conditions which involved the Peloponnesian War were well prepared ground for the intellectual trend of events. In the rapidly changing political fortunes of Athens may be sought the lack of faith in the ultimates of experience. The complete interests were centered in the experience of the day. Current problems of social and political importance demanded and received the attention of the thinkers of the period.

The scepticism of Greece at this period did not extend to immediate experience but only to the reality beyond present experience. The Sophists who denied that reality could be known spoke only of metaphysical reality. In conduct the insistence on the individualism then current prompted the denial of ultimate standard^s but those were the standards of custom. The scepticism merely brought out the distinction between custom and nature but did not attempt to deny the standards of what was nature. The achievement of Socrates lay in the direction of establishing a firm basis as criterion for moral conduct. Socrates meant to show that on the level of actual conduct there could be developed standards. The development of the category of nature is the most symptomatic^{fact} of the point being made here. The pre-Sophists all thought of nature as being physis or the ultimate stuff of the world. Here nature takes on a more anthropomorphic aspect. It is a category related to human as against cosmic behavior.¹ Socrates with the Sophists had no faith or interest in a science of natural things. The task of Socrates came to be that of pointing out that virtue involving knowledge had an adequate criterion. The emphasis that Socrates

¹Cf. Plato, Republic, Laws; 889 D.

places upon knowledge as a criterion for moral conduct points to a 50
fundamental characteristic of the Greek mode of thought. In the
Greek thought the objective attitude was always present. There could
be no thought unless it had its external and objective correlation
in reality. The correlation of thought and being is a characteristic
and fundamental attitude of the Greek. This accounts for the ration-
alistic trend of the entire Greek civilization. This predication^{lection} for
knowledge shows itself as an inherent trait of Greek character. It
is illustrated by the rise of traditional philosophical speculators^{low}
in Greece. In the time of Socrates we have the predication^{lection} for know-
ledge coming to consciousness. This was fully carried out in the
doctrine of Ideas in Plato. We must note that there we still have the
objective and external attitude with reference to the nature of reality.
The ideas are ^oantological entities existing eternally and immutably.

In attempting to indicate the basis of general experience for
the Greek attitude we must take into account not only the temperament
of the people but also the specific environmental conditions. There
are two points to be clearly distinguished here. In the first place
we have to consider the general temperament of the Greeks and the
physical environment in which they lived. These give character to
the general attitudes towards experience which are illustrated by
the actions and thoughts of the people. In ^{the} second place there are
developments of a social and political kind which give origin to
less inclusive experiences and their expression.

The rationalistic and ^oantological attitude toward experience
which characterized the speculations of Greece may be indicated
as being influenced so far as environment is concerned, by the
comparatively narrow geographical boundaries and other purely phys-
ical conditions. Within this broad general type of attitude the

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the changes in viewpoint toward experience may be traced to the influence of social and political conditions.

The philosophy of Plato illustrates the fact that extreme changes may be brought about in the attitude toward experience without overcoming the general tradition of which one forms a part. Plato's ideas are crystallizations of the concepts which Socrates develops in the realm of moral conduct. In the philosophy of Plato we find the fact indicated that even when Greek philosophy attained such self-consciousness as to be absorbingly interested in the attitude toward experience, it still retained its ^oantological and external viewpoint.

Plato should be given credit for attempting to set up a series of categories which should represent experience. This attempt indicates an appreciation of the problem of knowledge. That the categories are abstract ^oantological entities does not argue for the lack of analytical power on the part of Plato. The fact means rather that in his period no thorough appreciation of knowledge and the nature of the experience process was as yet possible. The Platonic categories are essentially functions of the experience in which they are formulated. The predication ^oof the Greek period means endowing with existence. In the Athenian period the philosophical attitudes were more ^{Epist}systemological than experiential. The Greeks had gotten over the absolute ^ametophysical attitude but were far from a genuine attitude of experience.

The development of the Platonic philosophy was an outgrowth of the problem of conduct that Socrates faced. Socrates was interested in coming to some basic ground in considering the criterion of conduct. He argued that there was a definite meaning of virtue

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If it is courage which is under discussion the problem is the exact nature of courage. If there is courageous action, if one behaves courageously, what is courage? The result of this kind of investigation was the development of the universal. The universal is to be best understood as a dependable criterion of moral conduct. Aristotle tells us that Socrates neglected the world of nature and sought the universal in ethical matters.¹

The universal has its origin in the history of thought with the Pythagoreans. The universal which Socrates sought for in the ethical realm were transformations of the forms of the Pythagoreans. We see in this transformation a change from the problem of existence to that of knowledge. The universal of Socrates is not an existing entity as are the numbers of the Pythagoreans. The numbers of the Pythagoreans were not separated from the sensible things in which they inhered. The universals of Socrates were subsisting entities but had no immediate presence in sensible things. The interest in conduct is also a symptom of a new national experience and we find that the period of Socrates was ripe for a reworking of the previous philosophical doctrines.

With the change in national experience there is a change in the philosophical tendencies which reflect that experience and we find the doctrine of universality transformed into the doctrine of ideas. The doctrine of ideas is a metaphysical statement of the problem of universals. The general solidification of the universal experience makes a new doctrine imperative. The thinker can no longer be satisfied with the arbitrary view of the individual man. The result of this is that from the knowledge aspect of Greek thinking is developed a strict metaphysics. The period of the Sophists was the change in viewpoint from a strict metaphysics of a naive kind

✓ Math A 987 B-1

to an arbitrary philosophy of knowledge. The whole Greek experience was opposed to any such loose Weltanschauung and the result was the metaphysical doctrine of Platonic ideas. The ideas of Plato are ontological entities, immutable and indestructible. It is important to note that with Plato philosophy leaves the realm of conduct as the exclusive domain such as the Sophist limited it to, and goes on to the broader fields of knowledge. This is the development of a note struck by Socrates when he declared that virtue is knowledge.

The certainty of knowledge is contested by those who deny the validity of the predication process. Antisthenes doubts the propriety of making judgments since they can not be valid. Plato makes knowledge valid in giving ontological significance to the ideas. And in maintaining the connection between conduct and knowledge the idea of the good is the highest idea.

The philosophy of Plato exhibits in a plausible manner the way in which the strictly technical formulation of the philosopher is a crystallization of the experience of the time in which he lives. The knowledge problem becomes with him a thorough metaphysical doctrine. In order to guarantee the validity of the knowledge process Plato makes the ideas entities of an immutable and indestructible kind. The setting up of a metaphysical criterion of knowledge is of course due to an inadequate appreciation of the nature of experience and of the knowledge process. The ideal of knowledge at this time was that of a strictly rational system. Plato belongs to the tradition which sees the truth and reality ensconced in a harmony of an objective kind. The ideas of Plato are developments of the numbers of the Pythagoreans, through the one of Heraclitus and Parmenides. The difficulty of participation is a natural result of combining the knowledge process

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with the metaphysical ideas of the previous thinkers. The Platonic philosophy indicates to us the spectacle of the vivid struggle which was made by the Greeks to overcome the bonds of objectivity. That is to say from our present vantage point it seems that they were making an unsuccessful fight to overcome objectivity. As a matter of truth the Greek philosophy is the expression of a particular experience and could not have been otherwise.

The great achievement of Plato is in recognizing that experience was to be found in the explanation of knowledge. That knowledge was considered to be the counterpart of being and thus open to the objections which invalidated Plato's doctrine. This invalidity was due to the general experience conditions of Plato's time rather than to any lack on his part. Plato deserves great credit for overcoming the difficulties of the Parmendian and Heracleitan conflict. At first the doctrine of ideas was apparently an endeavor to mediate between these two. The constant flux was brought into connection with the eternal and permanent. The difficulty of the participation doctrine then led Plato to the realization that the ideas were really forms of predication. These forms of predication were abstract logical categories, and indicated the strict objective viewpoint. It was by way of this abstract formulation that Plato reflected the experiences of his time. In spite of its externality of viewpoint, the Platonic philosophy indicates a growing development of the attitude toward experience which considers more the attitude itself than did the previous philosophy.

This development of the recognition of the attitude toward experience did not reach the standpoint of a psychological epistemology as has been asserted.¹ Plato is a Greek and while the Greeks developed remarkably to the point of being greatly interested in the knowledge

1. Cf. Views of Natorp, Taylor, and Stewart

process, they did not even entertain a subjective viewpoint. The SS
Greeks never came to a full realization of the nature of the experience process. As has been suggested, Plato reached only the stage of knowledge but not the stage of experience. For the Greeks experience was a play of forces and conditions which had their power and purpose hidden deeply away from the eyes of the ordinary person. Aristotle is as far from appreciating the true nature of the knowledge process as are the earlier philosophers. Even for Aristotle the universal represents a given entity to which the objects of experience must correspond. It was impossible for the Greek to attain to a subjective viewpoint in epistemology. The whole Greek culture as an expression of the experience of the period was dominated by the objective and external viewpoint. The Greeks of this period could not consider the knowledge process as an interacting component of a changing and modifiable experience. The world for the Greek as he determined his experience, was a fixed and permanent world. For the Greeks the real is. Whatever is must be eternal and unchanging. The Greeks were absolutists in the highest degree, and we find that their whole attitude, no matter how expressed, whether as a metaphysical viewpoint or as a doctrine of knowledge, indicates this. Symptomatic of this characteristic of the Greeks we find that their psychology is based upon a visual and tactual plan. The two types of experience giving a concrete and fixed world. The metaphysical doctrines of the Greeks are strongly biased by the mathematical viewpoint. The tuned string as expressing a numerical ratio for the reality of an experience is prominent in the metaphysical speculations of the Greeks. When the doctrine of knowledge reaches a considerable

development as we find it in Plato, it is still influenced by the extreme strictures of deductive logic. The process of knowledge for Plato aims at an extreme determination of abstract logical categories such as the Same, Other, and Existence of the Timaeus, or Being, Like, Same, unity, and their opposites in the Theaetetus.

The process of knowledge for Plato answers to the attitude of his time. In the Theaetetus¹ he indicates the attitude that being and knowing are the same. But being for Plato as is evident from all his writings cannot be anything but permanent and fixed. That makes it necessary for his knowledge process to reduce to the barest abstraction of existence². The category of Plato cannot adequately represent experience because there is evident a misconception of the nature of experience. Experience for Plato has no fluidity or development. There is of course experience which is described as becoming, but this is an absolute description and it never is. The real, never has become, it has existed from all time. These two kinds of being are absolutely separate and distinct.²

The difficulty which Plato had in making a connection between these two kinds of being intensified his attitude of making knowledge an important element in his thinking. The world of becoming can be brought into connection with the world of being only if we consider that being and not being are forms of the predication process. Plato is close to Parmenides in making Thought and Being one, but Plato has a much more sophisticated notion of thought than Parmenides had. When we say not being is what we must mean is that it is other than what we posit as being. It is not nothing because that is unthinkable. In this attitude of making existence depend upon knowledge Plato makes a great step in advance of anything that the previous philosophers

¹Theaetetus 188-189

²Timaeus 27.

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had done. We find here an attitude which becomes quite well aware of itself. The attitude toward experience becomes of importance in the determination of that experience. The attitude, however, is conceived in a spirit of extreme rationalism. There is no genuine insight into the nature of knowledge. Knowledge is presumed to be an immediate contact with a transcendent reality. The nature of the ordinary human happenings and events are not at all appreciated. For Plato the ordinary experiences which are the immediate conditions of the lives of human beings are not even real. The categories with which Plato would evaluate experience would be consequently abstract and rationalistic. This is in fact what we find in the Dialogues. There is apparent a constant attempt to state the fundamental values of experience, but the values given are obviously unsuited for the purposes they would serve.

The Aristotelian Phase.

In Aristotle we find a continued progress of the knowledge problem. The attitude toward experience becomes so conscious as to develop into a systematic methodology. Aristotle prepares the first systematic treatises on categories and logic. Aristotle attempts in his logical treatises to establish certain rules for the employment of the knowledge process. The logic of Aristotle may be considered as an organized system of rules for the organization of the facts of experience. Aristotle gets very close to the experience process since he is much more of an empiricist than is Plato. It is in this fact that we find the *raison d'être* of Aristotle's criterion^{ICISM} of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Aristotle's criterion^{ICISM} of Plato consists in finding fault with him because he does not consider closely enough the actual experience process. Aristotle is a physician and has a decided empirical viewpoint, while the attitude of Plato as a mathematician is more closely connected with the eternal and permanent in experience. Aristotle intends to find his universal in the particular, while Plato has the difficulty of bringing the particular into relation with the universal.

The scientific labors and writings of Aristotle indicate that he lived in a different stage of development of knowledge than did Plato. Aristotle lived in a period when the full fruits of observation and discovery were being reaped. The men of this time could undertake, with more or less assurance of success, to investigate and catalogue the total sum of scientific facts.

The logic of Aristotle is developed as a means of organizing the facts of experience with a complete whole based upon certain def-

inite principles. The facts of experience are, of course, for Aristotle closely related to their determination in language and custom. That is to say, when we speak of determination of experience for Aristotle, we do not mean that he determined it as do the logicians of the modern period. For Aristotle's conception of experience has very little in common with the modern meaning of that term. That explains why Aristotle's logic attempts to determine the nature of any new object with strict reference to an immutable model. The Aristotelian logic is essentially deductive in nature, and brings an absolute order into the objects of experience. A valid estimate of the work of Aristotle would consider that in spite of the statements just made, this philosopher represents a genuine advance over his predecessors so far as the awareness of the process of knowledge is concerned. Between Aristotle and Plato there is no far reaching difference with respect to the fundamental nature of experience. Yet Aristotle has developed a thoroughgoing technique for the handling of the objects of experience. This is ^{an} indication of a more profound appreciation of the nature of the experience process. The logic that Aristotle develops is of course found in its beginnings in Socrates and Plato, but Aristotle organizes it into a whole. The interest of Aristotle in the development of Logic comes from the empirical tendency of his thought. Being a physician he would naturally be more interested in the details of experience and thus be led to an interest in the systematization of knowledge.

Aristotle, we must posit from our standpoint, was closer to the actual experiential process in that reality for him did not lie beyond the heavens, but in his time ^{it} could not be conceived that genuine reality should be found here on earth. We see then that

the general attitude for the Greek philosophers including Aristotle is similar. There are, however, various degrees of developments within this general attitude. Aristotle represents an advance over Plato from this standpoint. Aristotle comes much closer to the idea of a scientist, that the modern world holds. Aristotle in some ways appears to represent a complete change from the Platonic traditions. He appears to be a philosopher of this world and seems to place his reliance in present world experience. Aristotle appears to represent completely the new viewpoint pervading Greece in the middle of the fourth century. Aristotle typifies the Greek attitude as it expands and becomes dominant. Aristotle typifies the Hellenization of the world's culture. The attitude of Aristotle is all embracing and all developing. It takes in all kinds of experience. The knowledge of Aristotle permeates all the corners of nature as the Greek notion with its Macedonian impetus branched out over the three continents. The attitude of Aristotle puts a premium upon knowledge and makes it possible for him to say that "All men by nature desire to know". Aristotle indicates in some places his keen displeasure with those who permit a "childish reluctance" to object to the investigations of "meanly regarded animals".¹

Aristotle's criticism of Plato² indicates that Aristotle was attempting to get closer to the actual level of experience. His criticism of Plato may be taken to mean that Plato had no adequate explanation of actual experience as it goes on. In his metaphysics² Aristotle asks what the forms contribute to sensible things for they neither cause movement or change in things. They do not even aid

¹Meta. A., M., N.,

²Meta. 5. 11

in the knowledge of other things or in their being if the forms are not in the individuals which ^{where} ~~were~~ in them. Aristotle has some ideals for a closer contest with actual things of experience, the particulars as he calls them, than he will admit Plato had. There is place in this kind of criticism for expectation ^S of a much clearer recognition of the nature of the knowledge process. This expectation is ^S ~~dissipated~~ with the ^{10w} ~~elaborateness~~ of a methodology of science. There is as yet no reformation of the intimate nature of the experience process. Aristotle makes a decided advance over his predecessors in attempting a thorough-going enumeration of the categories, but he does not come to any decided improvement as to the nature of the categories.

In examining the table of categories as Aristotle formulated it we are ^{mv} ~~impressed~~ with the fact that they are not any closer to the actual nature of categories than are those of Plato. This means in other words that Aristotle has no more adequate analysis of experience than has Plato. Again it must be urged that Aristotle has made much progress beyond Plato. He seems to realize more poignantly the importance of the predication process. Aristotle seems to face the knowledge problem with a greater degree of consciousness respecting its peculiar characteristics. Plato seems to be forced to a recognition that being and non-being can have meaning only as predicates of judgments. Aristotle seems fully aware of this principle. This point should not be urged as a mark of superiority of Aristotle over Plato. It might indeed be that were it not for the fact that Plato faced this problem with such successful outcome Aristotle would not have attained his place in the history of knowledge. The fact remains that Aristotle represents a stage of thought in which there

is almost full awareness of the importance of the appreciation of the attitude toward^d experience. It seems impossible to deny that with Aristotle we reach a point in the history of philosophy when the problem of knowledge stands out with sharp outline in the attitude of thinkers toward experience. The development of thought after Aristotle revolves around the principle of a better appreciation of the nature of experience. The improvements that thinkers introduced in the philosophical discipline have to do with a keener insight into the nature of experience. Until such an insight is attained, it is thought that the logic of Aristotle is sufficient for the solution of philosophical problems. Kant thus declares that to his time no improvement has been made in the logic of Aristotle. Kant of course overlooks the fact that Aristotle has a necessarily completely different attitude toward the categories since he has a completely different attitude toward experience.¹ In general Kant apparently fails to recognize the wide gulf that separates his own from Aristotle's conception of experience.

The categories of Aristotle are predicates of existence and not elements of thought. They are not the ground principles of knowledge, but expressions of the existential aspects of the objects of experience. The categories of Aristotle are classes of being, head^v under which may be placed the qualities and conditions of objects. As they are conceived as expressions of being there is also a heading for the thing in which the qualities are found, and which is found in the particular conditions. We find then substance as one of the categories in the Aristotelian table. The categories of Aristotle assume an object given,

¹Trans. Analy., Chapt. 1, Sec. 3.

and the work of the knowledge process is to enumerate the qualities and conditions of the object. The categories are not constitutive of the object. This indicates the wide divergence of the Aristotelian conception of the nature of the categories from the more adequate conceptions.

An insight into the motives for setting up just this series of categories is essential for the interpretation of the Aristotelian categorial doctrine. That such an insight is difficult of attainment is a matter of common admission. There seems to be no strict rule for the enumeration of the particular ten categories, or for the number ten. Indeed Aristotle gives in several places lists omitting the last two.¹ In topics 1, 9 and Cat. 4 are the only places where the whole ten are enumerated. It is suggested by Prantl² and Grote³ that he might have just as well had fifteen instead of ten. Kant ascribes this fact to the lack of system in Aristotle's work on categories and says he actually has fifteen when adding the post predicaments. The influence of the Pythagoreans' decuple table of opposites might be putting in an appearance here. This might have imposed itself upon Aristotle in a subtle manner perhaps with ~~an~~ ^{intuitive awareness} ~~consciousness~~ on his part. The most plausible viewpoint is that Aristotle derives these categories from the enumeration of the possible predicates that may be connected with a subject. The nine categories⁵ seem to cover all the points in the description of an object. Without carrying the point too far it may be said that Aristotle derived these categories from the realm of language. The

¹ Post A. 1, 22 Phys. V, 1. Met. V, 7, that is possession, position.
² Gesch. der Logik, 206.
³ Aristotle, p. 75
⁴ T. Analy. Chap. 1, sec. III.
⁵ That is excluding substance.

point to be made here is that the categories do not indicate any intrinsic process of evaluating experience. The categories are really descriptive terms functioning in a classificatory capacity. The logic of Aristotle deals with objective conditions, with propositions and not with the intimate functioning of the real experiential process. Aristotle is dealing with the expressions of attitude toward experience, not with the elements of the attitude which is experience. The doctrine of Aristotle is thus not an intimate account of the ^{supreme} process but the description of some phases of results of the experience process. While this position of Aristotle is an advance over his predecessors in the recognition of the importance of attitude, this attitude is not yet well understood.

That the categories of Aristotle do not represent an adequate interpretation of the experience process seems clear and this indicates further that Aristotle was not conscious of the genuine processes of experience. The philosophy of Aristotle considered as an attitude toward experience involves much more than can possibly be comprised in these categories. This is all the more peculiar when we consider that Aristotle did not think otherwise than that the categories he enumerates are sufficient to cover the entire range of experience. Aristotle seems unaware that he has a valuable list of other categories which do not find a place in his formulated ones. Especially needful for the representation of his Weltanschauung are necessity and contingency, purpose and end, essence, substance, being and others. This indicates that Aristotle was quite unaware of the place that the categories should take in his philosophical system. The dependence on the expression of the objects of experience are too much emphasized. The process of predication for Aristotle

is a process of enumerating the qualities and conditions of the subject. The qualities and conditions inhere in the subject. That is, an object is described. The predication process for Aristotle is not the determination of an experience. The experience is a determination already made and presented. The predication process is the enumeration of the elements of determination. Having this attitude toward experience the larger and more specific determinations of the experience do not appear in the Aristotelian table of categories. It was this fact of the inadequacy of the Aristotelian table of categories that led Platinus to criticize it as referring only to the sensible world, and not applying to the supersensible world at all.¹

In general we may say it is true that the Aristotelian categories do not adequately represent the Aristotelian philosophy. They do not aim at the interpretation of the Aristotelian attitude toward experience. For an interpretation of the Aristotelian attitude of experience we must take into account the categories not brought into strict formulation. We must consider the place in experience of the contingent and the possible. In attempting to interpret the Aristotelian philosophy one must do more than attend to Aristotle's definite assertion with respect to the categories.

In considering the whole scheme of categories that Aristotle uses we meet with this fact that the attitude expressed in the formulation of the categories reflects the general viewpoint of Aristotle. We should not say that the formulated categories do not at all express the attitude of Aristotle toward experience; we should say rather that they indicate some defect in his appreciation of the nature of experience. Experience for Aristotle is a more or less objective contact with things. This contact is objective in that there is no

¹Platinus, ^vEnneades VI.

creation of things by the experience process. It is for this reason that knowledge for Aristotle is primarily a process of systematization and classification. For the same reason also knowledge for Aristotle is demonstrative and not primarily investigative. The objects of experience are not determinations of the experience process but classifications of an experience process which is above all a serialization process. The categories of Aristotle are not constitutive of the objects of experience but merely descriptive symbols.

The work of Aristotle indicates a clearer recognition of the attitude taking function of the logician and philosopher, but it is necessarily doomed to ^{make} ~~work~~ little advance over the previous thinkers in that the attitude is dominated by a particular viewpoint. Aristotle is still under the sway of the externalistic viewpoint which is a characteristic of the Greek philosophy. Aristotle is as much dominated by the strict absolutistic viewpoint as is any thinker of the Greek period. Aristotle should be given credit for attempting to break down the distinction between the sensible and intelligible worlds. The categories of Aristotle indicate a protest against the exclusive ascription of the real to the realm of ideas. The categories of Aristotle may be taken to be extension of the viewpoint developed by Plato in the Sophist, which makes of the ideas predicates of propositions. That Aristotle has not made the most of the way he saw is evident since he has not given up the two world theory¹. Aristotle is a rationalist in precisely the same sense as is Plato. True being for him is just as unconnected with ordinary experience as it is with Plato. The trend of the entire ^fMetaphysics lends support to this viewpoint. In the

¹Burnet - Greek Philosophy, 345, holds Aristotle to be more of a separatist than Plato.

twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*¹ Aristotle indicates as sharp a division between the sensible and the supersensible, as the dichotomy was then stated, as is found anywhere in Plato. One might insist that Aristotle be credited with the attitude that so far as his actual scientific work is concerned he did harmonize the two worlds, of the ideas and of sensible things. In reply it might be said that this attitude represents a failure to work out completely his position. The logic of Aristotle's attitude drove him by necessity to the separation viewpoint. It was the absolutism of the Greek spirit that held its partakers captive. The predication of the unmoved mover is an essential consequence of Aristotle's philosophy. The absolutistic viewpoint is not lacking even in the attitude of Aristotle's method, and indeed vitiates it.

Aristotle begins his improvement over Plato by making the form a part of the thing. He means to bring the forms out of the world beyond the Heavens and to give them a place in the world of sensible things. He carries this point so far that the Form becomes the only important ^{factor} ~~factor~~ in the objects of experience. What a thing is depends upon its form, and the purpose influences entirely what a thing is to become.² Although the material must always be present it is not the important element. It is not even of equal importance with the form but in most cases it is present to the ^{realization} ~~determination~~ of the object. Since the form is really what a thing is, why any object is not what it ought to be is due to the baneful influence of the material involved. The doctrine of development of Aristotle

¹Meta. 1073 A, 2

²Meta. V. 4. 1015 A Part An. I. 1. 640, B. 28 641 A. 29, B. 29 sqq.
Phy. II. 1193 A. 28 - 194 A. 12 193 C. 2.

is a description of the attempt the form makes to realize itself. There is an internal necessity in nature which causes things to be what they are. The world of experience consists of objects which are attempting to realize their inner essences. That they do not realize their forms or purposes is the fault of the material which is related to the form. In matter Aristotle finds a hindrance to form and it is the cause of blind chance and natural necessity. It is matter which interferes with the purpose of nature to realize itself. The Aristotelian philosophy of nature calls for objects fully realized and exhibiting in the best way the purposes actuating their presence and condition. That objects are not fully realized with respect to form is in all cases the fault of the resistance of matter. All irregular natural phenomena are explained in this way. Aristotle carries this idea so far as to consider it an abortion of nature when children do not resemble their parents and especially the father¹. Zeller² points out that the birth of a bad son to a good father or vice versa, or when the nature of the body does not correspond to that of the soul, there is an abortion of nature. There are other instances indicating that the development of Aristotle is not a true development but merely a device for absolute classification. The doctrine of Aristotle implies a series of absolute forms to which the objects of experience must correspond. The objects of experience lack reality in just so much as they fail to resemble the forms.

It is clear that experience for Aristotle is just as much bisected as it is for Plato. The Forms still stand out as the essentially real and genuine aspects of experience. In so far as experience is not form it is not real. The most real is that which has in it a

¹Gen. An IV, 3 767, B.5ff.

²Die Philosophie der Griechen, 3. Auf. s. 429.

minimum of matter and becomes pure form. Aristotle is thus a metaphysician and his scientific experience does not contain much reality. It is only in intention that Aristotle goes beyond Plato. Aristotle is not yet appreciative of the nature of experience. He should be given credit for attempting to give a systematic statement of the categories. Aristotle should be credited with a keen insight into the problem of predication. His total contribution, however, is much minimized in that he was still dominated by the objective and metaphysical spirit which pervaded the Greek conception of experience. The categories of Aristotle are then parts of a scheme for the meta-^{ly}do-^{logical} ordering of the objects of knowledge. Because they are developed in connection with an attitude which is not entirely conscious of the nature of experience they cannot answer to all ^{ny} adequate conceptions of categories. They can represent to us a more conscious appreciation than was previously the case, that reality is given in experience, and recognized by the knowledge process. Belonging to a metaphysical tradition experience is to a great extent divorced from reality, and knowledge is a case of classification of the objects of experience which do in some measure approximate reality.

It is necessary to consider that the discussion of Aristotle's categories involves two sets. The first may be considered to be the series formulated in Topics and Metaphysics and other places. These indicate a growing conception on the part of Aristotle of the process of knowledge. In studying those categories we must grant Aristotle credit for a better attitude toward experience than his predecessors possessed. Aristotle seems to appreciate the necessity for giving a stricter account of the ordinary and average experiences, than did Plato, for example. Aristotle seems to have reached a thorough going

scientific viewpoint. We must posit for Aristotle a better appreciation of the fact that for an understanding of the world there must be a closer scrutiny of the process of knowledge than was true of any of his predecessors. The emphasis on the better understanding of the knowledge process must be construed as a keener appreciation of the importance of the understanding of experience. This is a much closer approximation to the appreciation of the experience/process itself than we have seen advocated by any of Aristotle's philosophical antecedents.

We have seen, that in spite of all this as was quite normal the categories of Aristotle were too close to the grammatical expression and reflected too much the mere processes of predication to be genuine representations of experience. They reflected the fact that the attitude toward experience which Aristotle held to was influenced by a too rigid and static conception of experience. We were bound to conclude that while we had in Aristotle a greater emphasis of the attitude in the understanding of the world the whole Aristotelian viewpoint was misdirected by the objective and metaphysical traditions which pervaded the Greek philosophy

The categories of a more general kind and which are not formulated in a series indicate quite conclusively the strictly metaphysical attitude of Aristotle. They indicate the slight advance that Aristotle made over Plato. Experience for Aristotle is a ready made, rigid type of being and has little in common with the plastic and changing events of our ordinary existence. Our experience to be real must answer to this beyond world of fixed character. Our experience is real only if it partakes of the real world which may be taken to be the realm of the final purpose or end. The world of the here and now is only a stage in the fulfillment of a purpose which transcends

the present both in time and space. It is in this point that Hegel finds himself so much in sympathy with Aristotle. All experience of the finite individuals marks only a stage in the development of genuine things. The objects of the present experience are attempts, more or less successful, to attain to genuine reality. This situation is brought readily to mind in considering some of the categories of Aristotle. Being for Aristotle reduces to a bare and abstract entity totally devoid of all qualities such as they are known in ordinary experience. Being for Aristotle is not a substance, as the moderns conceive it, it cannot be any tangible experience. It is one of the most universal of predicates and therefore cannot be anything because it is always a such and never a this.¹ This same condition obtains with reference to unity, and carrying out the principle which Aristotle states in connection with these two categories we find that the wider categories of Aristotle are far from giving us genuine experience.

A close examination of the wider Aristotelian categories indicates quite clearly that for Aristotle existence is the same as logical predication. There appears in Aristotle an attempt to go beyond Plato on this point, but the attempt quite obviously does not succeed. Aristotle seems to get closer to genuine experience but as we have seen, his awareness of the nature of experience is such as to not lead him to a closer contact with experience than Plato achieved. In considering the categories as Aristotle formulates and uses them, we see him holding an attitude toward experience which entirely subverts the nature of reality and of experience. In spite of the fact that Aristotle holds a more advanced attitude toward experience than did

¹Meta. 2 1038 b. 35 ff., 1040 b.17 ff., I 1053 b.17 ff.

his predecessors, he is so little aware of the true nature of experience that he does not transcend the attitude of the Greeks but rather culminates it. With Aristotle's formulation of a table of categories there is thrown into relief the problem of knowledge in a very pointed way. We find that the importance of predication is brought out. Experience is considered to be a determination process. The fault in this philosophy is that the determinations are given in a metaphysical way. They are assumed and experience must follow the outlines of their forms. The objects of experience must fit certain previously given forms. The categories of Aristotle do not constitute experience, the determinations are not characterizations of experience in the most fruitful manner that they can be thus determined, but they are given prior to finite experience. The determinations of experience for Aristotle do not take the shape of experience, they do not ^trace the intimate existence of everyday facts, but warp and distort the ceaseless flow of experience to fit certain prejudged determinations of reality. The determinations of experience are made before experience and are in truth formulated in connection with some speculative tradition. In the time of Aristotle the scientist and philosopher had not developed the courage to look upon experience with a confidence in one's own powers to determine its nature. In fact the time had not yet been reached by the scientist in which he could say that he could not determine the nature of experience. As has been so often repeated, the time of Aristotle is the time when a correct awareness of one's attitude toward experience was not yet developed. In this fact we find the reason for Aristotle's failure to appreciate the nature of development. It is for this reason also that he could not give a satis-

factory account of the relation of the universal and the particular. It is for this reason that Aristotle could not account satisfactorily for the so-called abnormalities of experience. For Aristotle the objects of experience which failed to measure up to their ultimate forms were unreal and could not constitute experience. In Aristotle we do not find as yet the attitude of experience. We have in full measure the metaphysical attitude, the attitude of objective and transcendent reality.

The philosophy of Aristotle may be considered as a definite representation of the general experience of the time in which it was formulated. There is something in common with the several other aspects of experience which it is a part and an expression. The Aristotelian Weltanschauung may be looked at from the standpoint of the changing political fortunes of the Greek people. We can see there some definite correlations between the two. The general social situation pervading Greece at this period finds its expression in the general philosophical attitude as exemplified in Aristotle's theory of Knowledge, Ethics and Politics. The differences between Aristotle and Plato represent genuine difference in the general experience of the time.

Aristotle is a stranger in Athens and is not entirely in sympathy with the completeness and solidity of the Athenian state. Perhaps also at this time the passing of the whole Greek independence was influencing his attitude. Aristotle was an individualist and this may be traced more clearly to the fact that the conception of the world was becoming more tolerant. The political changes taking place meant a greater freedom of those who were not Greeks. Aristotle's pupil Alexander was proposing to give equal consideration to Greek

and Barbarian. The portals of Greek culture and civilization ^{was} ~~was~~ opening wide, the other peoples were entering and enjoying the fruits of their development. The importance of the individual was increasing with the downfall of the autonomy of the Greek state. The mere fact of being a member of the Athenian state for example, was not sufficient to give a man his standing in the world. He must be something on his own account.

The development of science at this time was likewise a factor in the development of the importance of the individual. This development of science should not be considered as the cause of the increasing importance of the individual. The fact that the individual was becoming of more importance may just as well be taken to indicate a very vital stimulus toward scientific investigation. Each should be taken to be a symptom of ^gchanging conditions which resulted in expressions of newer attitudes toward experience.

Aristotle's insistence on the importance of the individual is to be traced to his reflection of the newer experiences of the Greeks. His insistence in his political philosophy on the importance of the individual and the secondary importance of the community may be traced to the absorption of the Greek states into the growing Alexandrian kingdom. His attitude may be considered also as a disapproval of the subsumption of the independent states to the overwhelming mastery of a single state.

The Aristotelian philosophy has other consequences than those Aristotle himself thought of. Aristotle is still a Greek and his attitude reflects a development of the Greek tradition. The conquest of Alexander indicate a branching out of the Greek spirit. The Greek attitude is an objective one and as reflected in Aristotelian ~~forma-~~

lation maintains its objective and fixed characteristics. As we have seen the philosophy of Aristotle begins with a definite stress of the individual in experience and ends with an insistence on the importance of the Form which puts the individual in an almost complete discord. This discrepancy comes out in Aristotle's emphasis of his non-autocratic view while holding that there are born slaves. Aristotle, while holding to the predominance of the individual still believes that man is absolutely a social animal. Men would degenerate and become a beast were he to turn his back upon society and live alone. With respect to Aristotle our conclusion must be that his philosophy is in an integral way a formulation of the general outlook upon the experience of his time.

It has been apparent throughout our brief resume of the Greek philosophy that a definite attitude towards experience is developed and maintains itself throughout the entire history of Greek thought. Greek philosophy is essentially objective as the whole attitude of the Greek is objective. We find a development from totally ignoring the process of experience to the point where it comes to be of genuine importance. The essentially subjective nature of the experience process never becomes a genuine part of the Greek attitude. The attitude of the Greek, whether in science, art or politics is an immediate reaction to experience. The Greek had never reached the position that the experience is dependent upon him for its peculiar quality.

In science the Greek developed the ideas which were derived from a practical need until he reached a systematic structure of logically related elements. The development of ideas was not made to accord with an elaboration of human needs. Greek science is more impersonal and unrelated to human needs than it has ever been since.

Symbolic of this fact is the great prominence of mathematics in the hierarchy of Greek science. The speculations of the Greek thinkers are very closely allied to the mathematical disciplines. Only the last period in Greek culture is characterized by a thorough study of empirical science. Empirical sciences begin to flourish only when the star of Greek civilization was setting as a national process and product.

The Greeks never developed their physical science beyond the static conception of experience. The general viewpoint of experience among the Greeks called for a type of science which should consider the facts of the world as fixed and unalterable. The fundamental question in Greek science is, Why does a certain thing happen? How it happens is not a pressing question. In the biological sciences the investigation of what actually did occur gave way to the pre-supposition of what should occur in a fixed and stable world. This indicates that the nature of the experience process was not a subject for investigation. An inquiry into the nature of experience would always give the changing nature, such inquiry would give the idea that experience is not simple and uniform. It would indicate that experience is not a process independent of the person who had the experience. The psychology of Greece indicates also the objective attitude which dominated the Greek scientist. The experiences such as the psychologist described them were expressed in terms of vision. The objective attitude was at the basis of all descriptions of mental phenomena.

The art of Greece indicates with other cultural disciplines the objective view of the Greek mind. Greek art is essentially concerned with the type, with the real beyond the accidental expressions afforded by the particulars. The architecture of Greece is graced

with the simplicity of mathematics and with the striking symmetry of order and balance. The art of Greece does not express any individual experience, but the experience of the whole group. Each piece of art seems to have enshrined within it the entire Greek spirit.

In Greek literature the conflicts seem to be of vague, abstract principles, not between the individuals. The experiences depicted are of entire groups. Greek tragedy is for the most part occupied with descriptions of the titanic struggles ^{with} of eternal laws and not of the strife of human beings.

In religion the spirit of externality and detachment is well exemplified. For the Greeks religion was never a personal affair - it was a matter of state. The religious rites and practices were of a national character; they never were the personal affairs of the individual. So long as one observed the rites presented by the state what an individual believed was his own private concern. Religion in Greece was an objective matter and was not an intimate part of the individual's life. Greek religion was a cold, intellectual affair. It had nothing in it of the soul stirring dependence of the individual upon unknown forces. It did not represent a striving for an indescribable something that could never be obtained.

The categories of Aristotle no more than those of any Greek maintains that contact with experience which would make of it a valid element in genuine thought. The functional nature of the categories so far as Greek thought is concerned, is brought out in the fact that the attitudes there are in immediate contact with the particular kind of experience in that place and time. The philosophers of Greece no more than any up to very recent times appreciated the functional nature of categories in their overt attitudes.

Hellenistic Period.Analytical Table of Contents.

With the dissipation of Athenian power there ends the characteristic Greek philosophy. After Aristotle the new human experiences bring new attitudes toward those experiences.

The rationalistic philosophy of Athens becomes modified in essential particulars, there is a note of individualism brought in which was not so prominent before.

The methodological viewpoint drops out and the Stoics bring about such a change in the Aristotelian categories as to mark a break in the development of the philosophy which is highly conscious of its own attitudes toward experience.

The functional nature of the categories they use is indicated here as in all the previous cases by the corresponding changes in them; and the lack in formulating them; and in the general experience of the periods.

In the Alexandrian-Roman period the categories with which experience is determined reflects very markedly the influence of the fusion of western and eastern civilization. In a general way the experiences were beginning to be categorized in a romantic spirit. The world was looked upon from the standpoint of the extremely helpless individual. The feeling of dependence upon and need of God served to give character to the attitudes of the period.

The essentially Greek conception of life and experience culminates in the Aristotelian philosophy. There is found in Aristotle the highest point to which the Greek philosophy attains. The essentially characteristic Greek viewpoint is summed up in the statement of Aristotle. After this philosophy we have a change in attitude of a decidedly fundamental sort. The essentially Greek attitude gives way to a conception of experience and of man, which is an extreme one from that standpoint. The extreme objective attitude towards ^{life} steps aside, and there comes upon the stage of western philosophy a conception of life and of man which emphasises the inner experiences. The subjective experience comes to the fore and dominates the culture of all men for a considerable period of time. The emphasis is transferred from objective nature which contains the human being as a part to the human being itself. In a way we may say that the world of nature decreases its proportions. The interest in external nature becomes diminished and the experiences of objective things are to a degree lost. Again it might be said that in this period there comes a separation between the sciences of man and of nature such that both the subjective and objective attitudes can be fostered.

The post-Aristotelian period in philosophy marks a series of changes in human experiences which were of tremendous importance for the history of thought and action from that time to this. There came to pass with the downfall of Greek independence that entire hellenization of the world which brought a new complexion upon the works and thoughts of man. This attempt at a profound ^{development in the ordering of human} development is the ordering of human appearance may be traced to some of the necessities of the period with the loss sustained in the loss of citizenship in the Greek states came an appreciation of a greater reliance upon self. The self received an importance in this period such as it never knew before. The individual

... ..

became of extreme importance in his experience and experience came to be determined with reference to the individual. The individual grew to depend upon himself for the interpretation of his experiences. Science grew more humanistic and more practical. The scientists of the time were interested more in problems affecting human individuals than problems of serious cosmic import.

The development of the knowledge process which came to a head in Aristotle was not entirely lost with the Stoics and Epicureans but they made a different use of it. After Aristotle the attitude toward experience became more and more conscious of itself and finally resulted in a more or less complete scepticism. In the first place there develops a critical examination of experience. Genuine scepticism makes its appearance for the first time, and indicates that men will rely more upon himself than was the case previously. In the second place the interests of the period are more closely centered in Ethics and Religion than was true in the Greek period. The ethical and religious life becomes an intensely absorbing element in experience.

The growing importance of man as a factor in experience marks a difference between the Greek and the Hellenistic conceptions of Experience. The latter was the growing conception which culminated in the attitude which made it an unbreakable rule for each man to be a citizen of Rome. The trend of events seems to be toward a subjective attitude. This makes it possible for the Epicureans to deny the social nature of man and for the Stoics to believe ⁱⁿ it because of the participation of the individual soul in the world Reason. The prevalence of the stoic attitude indicated that the dependence of man is not yet ^m complete. We find that man still considers himself a part of the world ^{all}. The Stoic overcomes with this viewpoint the difficulties attending the loss of the small state citizenship.

The Hellenistic period also gave origin to the concept of the sage. The wise man it is who knows the way of happiness in spite of any worldly misfortune. The fact that the ethical doctrine of the Hellenistic period revolves about the conception of happiness is an indication of the growing importance of human experience. Man had to depend upon himself and since he could not control the external forces he considered it his duty to conquer himself. This helplessness resulting from the experience of the time showed its effect also in the scepticism prevalent in the period. There arose questions as to the possibility of knowledge, questions which now seemed to carry much force and conviction. Pyrrho who stands as a symbol of a stern sceptic need not be considered as a first founder of a sceptic doctrine. It is suggested that the lack of insistence upon a strict scepticism in the history of thought before Pyrrho does not mean that the will to deny was entirely lacking. It appears clear that the nature of the Greek experience was such as to not make the sceptical attitude of lasting importance. The completely sceptical attitude could not be a true symptom of Greek thought.

The formulation of a logical doctrine and an expressed attitude toward the categories would not naturally enough be expected in the Hellenistic period. From the standpoint of a strict continuation of the tradition found in Aristotle there is a break with the post-Aristotelian philosophers. From the standpoint of a strictly formulated theory of knowledge we may consider that with Aristotle comes an end to such development. This period brings with it an overwhelmingly new attitude and it must necessarily be some time before a systematic viewpoint can be formulated. The logic which is formulated is a formal process and with the minimum of connection with actual things of experience. The Stoics attempted a reformulation of the categories but this may be taken to be a regression rather than anything else. Their attempt seems to give up the strict reliance upon the knowledge process. The categories

On the Stoics and Sceptics.

for the Stoics became more ontological than was the case since a series of categories was first formulated. The emphasis of the attitude toward experience is given up and experience is evaluated as an external fact. This result would be expected when we consider that the entire Stoic doctrine is to become fused with the World All. The individual finds his essence and perfection in becoming joined with the world reason.

With the Stoics there is a return to a mechanistic explanation of nature. This is true also of the Epicureans who indeed held to a frank materialistic viewpoint. Emphasis is placed upon external nature but it is an ordered nature such as could contain man in relationship to it. The determination of the experiences are all influenced by this emphasis of the individual in experience. The starting point for all philosophical systems in this period was happiness. All speculation and all philosophy was a means to this universally desired end. The complete renunciation of all knowledge is possible in such a time and skepticism flourished in the Hellenistic period with Stoicism and Epicureanism.

The change in the doctrine of categories which the Stoics brought about made them into formal ontological principles. They became modes of predication of natural things. The formulated series contains the highest categories/^{to} which all the others are by degrees subordinate. The Aristotelian categories are reduced to four, Being is the highest; under this is essential quality; under that accidental quality; then comes relation marking the connection of the object being predicted with other objects. The changes which the Stoics introduce in the doctrines of categories indicates the change in general attitude toward experience which occurred in their period. There is no strict evaluation X

of doctrine to be traced here. The development which can be traced from Socrates to Aristotle cannot be found continued in the thinkers of this period. The Stoics and Epicureans indicate a break in the development towards a closer appreciation of the philosophers' own attitude. The Stoics are expressing an external attitude which from the standpoint of consciousness of attitude, is very similar to the Pre-Sophistics. The emphasis of the individual in the Hellenistic period may be taken to continue the tradition which is conscious of its own place in the formulation of attitudes although the period marks a break in the development of Athenian philosophy.

In the Hellenistic period we find the teleological viewpoint give up. There is a more mechanical viewpoint adopted. The teleological ideas immediately preceding tied the individual up with the mass of experiential objects and things. The mechanical viewpoint of the Hellenistic period gives differentiation to the objects of experience. The experience becomes more and more individuated and even if the emphasis on the attitude itself is neglected it is clear that a new attitude is formulated and developed. It was in the Hellenistic period that the Stoics first formulated the principium individuation^{is}. No two things can be entirely and in all respects alike.¹ This point is well worth stressing, that although the philosophers of the Hellenistic period are not after Aristotle becoming more and more concerned with the attitude of experience, the attitude that they do adopt paves the way for a closer connection with the attitude itself. This is illustrated by the Stoic epistemology^{of} and the Epicurean insistence on happiness in their Ethics. The whole trend of the times is then to evaluate experience in such terms as to point unmistakably to the projection of the individ-

¹Hicks - Stoics and Epicureans.

ual into the determinations of experience. The determination of the world as an evaluation of his experience is in the Hellenistic period still give in terms of this world. We find indeed an attempt made to give up the formulation of experience in the conceptual terms of the Greek philosophers. The evaluation of experience is anthropocentric, but still of this world. In the next period we find that the experiences are evaluated in the categories of a transcendent existence. We may say that the Stoics, for example, come back to an immediate contact with the world. The attitude toward the world is not stressed as much as the determination of the world itself. The emphasis is different, however, from that of the pre-Sophistic philosophers. The kind of experience that is being expressed is entirely other than that of the pre-Sophists. In the Hellenistic period the world is of extreme importance not for its own self but because it provides a home for the individual. The experience looked at from a viewpoint more or less external to the individual in the Hellenistic period became determined more and more from an individual viewpoint. The fact that the loss of Greek independence made the individual shrink into himself, did not carry any farther than to individualize experience. A subjective viewpoint was not attained before much later times.

The Alexandrian-Roman Period.

The Alexandrian period represents an expansion and a development of thought and culture. The establishment of Alexandria as a center and seat of learning brought forth an attitude toward experience which was not only new but even revolutionary. Alexandria represents a series of changes which has taken place in the thought and attitudes of the time. There has come a mingling of elements. East and West have streamed into each other and fused in idea and in action. The differences in thought have been overcome just as the differences in national autonomy have been overcome. The Alexandrian period is marked for the fusion of Occidental and Oriental ways and views of life. This leads to a change in the fundamental outlook upon nature and life. The Alexandrian period brings to us a new type of experience and a comparatively new mode of evaluating this experience.

The individualizing tendency which the Hellenistic period showed has become so intense and acute that man not only looked at experience from his own point of view, but he made that point of view an extremely personal one. The need for attachment to some definite thing become so acute as to become finally the extreme necessity for the soul's salvation. From this grew the extreme subjective viewpoint which contrasted with the objective attitude which it replaced in the history of western thought. The Alexandrian period shows us a new type of attitude; it becomes frankly religious. The change to the religious aspect is gradual and passes through the essentially ethical aspect of the Hellenistic period. In the Alexandrian period the determination of the world comes from a religious source. The innermost needs of the

individual give the clue to the determination of experience. Philosophy in this period turns away from nature, and from morality and takes refuge in religious experience. The attitude of this period gives up its frankly materialistic viewpoint and attaches to a spiritual viewpoint of the world. There is a remarkable change come over the attitude of man with respect to his experience. From looking at things from a realistic standpoint now there is stressed the view of a spiritual world.

The Alexandrian period marks a period in the history of thought when the mystical and romantic attitudes toward life become very prominent. This attitude may be traced to the oriental influences which are striking symptoms of the Alexandrian culture. This mystical or religious attitude makes itself felt in the formulations of experience as involving other-world elements. The determinations of experience in this period are given in somewhat other terms than has been the custom hitherto. There is apparent a change in attitude that is fundamental and different from that of the previous periods. The emphasis of the time is placed upon the supersensuous which upon the formal side emerged from the Platonic division of the world. Symptomatic of the period are such conditions as the attempt to spiritualize all experience. The conflict between body and spirit for supremacy results in a complete subordination of matter to spirit.¹ The predominance of revelation as the source of knowledge is indicative of an attitude which places its confidence in a realm beyond present experience. Man seems to base his confidence in his own ability. The strong sense of individuality and personal power which makes the Greek man and thinker is lacking in the individual of this period. Historians place great

1 Cf. Windéband - Ges. d. *g. P*

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emphasis upon the individuality of the Greek especially of the Athenian period.¹ There is a growing loss of confidence in one's own person with the fall of Athenian independence. In the Greek period the strength of the social structure was sufficient to give a sense of power and authority to each individual. In the Alexandrian period this is practically all dissipated. There is a keen desire on the part of man to become joined and fused with a something beyond themselves. Man is no longer sufficient unto himself but seeks to transcend himself and to be taken up into the whole.²

There is no question but that one of the causes for this change in attitude involves the changes going on in the general experience of man. So far as political affairs are concerned we find man has practically lost his hold upon his local group. Man has lost his immediate and direct contact with a strong sustaining power. The individual has been forced back into himself and upon himself. The all absorbing problem for the individual now is to save his soul. With the loss of his temporal connections man cleaves with all his strength to a hope in the beyond.

As a conscious formulation of a doctrine of categories we may take Platinus as an example, Platinus stand in this period as an excellent example of one who faces the problem of the nature of categories and proceeds to deal with it directly. Platinus criticizes the Aristotlean categories because they are applicable only to objects of sense. Platinus is concerned in establishing a doctrine of categories which will determine the genuinely real objects, those of supersense. We find in Platinus a tendency to stress the intelligible world, for there is found reality. The world of ordinary experience is not real for Platinus. Reality for Platinus is found in the transcendental region

¹Cf. E. Meyer, *Kleinere Schriften*.

³For contrasting political views of Greek and Oriental, cf. Wheeler, *Alexander the Great*.

beyond human experience. The realm of human experience is illusion and the falsification of the real. It is of the vilest vile and the inherent seat of all evil. The entire attitude of Platinus as a representative of his period is to glorify the intelligible and de-mean the world of sense.

Platinus represents a transition stage between the older external view and the modern subjective standpoint. Platinus indicates an appreciation of the insufficient of the Greek viewpoint. Platinus is reaching out after a newer and completer attitude toward experience. The social situation demands that another attitude toward experience be embraced. The result is not, however, such that Platinus and his followers realize a better mode of evaluating experience. They do not have any better appreciation of the meaning of life and reality. The Neo-Platonists have not yet come to the realization of experience as such. There is no closer adherence to the attitude itself than was the case with the Greek thinkers in the preceding periods. Their emphasis of the transcendent and spiritual indicates clearly a growing sense of helplessness on the part of the individual. This is not what we may term from the modern standpoint a healthy subjectivity. The subjectivity of the Alexandrian-Roman represents a sickly dependence upon something not present. It is the projection of the inner self in a romantic rather than in a naturalistic manner. There is merely a turning away from the older tradition to embrace an opposite viewpoint. We might trace in this school the beginnings of a subjective standpoint which led ultimately to the appreciation of experience as experience. In the Neo-Platonic school we have not as yet any appreciation of the nature of the experience process. Platinus and his school represent in the most apparent way the beginning of an attitude toward experience which results finally in an

appreciation of experience as such. But this is only a beginning and from the standpoint of a completed achievement this school is as far from a conscious appreciation of the nature of experience as is Aristotle. In this period we have the relinquishment of the cold intellectual attitude and the acceptance of a warm internal contact with the world. This beginning may lead to either one of two consequences. This close commerce with things of the world might lead to a careful and consistent evaluation of objects. The relation of experience and reality might be determined with exactness. The viewpoint might lead to a careful scientific procedure and investigation. The alternative consequence is that an attitude of mystic relation of the individual to the world all is developed. This latter condition occurs in the Neo-Platonic world. There is in this period no advancement in the better appreciation of the process of experience. The Neo-Platonists do not attain even to a wholesome subjective position. The evaluation of the supersensuous world and the accompanying conditions ^{are} due to a ruthless subjectivism which seized upon the men of this period. In order that the subjective viewpoint should be fruitful and plausible it is necessary to have a strict confidence in the experiences of the individual so that a confident evaluation of the experiences is possible.

The categories of Platinus aim to indicate a wide breach between the sensible world and the world of intelligible things. The intelligible world is for him, of course, the real world; the other is not real but a shadow or appearance of the real world. This doctrine brings out the mystical element in Platinus. In order to bring out some sort of order and attachment in the world Platinus makes use of the conception of a One with which the entire world of objects and persons must enter. In so far as the world is real and good it is composed

of soul material, material which has been derived from the ⁰One supreme principle by emanation.

One essential characteristic of the New-Platonic Weltanschauung stands forth as an ever-recurrent theme, and that is the emphasis on the higher values that are attached to the beyond of experience. Platinus does not go over as completely to the transcendent world as do the later philosophers. Platinus still maintains his hold on the world of present phenomena although he denies it has genuine reality as one of its components.

The Alexandrian-Roman period is a period of extreme individualism but an individualism of a peculiar sort. There is a sickly turning in of the person into his own self and a fearful dependence upon one's own resources. This type of individualism stands in marked contrast to the Greek individualism. The Greek individual stood firm and with whole hearted reliance upon himself as a sturdy member of a solid society. Greek society was homogeneous and exclusive and as long as it held together it gave its members a firm hold upon themselves and upon the objects of their experience. The present period made of the individual a cog in a giant machine. Nationalistic lines were broken down and from the compact city state there resulted a cosmopolitanism which swamped the individual completely. There were great political organizations developed but the ordinary individual had no large share in them. His interests were outside those of the grand organization to which he was counted a nominal member.

A glance at the cultural situation of this period indicates the weakening of the staunch individualism of the Greek times. The Alexandrian period produced some results in the scientific fields, but this work was decidedly of an empirical and factual sort. No elaborate principles were developed. There is to be seen here the carrying on of

the interest in empirical facts which began in the last days of the Athenian period. The great eagerness in the search for facts is an inheritance from the last phase of Athenian thought. The interest in science was fostered in medicine, geography and in fact all the so-called humanistic sciences. The advances in mathematics and astronomy were quite remarkable. As compared to the later or strictly Roman aspect of this period the earlier or Alexandrian period proper was brilliant with discovery and achievement. There is, however, a sad reflection cast over the period as a whole for the intellectual energies show undoubted signs of ~~weakening~~^w and ~~waning~~^w. The investigators ^{show} an inclination to employ themselves with the unusual and the bizarre, they did not hesitate to stoop to dream books and ^gastronomics.¹ The tastes ran to mystical and magical causes of things and led to a vicious occupation with magical powers, stones and plants. Even the great astronomical discoveries were diluted with astrological and other superstitions.²

In the Roman period we have a complete failure of the scientific movement. In Roman hands science was completely dissipated. The scientific movement which was so strong in Greece gradually become extinct in the Roman period. Rome was occupied with the building up and the maintenance of a huge political system. The intellect of Rome was occupied with the ^{invention} of schemes by which to hold together and control the enormous territories and dependencies which she made a part of her domains. The experience of the Roman period is expressed in an excellent manner in the Laws which were formulated and administered. It indicates the place of the individual in this mighty ocean. The individual of the Roman period found himself quite

¹ Susemihl - Geschichte der Griechischen Literature in der Alexanderi-
nerzeit I. 1891, S. 835.

² Burckhardt - Griechische Kultur 4. 1902 S. 624.

outside the pale of events. The contact of the individual with things actually going on was very limited. The Romans were subjects and not citizens in a concrete sense. The Roman political organization was a vast end in itself and did not exist for the people. The final reduction of the Roman state testifies to the inherent weaknesses of its peculiar structure.

It is in these characteristics of Roman Society that one finds the causes for the development of an attitude which stressed the values of the other world. What was lacking in the present world was sought in the world beyond this. The spiritual world became a reality to the peoples of this period. In the spiritual world could be found solace for the sufferings and hardships of this present life. The progress of the Christian doctrines has a rational explanation in this social situation. The religious attitude whose essential characteristic is bringing the human ^{being} into contact and under the protection of a permanent and efficient power must have developed in this soil. A critical and scientific attitude was impossible at such a time for that attitude implies that the individual has a solid foundation for his work. Interest in the forces and objects of the world must assume that the world is present and favorably disposed toward such interests. In other words, before man can devote himself to a whole hearted interest in his experiences, these experiences must have some fixity and permanence. Experience must be something in its own right. This was not the condition in the Roman world. There had not yet come that higher individualism which could give a confidence in one's own experience. The older type of individuality which received its support from a feeling of close and secure contact with a strong social organization had disappeared entirely. With the downfall of Greek independence there was begun an era in which the stable individuality took a steady decline. In the Alexandrian-Roman period there was no question as to the dev-

elopment of a satisfactory attitude toward experience. The attitude toward experienced did not receive any classification and definition in this time. The investigations in the functions of knowledge were impossible when men were so preoccupied with attempts to attach themselves to their surroundings.