

The Humanistic Period.

## Analytical Table of Contents.

This period marks the beginnings of the ascendancy of the human experiences as a basis for the interpretation of reality. In detail this attitude takes the form in which philosophers stress the importance of the human understanding in the knowledge of reality.

In the naturalistic period the satisfactory orientations of the thinkers in the world of experience is indicated by a zealous industry in the study of nature. The actual experiences in the form of scientific data are investigated and brought into determination. With the greater development of the personalistic attitude the problem of the capacity of the human mind to know reality is brought out. There is a constant increase in the factors involving the awareness of one's attitude towards experience.

With Locke the consciousness of making an evaluation of experience comes out in the strict determination of what can and what cannot be the object of human investigation. Locke attempts to evaluate reality from this standpoint. There is the appreciation that objects and events must be evaluated as within the realm of practical experience.

Leibniz stresses the relation of reality to the knowledge process in making objects consist of the clarification of ideas. The implied idea that the experience of the individual is important in determining reality is found also in the emphasis placed upon the mind in the acquisition of knowledge. The extreme individualism of Leibniz'

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position is illustrated by the monadism which is the central theme of his entire thought.

Both Locke and Leibniz reflect a social experience in which after the group entity is become more or less stable the individual members begin to acquire some importance. In each thinker the specific facts of the environing experience induces a different formulation.

In British thought the increasing value of the individual finds expression in the idea that reality can be found only in the conscious states of the individual. There is in this type of attitude the obvious implication that reality is very closely connected with experience although experience is entirely misinterpreted. This position is worked out by <sup>e</sup>Barkely<sup>e</sup> and Hume, each in a way which brings out definite social conditions and changes.

Kant arrives at a self-conscious attitude toward experience. He is clear on the point that reality consists of determinations of experience arrived at by the judging processes of a thinker. Kant expresses in an excellent way a condition of social experience which places great store by the freedom of individuals who are, however, strongly bound by <sup>histories</sup>objections to the whole of which each is a member. In Kant this exhibits itself in the turn his philosophy takes because of his anxiety to avoid a subjective idealism.

The successors of Kant brought what they termed an organization into the doctrine of categories. They made the categories include more than did Kant. They made their categories objective indicating the identity between the thought or knowledge of objects and the objects themselves. This attitude begins the German idealistic tradition. On the side of the event<sup>s</sup> which this attitude parallels we find an extreme need for a unification of the social group to bring about a desired end.

The union of all events and persons in one absolute is an attitude which mirrors the unification of all its individual members to rebuild and regenerate the German empire.

### The Personalistic Period

The development of personality and individual freedom progressed in Europe in immediate continuity with the rise and development of national autonomy. The States of Europe came into being with the <sup>Civilization</sup> civilization of power in the hands of the kings. The freedom from the church came about by the strength acquired by the great leaders in their own countries. The autonomy of England and of the Netherlands came about through the resistance of the Tudors and the Princes of Orange, against the Spanish Philip who was allied with the Pope and <sup>constituted</sup> the militant part of the church. Later France established its ascendancy <sup>under</sup> Louis XIV to the utter despoliation of Spain. The stability of the government established, the rise and development of commerce and industry assured, the beginnings of individual liberty and progress have their inception. The conditions become ripe for the expression of attitudes and feelings in the Arts and the sciences. The experiences become incorporated in expressed formulations of a philosophical nature. The history of philosophy trails across Europe in the same paths as the social and political events. A <sup>social</sup> racial situation which gives freedom and security to the individual is paralleled by a philosophy which is more nearly the expression of the individual's experience than is the case with the philosophy which parallels a period of subordination of the people. The attitudes toward experience become more critical with the standardization of the <sup>social</sup> racial conditions until finally the fact that the attitudes are functions of the social conditions comes to consciousness.

In the Personalistic period we have the categories of philosophy taking on a particularly human characteristic. The method of

determining the world indicates the important place of the individual in experience. In the British traditions we find the stress laid upon the human understanding. The problem of the past generation which could be stated as the attempt to know the world, in the present period reduces itself to the question of what can the human mind attain to in the way of knowledge. We may consider Locke as an example of a thinker who brings the categories back to the inner nature of man. Locke is making an attempt to bring back the world to the experiences of the human individuals. It is in this strain that Locke makes the keynote of his philosophical attitude the practical results of his study. Locke is said to be the first epistemologist and the statement is well justified if we take it to mean that he raises a knowledge problem by way of bringing out the place of the experiencing individual in the determination of the world. Locke, it must be understood, does not clearly recognize the problem he is facing. Locke represents a transition period, a turning point in the development of philosophical attitudes. Locke is merely beginning to indicate a line of philosophical development. We might say that it is true of Locke as of all the philosophers of the period that they do not make a satisfactory analysis of what experience is. Locke then expresses a tendency of his age to give an importance to the individual. It was in Locke's time that real property was considered for the first time as the result of man's labor expended in improving the original soil. The attitude of Locke is born of a particular development of social phenomena. As the social conditions in England change the expressed attitudes toward experience likewise change. It happens to be a fact that in England there is a progressive development of the appreciation of the value of an individual being. The freedom of thought and action grows through a stage of insistence

upon the right to the product of one's labor, to a stage of importance of the individual human being. The development of philosophy in England parallels this series of stages.

On the Continent the appreciation of the individual grew to great proportions also, but there the absolute autonomy of the individual was not insisted upon in such sweeping terms. The social conditions on the continent were developing in a somewhat different way than in Britain. The rise of absolutism came a little later on the Continent. When the divine right of kings was given up in Britain it was still clung to on the continent and especially in France. The German nation which had suffered its Catholic unity break into a hundred pieces, had not reached its protestant autonomy which came with the strength of Prussia. As a representation of such a social experience we have Leibniz, the German philosopher. He shows clearly a struggle between two tendencies. On the one hand he holds firmly to the mechanical viewpoint which is prompted by absolutistic conditions, which he still clings to a spiritualism, indicating an extreme appreciation of the worth of human individuality. Leibniz attempts a reconciliation of these two tendencies, and so he is at once the opponent of Newton and of Locke. Leibniz believes firmly in the mechanical nature of the universe. Nature for him is a gigantic mechanism but it is a national mechanism. For Leibniz God is directly involved in the workings of the laws of nature. Leibniz makes sport of Newton's God who is a poor mechanic and must needs put his finger to his machine occasionally. The work of Leibniz both in its form and content indicates a vacillation between two differing viewpoints. There is here the implication that the expression of this type of attitude is directly in correspondence with a peculiar social situation. The philosophy

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of Leibniz is above all an expression of an extreme individualism which in some form or other is directly continuous with a super-structure which is an embracing unity. The two traditions growing out of the attitudes formulated by Locke and Leibniz correspond to a social experience which marks the beginnings of an appreciation of the place man plays in the determination of his world. There is a drawing away from the attitude which makes a man merely a part of a large world machine. The worth of man on his own account will become an explicit component of the consciousness of man. With Leibniz this is better brought out in spite of his failure to give full expression to this in his writings. Leibniz in many instances seem<sup>d</sup> to belong to an earlier age than does Locke. This is brought out in the controversy between the two with respect to innate ideas. It is clear that Locke is struggling to get away from the tradition which makes man entirely dependent upon some conditions outside himself. He is attempting to make man's experience dependent only upon man himself. The mechanical world tradition has its philosophic roots in a rationalistic conception. Locke meant to break away from that. Locke's surroundings were such as to give the individual great confidence in his own personality as an important factor in experience. There came about a dichotomy between the functions of experience. The great increase in man's powers referred to practical conduct and bore no identity relation with ultimate truth. This dichotomy brings out the problem of the place man plays in the determination of his world. The constituent nature of experience in the structure of reality begins to be first realized.<sup>1</sup> The fact that it is only beginning is a confirmatory testimonial. It brings out the fact of the new departure.

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Moore Fun. and Rep. in Locke's Essay.

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It was a beginning because Locke still thought there was much lacking in this attitude for the determination of experience. Locke still lived close to the scholastic tradition and shared in an inadequate viewpoint concerning the genuine nature of experience. With Leibniz there is also brought out the dependence of the experience upon the individual who has the experience, but more than Locke, Leibniz clung to the older traditions. Leibniz was certainly more correct in his contention of the spontaneous power of the human understanding but his conception was evolved much more in sympathy with the scholastic tradition. Conditions on the Continent were more nearly akin to former times. The free development of individuals was not allowed to take place until long after it was a fact in Britain.

The time of Locke was one of great change in England. The growing power of the people finds an expression in the formation of political parties. The Tories and the Whigs in their conflict over the principle of toleration show us the increasing importance that the individual is acquiring in English political affairs. Another series of events which is of extreme importance for the consideration of the social affairs of England begins with the Revolution. This event resulted in the establishment of the principle that an English king ruled by the suffrage of the people and not by Divine Right. Passive obedience was also given up. No money could be obtained without Parliament and no army could be maintained in time of peace. There was recognized the right of petition, the right of freedom of debate in Parliament, the necessity of frequent Parliaments and the right of free choice of representatives.<sup>1</sup> The election of William and Mary to the throne of England indicated the new powers exercised by the people.

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<sup>1</sup>A. Hossal in Social England.



The Toleration Act of 1689 gave voice to the rights of individuals to free development. It was, of course, stated in terms of the right of Public worship.<sup>1</sup> The developing nature of the individual's value comes out in the fact that neither Locke nor his time knew the meaning of tolerance in its complete aspect. Locke granted tolerance to all but Atheists and Catholics and this reveals a prejudice which is born of a strong attachment to a past tradition. The immediate occasion for the view that Locke held was probably the fact that he looked upon the Roman Church as a political power inimical to the well being of a Protestant state.

The attitude toward experience as formulated in the philosophy of Locke adequately parallels the experience of the time. In the case of Locke he was admirably fitted to formulate an attitude toward experience because he took so active a part in the experiences of the time. Locke was in fact the official philosopher of the Revolution in England. His relations with Shaftesbury and with William III gave him an excellent opportunity to study conditions as they actually were.<sup>2</sup> In his philosophy Locke indicates an unmistakable tendency to determine the world in terms of the experience of the individual. The significance of the categories with which the experiences were evaluated were to be derived directly from the thoughts and activities of the individual. The meaning given to the values of the world were to be derived directly from the thoughts and activities of the individual. The meaning given to the values of the world were to be brought out of the experience of the individual. Locke makes an admirable beginning in this direction but there is no complete carrying out of this attitude. Locke is not able to break so completely with

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1 Cf. Schevill, History of Modern Europe, I.  
 2 " Fox Bourne, Life of J. Locke, Harpers, 1876.

with the past as to make the world and himself conditions of the functioning of the experience process itself. Locke makes explicit the attitude that as concerns God and himself there are certain factors of experience which for him lies outside the process of experience.<sup>1</sup> God and himself are intuitive objects, <sup>which</sup> the precede and go beyond all possible experience. The Cartesian influence seems apparent in the discussion of the self-existence of the individual. The continuity of the thought of this period with that of the Scholastic stage is very apparent. The efforts to reach out for a viewpoint which would have its ground in the immediate conditions of experience are likewise apparent.

§ The division of the fundamental categories of experience into primary and secondary indicates the attempt that is being made to evaluate the world in terms of human experience and the partial failure of the attempt. Locke in common with all thinkers of this period, is struck with the independence of some aspects of the external world of the individuals who experience them. This is a viewpoint which shows a great advance over the attitude which makes the entire experience an affair external and independent of the human individuals who have the experience. That was the situation in the Greek stage of thought. Since a valid attitude toward experience must consider it in part independent of the individual, we should rather find Locke's failings in that he did not have a completely satisfactory notion of what experience is. To bring into experience a dichotomy based upon the relative contributions of the thing in itself, and of the experiencing individual is to entertain obviously false notions of the character

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<sup>1</sup>Essay, Book IV, 9 and 10.

of experience. Experience becomes partly something which is not experience and never can become such; The most fatal consequences of such a faulty conception was suffered by Locke and his philosophy. It was no less a matter than being forced to the conclusion that a genuine science of nature is impossible.<sup>1</sup> The human understanding can attain only to practical advantages and not to theoretical knowledge. Locke cuts his world into parts, one only of which is subject to the scrutiny and understanding of man, the remainder lies beyond the capacities and faculties of his understanding. Locke divides his world into the demonstrable and the probable; the latter only can be object of our experience. It is clear that Locke has only a very inadequate conception of the nature of experience. Locke labored under the conception of a world which must be absolute and independent. Knowledge of this world can be instrumental merely to the practical needs of the human individual. The importance of human experience for Locke resolved itself into the functions necessary for the acquisition of the "advantages of ease and health, and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life." These advantages come from the occupation of knowledge with sensitive objects, that is, objects actually present to our senses. It is evident that Locke thinks of our experience as being the appearance or faint copy of a reality which lies behind. We may credit him with making the appearance a product of an experiential process.

In Locke's Essay we find a very elaborate analysis of the categories made use of in the determination of experience. These are all brought into a scholastic scheme of progressive gradations from

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<sup>1</sup>Essay IV, 3, 29    IV. 12, 10.

the simple to the most complex, and called ideas. The list gives at once the impression of the abstract and rationalistic character of Locke's thinking. The objects of experience are presumed to be built up out of simple qualities and functions called ideas. The whole experience is constituted by the complication of these simple ideas. The complex ideas are of three kinds, modes, substances, and relations. The most important point concerning these scholastic ideas and their complication lies in the fact that the experience which results from them is presumed to be greatly influenced by the mind of the individual. The entire essay of Locke denies its importance from the fact that it does attempt to find reality in some sense in the human experiences. That it does not seem to appreciate what human experience is really like is the fault of the time in which it was written rather than any lack in the author. As typical of Locke's attitude with respect to the categories we might consider that of substance. Substance is a universal category for it must be included in any object which has qualities and relations. Substance is a necessary element in experience for it lies at the basis of experience, all qualities and relations must inhere in substance. It would appear now that Locke gets pretty close to the experience process, but there is a break here, for substance, although it is a supporter of known qualities, is itself absolutely unknown and unknowable. The philosophy of Locke turns out to be not an experience philosophy excepting within very narrow limits. For Locke as for all the thinkers of the past, reality was somehow not the objects and events of the present world. Reality must be something beyond them. Locke could not extend such implicit faith and confidence in the experiences of human individuals. The work of Locke, taken in its historic nexus, might be said to result in the modest confession that

definite limits are set and will continue to thwart the talents of human beings in their attempt to reach reality. A more faithful judgment must be made concerning the work of Locke as an attempt to evaluate experience. It would be overlooking much to not appreciate that the Essay Concerning Human Understanding is an advance over the scholastics.

The Philosophy of Leibniz is an expression of the autonomy of the individual, an expression of the importance of human experience. The attitude of Leibniz is conceived under very different conditions than is that of Locke, and we will find that the implications of the two attitudes vary considerably. Leibniz is much closer to the source of the mechanical philosophy and science than is Locke. The centre for mathematical pursuits in England was Cambridge and not Oxford. Oxford was more a centre for the study of medicine. The interests of Leibniz are clearly indicated in the fact that during a very brief residence in London in 1673 he became acquainted with the notable men of science who lived in England, especially Peel and Boyle.<sup>1</sup> The visit to London at this time quickened the interests of Leibniz in mathematics and physics and when he returned to Paris he became an intimate associate of Huygens. The philosophy of Leibniz shows at its basis the mechanical conception; the mathematical and logical methods predominate in his thought. This mathematical conception is so modified, however, as to allow the greatest place possible for the individual. Leibniz brings out the importance of the individual experience by showing a very close connection between the thought of the individual and external reality. The greatest objectivity is owing to the distinctness and clarity of ideas. Space and time

<sup>1</sup>Guhrauer, Life of Leibniz.

for Leibniz are ideal rather than real, such as a mechanist like Newton conceived them.<sup>1</sup> Substance itself is for Leibniz of the material of experience, for it is at bottom force, and force is not material.

In spite of the mechanical basis of the Leibnizian philosophy, Leibniz is the most thorough going of individualists. The world is at bottom composed only of monads, units of the stuff of the world. The monads are each coextensive with the whole of the world; the part and whole are subsistentially the same but there is a difference in development or unfolding. The monads are absolutely indivisible and unrelated, they must be single and exist for themselves. They cannot contain each other. The extremely individualistic viewpoint of Leibniz resolves into the attitude that the stuff of the world is not material as the mechanistic conceives it, but spiritual. Everything in the world is alive and conscious. Leibniz's viewpoint comes to be a spiritualism. The spiritualistic and dynamic viewpoint of Leibniz indicates the dependence of objects upon the individual's experience, although the whole experience is conceived in metaphysical terms. Leibniz no less than Locke stands as a philosopher who makes his Weltanschauung a function of the individual experience. The two viewpoints, however, reflect the different soils in which they are conceived. Just as the social surroundings of Leibniz are closer to the conditions of the older traditions, so does the philosophy of Leibniz show a closer connection with the scholastic tradition.

The individualism of Leibniz's philosophy is indicated in his attitude toward innate ideas. Leibniz insists that the mind is not

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<sup>1</sup>Letters to Clarke, 3rd. - Windebländ-Tufts History of Philosophy, p.422.

without a very active and spontaneous function in the process of experience. The mind is never a tabula rasa which has impressions from the outside made upon it. It is rather an active power contributing much to the process of experience. Leibniz conceives the mind as having its main function in clearing up ideas contained in it in a confused state. The process of clearing up ideas is the process of bringing them into self consciousness, a process of apperception. Leibniz considers the ideas to be virtually innate in the mind, that is, in perception. Experience must be in great part then, the work of the mind and is not merely brought to the individual. This formulation of Leibniz is the beginning of a tradition which gives the human reason a very important place in the acquisition of knowledge and in the judging of the worth and condition of nature. Leibniz is a forerunner of a line of thinkers who stake all upon the human being because of the rational capacities that he has. Upon the continent the viewpoint that Leibniz formulates becomes the standard attitude which makes of man an extremely important factor in experience. Leibniz may be reckoned on the intellectual side in some sense an initiator of the age of Reason. Leibniz's attitude is stated to have had its effect upon English thought and particularly manifested by such works as Pope's Essay on Man<sup>1</sup>. The French rationalists no doubt represent a development of the attitude that Leibniz formulated. In tracing a formulation which resulted in the emphatic stress of natural and human rights, one would need to reckon with Leibniz. In harmony this attitude also resulted in the period of intellectual Storm and Stress, a period in which each man considered himself a genius and capable of remaking the

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Latta, Leibniz, 1898, p. 198.

world. The direct influence of Leibniz on Lessing and Herder is obvious.

There is no possibility of overlooking the fact that Leibniz is constantly aiming to bring out an extreme individualism as a fundamental principle of experience. Leibniz is expressing an attitude which indicates the consciousness of the importance of human experience. We have in Leibniz another aspect stressed than we find in Locke. Leibniz is a mechanist and as such accepts the implications of that viewpoint. Leibniz accepts the world as firmly fixed and definitely given. A fundamental element in the Leibnizian thought is the principle of contradiction. Leibniz faces the problem of how this world can be an object for knowledge and this forced him to assume great power on the part of the knower. The result is the monadological conception which he formulates. The world is really an unfolding, a development of what is latent in the monad. Leibniz carries this out to such a point that his fundamental principle comes to be that of sufficient reason. Instead of accepting with Locke an apparent sensuatism Leibniz inclines toward his peculiar form of Rationalism. We may take both these views to be born of a situation which has to find its world expressed in terms of experience. The world must be evaluated in terms of the human personality and its power. Locke makes his evaluation in so far as it can be done in terms of simple elements of an immediately experienced sort. Locke was of course not entirely a believer in the sensuous explanation and in his limitation of the powers of the individual he shows himself not entirely a believer in the experience attitude. Leibniz also does not entirely

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Merz, Leibniz, 1884, p. 195 ff.



put his philosophy in the realm of experience, but being born of a set of different circumstances from that of Locke, he expresses a somewhat different attitude. Leibniz is much more a metaphysician than is Locke and puts his attitude more in such terms. This in a way explains the fact that Leibniz leans so heavily upon God. It is a characteristic of the metaphysician<sup>cion</sup> to invoke the aid of the Deity in order to explain what he needs to account for. This fact is readily understood since the outstanding characteristic of the metaphysician is to explain more than in the nature of the case it is possible for a philosopher to do. Quite naturally then, at some point or other the metaphysician falls back upon God to help him in his difficulties. The history of philosophy indicates quite clearly that since the birth of the belief in powerful gods the degree of metaphysical taint in a philosopher can be measured by his use of God whether implicit or explicit as a support for his theories. A matrix of the philosophy of Leibniz is certainly conceived in heterogeneous ideas. It is an attitude stressing the experience of human beings and still it is not unjustifiably termed a web of abstract speculation. The attitude of extreme individualism which runs through the Leibnizian system brings out this point. The individualism of Leibniz is carried to an extremely metaphysical outcome. In the matter of a mechanical viewpoint also Leibniz seems to base his philosophy upon a principle that physics must be carried out to metaphysics<sup>1</sup> and so Leibniz reports<sup>departs</sup> as he does from the mechanism of Descartes. Leibniz is aiming at a method of making his philosophy concrete. He aims at an organic conception which shall include the experiences which are the components of the world. The doctrine of confused and clear perceptions as

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Principles of Nature and of Grace, in Latta, Leibniz, 1898.

constituting the content of the world brings out this point. There is clearly apparent in the philosophy of Leibniz an expression of the inclusion of individual experiences in the make up of the world. This is an attitude that has also been expressed in Spinoza. It comes out in the idea that man is a part of the stuff of the world. Man is part of substance & God. Leibniz expresses the same attitude in his pre-established harmony. Man is not without his connection with God, that is with the whole of the world.

The change in attitude toward experience comes out in Leibniz with remarkable clarity. The gradual change in the evaluation of the world comes out in the different categories that Leibniz uses and in the different meaning he attaches to the same categories. A study of Leibniz shows clearly how such important categories as Substance, Matter, Passibility, Cause, Motion, Space and Time, Atom, perception, and Force, were given a new determination to suit the new conditions. These categories are adapted to a viewpoint which regards the world as mechanical and yet organic. The organic and dynamic viewpoint of Leibniz brought forth such new evaluatory terms as sufficient reason, the compossible and others. It is more apparent in the case of Leibniz than in that of other philosophers just how the experiences of the time become expressed as a formulated attitude which gives system an order to the values that these experiences take on.

The philosophy of Leibniz is born of a situation which is more or less unstable and chaotic. Leibniz is a German who was born two years before the Peace of Westphalia, and who wrote in French. The Germany of Leibniz at the conclusion of the Thirty Years War was in as pitiable a state of devastation and misery as any nation has witnessed in modern times. The successive overrunnings of the country by Swedes,

Spaniards, Kroats, and French left the country barren, poor and degraded. When the intellectual and social forces began to renew their energies they gleaned their vigor from the neighboring French. In political matters the absolutism of the French was transported to Germany and there spring up sun kings to the number of four hundred.<sup>1</sup> Germany was not the soil from which could spring a purely mechanistic philosophy. Absolutism was indeed found there but it was an absolutism that was the height of individualism.<sup>2</sup> The mechanical determination of experience was not borne out by the events and occurrences in Germany. The mechanical influence could have been acquired by the thinkers from a contact with French and England, but if the philosophy is to represent the experience of the German people it could not be an atomic mechanism but a monadistic one.<sup>3</sup> For the completion of the stable world in which one finds oneself the resort must be had to the content of the inner life. The soil of Germany at this period represented in some sense the same situation that other parts of Europe presented in the days before political unification. There was still very prominently in mind the problem of orienting oneself in the world. The philosophy of Leibniz indicates a people lost in the mazes of earthly existence, seeking for itself a home which faith leads it to believe is somewhere in the whole of the world itself. The elements in Leibniz's philosophy which are similar to those in the Scholastic philosophy indicate an environment which is similar to the social experience of the thinkers of the Scholastic period. The insistence

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<sup>1</sup>Richard, History of German Civilization, p. 222.

<sup>2</sup>Monadology 70 - is a reflection of this.

<sup>3</sup>For Leibniz there could not be <sup>the</sup> principle of nature merely, but also principle of grace.

upon the spiritual nature of objects shows the influence of the extreme subjective factor which always characterizes a viewpoint which is developed under conditions of social hopelessness and demoralization. To judge from some of the correspondence with Hessen - Reinfels the problem of salvation is a personal matter for Leibniz.

To summarize the results we obtain from a study of Leibniz we find in the first place that Leibniz does not express as much as Locke the conscious inclusion of the experience factor in his philosophical formulations. We find also that the differing experiences which surround Leibniz result in a different conception of what the nature of Experience is. Leibniz stresses the cognitive processes of the individual in the experiential situation. He lays great emphasis upon the active powers of the mind in experience. This results in a measure in the too heavy loading of the mental powers of the individual. The world is given over to the mercies of the monad. The philosophy of Leibniz is entirely too metaphysical for the period in which it is developed. We have attempted to indicate that the social experience of the nation can in large measure be drawn upon to account for this fact. Were it not for the contact that Leibniz as a thinker had with other events and conditions of his time, his evaluation of the world would in no sense have attained the excellence which it has reached, and it would not have been typical of the experience philosophies. Leibniz and Locke both are experience philosophers. Leibniz does not halt at the common sense that Locke does. Locke no more than Leibniz grasps the general significances of experience. In his conscious thinking he makes it refer to commonplace activities. The division between these phases of experience and to underlying realities is made easy for him. Leibniz aims to include in his conception all experience and thus gets into his metaphysical

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### The British Period

The historians of philosophy who write in the traditional strain all show the development of English philosophy from Locke to Hume as a natural evolution of certain definite logical grounds. There is implied the assumption that there was something in the Lockean philosophy which inevitably leads to Hume. It is also implied in such writing that Berkeley is a natural middle link between the two. A much more accurate viewpoint is that the formulated attitudes of these thinkers answer to experiences which are internally continuous but which show great modification and development. The tone of individualism and empiricism which pervades the philosophy of Berkeley, Hume and all their predecessors represent attitudes which express the fundamental characteristics of the British social experience. The philosophy of Berkeley and Hume are not logical derivatives of the philosophy of Locke, but the philosophies of all three sum up in abstract and intellectual form a series of conditions which seemed to have a decidedly organic status and development. The conditions which they sum up in part are the growth and development of democratic and industrial England. The philosophy of Berkeley and Hume reflect well the material resources and the practical achievements of a nation which developed an empire with almost three centuries of undisputed sway. The philosophies of Berkeley and Hume could no more easily have been individualistic and empiristic, than could England be washed by the constant breakers of the Atlantic surf. The viewpoints of Berkeley and Hume were developed under conditions in which the significance of the

individual experience became an object for conscious consideration. The industrial changes in particular which came about in that period brought with them new attitudes concerning man. The entire viewpoint of the period became more practical and was concerned with the specific conditions of human welfare. Trade and its successes brought with it a reorganization of the social structure. The classes in society took on new forms and standards.<sup>1</sup> Industry and trade brought out the specific qualities of individuals first as self-centered, free agents and later as equal members of a national association. Commerce and industry broadened the horizon of man and made <sup>M&W</sup> ~~them~~ appreciative of their own experiences. The attitudes toward the experiences as they developed in this period partook more of the experiences than was previously the case. We find then that Berkely<sup>e</sup> attempts to state experience in terms of mental states assuming that of those states are constituted the objects which compose experience. Berkely<sup>e</sup> meant to put the whole experience into such terms. His writings indicate the heroic efforts to bring about this result. The waning power of the God category which shows some signs of life in Berkely<sup>e</sup> indicates that he was not entirely successful. There are still some categories used in Berkely<sup>e</sup> which indicate that the problem of experience is still not a conscious one in philosophy. With Hume and Kant it comes more and more to consciousness and experience becomes frankly the constituent of things. The viewpoints toward experience begin to drop out <sup>s</sup> ~~their~~ presupposition gradually and aim to become records of the ongoing of experience itself. The attitudes toward experience begin to be expressions of the mechanisms of experience and not expressions of attitudes toward powers, forced

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<sup>1</sup>Tufts, The Individual and his Relation to Society, Univ. of Chicago Contribution to Philosophy, 1904.

and principles presumed to underlie experience. If we consider the Renaissance period to be the beginnings of the formulation of modern attitudes toward experience, we may consider the present period to be a transition to the viewpoint that philosophy is an essential expression of experience itself. The difficulty with Berkely<sup>4</sup> as was true of Hume and Kant, is that he has not an adequate viewpoint with respect to the nature of experience. In Berkely<sup>4</sup> we find a beginning of the realization that experience which he stated, of course, as reality, is given in terms of experience, that is, in terms of ideas as he called them. Berkely came close to the vie<sup>s</sup>point that knowledge and philosophy can only be meaning<sup>ful</sup> in terms of experience, but he was not ready to recognize the truth that experience was not mental states or perceptions. Berkely's endeavor to overthrow the distinction between primary and secondary qualities indicates that he was beginning to find in experience itself the support of reality. He was becoming sceptical of the supporting strata of experience. He was losing faith in matter and in the existence of Abstract Ideas. He did not, however, come to the adequate realization of this because he mistook the nature of the experience process.<sup>1</sup> Berkely persisted in taking one aspect of experience to be the whole. With Kant similar conditions prevailed. He went much farther in making a close connection between experience and the attitude toward it but he too had a mistaken notion of the nature of experience. Kant saw experience from the abstract standpoint of the physical scientist. Kant the philosopher was betrayed, into the hands of

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. I.

mechanics. The evaluation of experience upon the basis of its own rights and evaluation did not come until later and at the present time is only beginning to be sufficiently understood.

The general conditions of English experience in the period under discussion show symptoms of remarkable changes. England during this period indicates the development of individual liberties, and a closer attitude of thinkers to human conditions. The point now under discussion was one in which the significance of the individual as a member of the civil order was coming to the consciousness of the people. The political and religious controversies and discussions were about to become replaced by social and economic topics. The political conditions were becoming more and more definitely settled and the attitudes of the individuals were less to be shaped now by the dictates of group orientation. The problems for the thinkers become those which are influenced by conditions within a group, and by <sup>the</sup> non-excluded conditions arising from inevitable relations between groups. The influence of nations upon one another can never be genuinely excluded. The problems which agitated the minds of thinker in England concerned more the growing circumstances which resulted finally in making of England the workshop of the world. England during the <sup>reign</sup> of Anne won a leading position among the nations of Europe<sup>1</sup>. Its <sup>political</sup> destinies become fairly well settled. During the same reign England became united with Scotland in fact. The apparent union become an actual one when the Parliaments were united. From that time England and Scotland were governed by the same laws. The growing democratization of English social life continued and is

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1Cf. Schevill, History of Modern Europe 1898, p. 25



marked by the beginnings of cabinet government in the reign of George I. In this time also the beginnings of England's industrial greatness became symptoms of the prevalent social order. The social conditions indicated by the facts mentioned are reflected in the philosophy of Berkeley. The philosophy of Berkeley indicates a growing tendency to regard as significant the experiences of the individual. The social democracy which is developing in England is reflected in Berkeley in his attempt to express reality as ultimately the conscious states of the individual. Just as the beginnings of individual independence are reflected in Locke's interest in the human understanding, so is the development of this independence marked by Berkeley's advance over Locke. Locke clings to the notion of substance in some sense, indicating the lack of confidence in the capacities of the individual. Berkeley shows an advance in this respect and his change of attitude toward substance indicates an increased reliance upon the experiences of the individual. Berkeley represents in the history of philosophy the growing development of the experience philosophy. The social conditions which prevailed in Berkeley's time gave evidence to the spirit of individual freedom and even license which indicates the reorganization of the social structure. England was a country full of the ebullition of reaction against previous social rigidities. The English were beginning to sense the power of national expansion. Berkeley as a man of fine sensibilities was sore distressed with the prevalent moral tone of society. Berkeley stands as a heroic protest against the egoism and the selfishness of the English society of the period. Berkeley protests emphatically against the statement of society such as Mandeville presents it and his *Alciphron* is an eloquent argument against it. He longed for a

society in which his social ideals would meet with some realisation<sup>1</sup>. In general this period was lawless more or less corrupt, and remarkable for its speculations and lobbies. There does not appear to be the social stability that one would expect in an established society. This period is the time of the South Sea and other bubbles which flourished then and added to the general chaotic conditions.<sup>2</sup> Lawlessness prevailed in this period and individual license was rife. Hangings were so frequent and so profuse that many had to be transported because there was no room for them upon the gallows<sup>3</sup>. Berkely<sup>4</sup> conceived of himself as a defender of theism against the great mass of opinion which seemed to be atheistically inclined. This fact adds testimony to the characterization of this period as one of free and unintellectual social experience. The world as an object of philosophical determination would be evaluated in terms of the individual experience. Experience itself would enter more definitely into the determination of objects and events. Attitudes toward experience are becoming more and more spontaneous formulations of the happenings that <sup>are</sup> we experienced. Attitudes are becoming closer connected with the experience which give origin to the attitudes. This is tantamount to the statement that there is becoming to be realized that one's experience is in great part a function of the individual who has the experience. The theism of Berkely<sup>4</sup> may be taken to be the expression on the philosophical side of a need for a more stable <sup>care</sup> for the social experiences. With Berkely<sup>4</sup> there is a definite change in the meanings of the categories <sup>employed</sup> in describing and evaluating experience.

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<sup>1</sup>Fraser - Berkely, in Blackwood's series, p. 117.

<sup>2</sup>Social England, V. 5

<sup>3</sup>Loc. cit. V. 5.

The fundamental category of substance takes on a decided change from even the period of Locke. Substance becomes in the long<sup>g</sup> age of Berkely immaterial. Berkely means by this to deny that substance has any existence outside of the minds which perceive the objects having substance as their components. This attitude may be interpreted to mean that Berkely<sup>v</sup> is unwilling to admit that the objects of experience are composed of anything but the actual material of experience. In a peculiar way<sup>y</sup> the place of experience in the realization of the presence of objects and events is brought to consciousness. Berkely<sup>e</sup>, as did Locke before him, indicates an advance in terms of experience and not in terms of some assumed substance or principle which underlies and conditions our experiences. The attitude of Berkely<sup>e</sup> in so far as this represents his attitude, is commendable but he was not able for lack of perspective to evaluate his attitude in this way. Berkely<sup>e</sup> so little understood what his own position really meant as to believe that he was at war with the Newtonian philosophy. Berkely<sup>l</sup> was of course deeply imbued<sup>m</sup> with theological and religious prejudices and thus failed to understand how the work of the "natural" philosophers of his period were expressing a similar attitude.<sup>1</sup> The discussions in the defence of free<sup>7</sup>thinging in <sup>mathematics</sup> ~~Mothlety~~ indicate quite clearly what attitude Berkely<sup>e</sup> is attempting to set up and defend. Berkely<sup>e</sup> seems to be reaching out for the pure facts of experience so far as science goes. This is true even though we may interpret him to be misconstruing the essential nature of natural science such as Newton and others stand for it. The true significance of Berkely's position lay not in his supposed

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Seth - English Philosophy and Schools of Philosophy, 1910.

opposition to the atheists and sceptics, but in his furtherance of the philosophy of experience. The excellence of Berkely's philosophical expression falls away with his later work. The <sup>Sims</sup> Series of Berkely is in some sense a spoilation of the splendid attitude indicated in the Principles and in the <sup>Three Dialogues</sup> Developments. In this connection we see that it is not a strange irony of fate as Seth suggests that Berkely should become regarded as of the sceptual tradition while attempting to refute that attitude. Berkely's philosophy stands as an attitude toward experience which was developed under definite conditions of experience, and his philosophy is a link in the chain of attitudes which developed parallel to the development of that experience.

Berkely's significance in furthering the philosophy of experience comes out in his discussion of the other categories such as Space, Time, Motion, Cause and Numbers. Berkely protests against the principle that there can exist such a thing as an abstract idea. His point is that Space and Time are derived from an actual sensation-al situation, which is assumed to be the only genuine experience situation. In this connection Berkely comes out as explicit as possible with the attitude that the categories of experience are derivations of experience itself. With respect to abstract ideas Berkely believes himself to have gone beyond Locke and from our standpoint he indicates a viewpoint very close to the actual experience situation. Berkely denies that these are abstract ideas such as color, for example, which prescind from the species or individuals comprehended under it. For Berkely the presence of such abstract ideas would be a distant removal from experience.

In section 116 of his <sup>Principles</sup> Periods of Knowledge Berkely has a

splendid statement of his position which brings out the place of experience, in the attitudes toward experience, or philosophy. The work of Berkely indicates in a splendid manner the reinterpretation of the categories under different general experiential circumstances. It is clearly seen how the categories change their meanings and what conditions the names selected for the categories. The social conditions of Berkely's time represent the growing importance of the individual and thus the categories get their significance in terms of individual experience. Berkely read the signs of his time to indicate that men were drifting away from the higher things of life and plunging into vice and error.<sup>1</sup> He conceives then his determination of experience in spiritual terms, emphasizing the idealistic elements in experience.

The emphasis that Berkely placed upon the fallacy of distinguishing between primary and secondary qualities is an excellent indication of his attitude toward reality. This position marks the development of the attitude that in experience alone is reality to be found. There is nothing beyond our experience. It has no supports and no presuppositions. In much of his writing Berkely places great reliance upon common sense. Berkely seems to be utterly refuting <sup>a metaphysics</sup> and clinging to a doctrine of ordinary experience. Reality is given in the sensations or perceptions of the experiencing individuals. Berkely sought to safeguard this position against obvious criticisms by declaring that in the final analysis all things are perceived by God. But Berkely does not wish to be understood as believing that God was the guarantee of the object of the experience. Berkely was content to let the fact of an object's perception con-

<sup>1</sup>Alciphron 1732; Essay towards preventing Ruin of Great Britain

stitute the existence of that object. If there was experience the experienced objects were real.<sup>1</sup> In fact Berkely<sup>ε</sup> states that his proof of the existence of God comes from the fact<sup>+</sup> that things do exist and therefore must be perceived.<sup>2</sup> The primary qualities are not beyond perception, they do not exist of themselves. Nothing exists but that which is perceived. There is here the unmistakable attitude of the experience philosophy. The world is<sup>ε</sup> evaluated in general in terms of experience.

The attitude of Berkely<sup>ε</sup> taken as a general expression of a definite social experience partakes in great measure of that experience. There is expressly implied the conviction that a view of the world must be given only in terms of the events and objects which constitutes<sup>ε</sup> the actual surroundings of human beings. The defeat<sup>ε</sup> in such a philosophy as Berkely<sup>ε</sup> as indeed of all the British experience philosophy is that a wrong conception of experience is entertained. While the overt attitude is that the experiences must be determined in terms of experience that experience is conceived as consisting of such objectionable elements as to vitiate the attitude. To take Berkely<sup>ε</sup> as an example he conceives experience as consisting ultimately in terms of qualities of sense. "A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries<sup>F</sup> of sensible impressions or ideas perceived by various senses, which ideas he limited<sup>ε</sup> into one thing by the mind: because they are observed to attend each other." The ideas or sensations as we should call them are just as objectionable abstractions from experience as any that Berkely<sup>ε</sup> excludes in his

<sup>1</sup>Hyles 2nd Dialogue

<sup>2</sup>Loc. Cit.

writings. Experience is then not experience but really a combination of entities which are presupposed and not found in experience. The position of Berkeley is then only an experience philosophy in its intention. In its completion it is still a metaphysical viewpoint. This is true also of Hume although Hume makes some advances in the development of the experience philosophy.

The attitude towards experience which we call the experience philosophy develops with the expansion of the social experience in which it first finds expression. The time of Hume's philosophy was marked by an extreme emphasis of the human individual as a factor in experience. There has been an advance from the interest in the human understanding to human nature. The tendencies of the times move in the direction of a closer intimacy with the human individual. The value of the human individual is coming out in the greater place he takes in the industrial world. Enormous powers are being manifested by the human individual in the production of economic goods. The industrial revolution which became an enormous factor in the development of British life brought out the interdependence of industrial expansion and individual enterprise. The improvements in manufacture and the great increase in wealth and power brought remarkable changes into the life of the British. Every attitude and institution was affected and a completely new nation was created. The increased importance of the individual gained expression in the development of the "laissez faire" principle which dominated British thought for an exceedingly lengthy period. In commercial and industrial centers entirely new ideas began to prevail. The social sciences date their origins from this period. Political economy in some of its present characteristics begins in this

time. The general diffusion of intelligence becomes a developing symptom of the period. This indicates an increasing importance of the individual. Ethics takes on a new face and begins to consider its problem from the standpoint of man's instincts and feelings. The emphasis is upon the nature of man rather than upon some abstract qualities given in connection with man. Hume declares then that reason can never be the motive to any action but is always the slave of Passion. It became a period in which the moral criteria were sought for in the make up of the individuals and not in abstract principles far removed from the sphere of human conditions. There was in general a revulsion against intellectualism, there was the realization that man was more than mind, and had the composition of human nature. Hume revolted against the intellectual ethics of Locke and Cudworth, and his leaning toward a theory based upon human nature made him a stern critic of the mathematically demonstrable morality. The utilitarian aspect which ethics took on at this time indicates also the fact that the attitudes which are formulated concerning experience find many points of contact with experience. The good is stated in terms of the useful and thus comes closer to the wants and needs of individuals than do the abstract principles.

The direction in which the experience in England was tending is well illustrated by some of the religious movements which flourished at this time. The rise of Methodism at this time brings out the emphasis of the period upon the inner nature of the individual. Methodism places a large premium upon the intimate experiences of individuals. The Methodist movement is an attempt to express and make prominent the inner feelings with which one is endowed. Other religious movements beginning about this time gave voice to the



growing dissent and freedom which marked the growth of individualism.

The viewpoint toward experience which Hume formulated indicates a corresponding change to the changed conditions. The philosophy of Hume is more closely knit up with the actual experience processes than is true of Berkely. There are unmistakable evidences in the writings of Hume to indicate that he intends his attitude toward experience to be derived absolutely from experience. This is unmistakably expressed in his view that no idea can be derived except from the impressions, and the impressions are for him the very essentials of experience. Hume goes beyond Berkely in abandoning the inevitable perceiver who gives the guarantee for the existence of the perceived objects. Hume reduces all experience ultimately to the impressions of sense. Hume does not accept with Berkely the given fact of self. Hume reduces the self to a "bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement".<sup>1</sup> Hume accepts frankly the farthest consequences of the empirical viewpoint. The whole of experience is reduced to this flux of impressions. Hume has carried the experience philosophy to its ultimate conclusion. The connection between experience and the attitudes toward experience are formed of the very same material. The Weltanschauung of Hume is derived from the ordinary experience of the individual which reduces finally to the data of sense.

The deficiencies in the viewpoint of Hume toward experience comes out in the examination of his overt categories and in the doctrine of categories he leans upon in his discussion. The categories for

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<sup>1</sup>Treatise I, IV, VI.

Hume so far as his own exposition is concerned are the seven philosophical relations which constitute knowledge and probability. These may be taken to be the materials from which are formed his Weltanschauung so far as it is overtly experienced. One must, however, add to these at once the category of Idea and its immediate correlate, the Impression. We see indicated the fact that Hume's philosophy leaves place for levels of Material. There is first the level of Ideas and Impressions. These are the stuff of experience. These are the materials of which all experience is constituted. The immediate mechanism for the transformation of these impressions and ideas is "the gentle force" or attraction, the exact causes of which are unknown, and which is called association. Hume does not hesitate to declare that we can never go beyond these impressions but leaves open the problem of their exact working.<sup>1</sup> That is, Hume does not attempt to attack the problem of the causes of the impressions of sense. The second level consists of the relations which are built up from the original ideas. The obvious point in this attitude is that the categories with which the world is evaluated are of the stuff of experience. There are no values or categories composing the attitude toward experience which are not of experience. This is an advance over Locke and Berkeley. With Locke there still remained as an evaluation of experience substance which had an existence beyond experience. Berkeley reduced substance to states of consciousness but allowed, however, the self to be an underived element of experience. Hume means to exclude absolutely everything but the impressions and ideas and their derivations. Hume means to frankly evaluate experience in terms of its own self. The categories of Hume are categories of experience.

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<sup>1</sup>Treatise, Part II, sec. 6; Part IV, sec. 5.

The experience of the individual has finally come into its own in an unrestricted manner. The world is reduced to man and the objects and persons he deals with.

Up to this point we find Hume quite in line with more recent tendencies in philosophy. This attitude in philosophy is entirely wholesome and indicative of progress. There is much to be said by way of dissatisfaction with the Humean attitude toward experience. Hume regards experience as an artificial compounding of given elements. The world for Hume and knowledge of it are based ultimately upon such vague abstractions as the old metaphysics dealt with. Hume's viewpoint as Berkely's, goes no farther than its commendable intent. So far as its development and its actual value, it falls far short of being a satisfactory position. Hume's period was one which stressed experience but this was done in favor of a standpoint which was immediately concerned with mathematical rigidity. The individuals are not entirely men of flesh and bone but units of a given kind. The ideas which Hume deals with are chemical elements particularly useful for composition purposes. The impressions and ideas of Hume are as far from experience as they could be. Experience is not constituted of these permanent rigid entities. In the entire discussion of Hume no adequate description is given of the workings of experience or any of its parts. The association school of psychology does not touch in any sense the exact functioning of the knowledge processes when experience goes on. The discussion of the Passions as well as the Understanding takes on an artificial aspect. The experiences of an individual are handled as by a cabinet maker who puts together distinct parts. There is no handling of an organic process which is very finely interrelated and adjusted in its parts. The period of

Hume could not appreciate the genuine worth of an individual. There were just the beginnings of an interest in the human characteristics of individuals. This growing but very inadequate attitude is illustrated by the economic theories prevailing. Hume attempts to refute the idea that the wealth of a nation consists of its money.. He declares that "men and commodities are the real strength of any community." There is a general emphasis upon labor as being the source of power and riches. The viewpoint just misses the importance of man as a factor in the economic world. Hume in common with his entire period in making of man and his labor the source of power and wealth degraded him to the level of a commodity. Man is no more, so far as his labor goes, than a commodity. The importance and dignity of human personality is not made much of. It is lost in the intricacies of its commodity value. Hume together with his time overlooked in their final viewpoint the true inner life of man with its warmth and color derived from complex passions and desires. Hume spoke of such matter, but in the end made his individuals consist of cold lifeless atoms put together by eternal laws. Hume was a victim of the mechanical attitude which persisted in his day. The experimental method of reasoning which he sought to introduce into moral subjects was a too rigid and abstract method for handling genuine human nature.

The categories of Hume are based upon given principles or facts and are not elements of experience. The philosophy which is reared upon such structures must be something other than a philosophy of experience. The experience philosophy of the English tradition is an experience philosophy in intent only. In its implication and essential nature it is based upon presupposed elements which are accepted and not at all derived from the experience processes themselves. The world of phenomena and persons is not evaluated in terms of itself but

rather in accepted terms which are artificially imposed upon the world of experience. The categories of Hume as the best representative of the traditional experience philosophy are logical categories and not meaning categories which are genuinely existential because they preserve a vital connection with the actual conditions of experience. The fact that this kind of criticism can be made of Hume indicates that he stands for an attitude toward experience which is more in accord with experience than was previously the case. Hume does intend to evaluate experience in experience terms but his intention is not fulfilled. In spite of his failure to work out a satisfactory experience philosophy Hume has done a creditable work in advancing the cause of the experience tradition. It is commendable to be a precise representation of one's period of cultural development.

The Kantian Tradition.

In the modern period of philosophy there was established the irrevocable attitude that reality was in some way or other given in experience. The particular formulations of philosophic theory aimed to state just what the nature of this experience was. This attempt to state the nature of experience was more explicit than in the pre-experience period, when the relationship between reality and experience was unrecognized. The conscious attempt to state the nature of experience as a formulation of an attitude toward it is no better exemplified than by the words<sup>K</sup> of Kant. Kant has achieved an unsurpassable place in philosophy by offering a definite and deliberate attitude toward experience from the *awakened* standpoint of experience. Innumerable interpretations can be made and an indefinite number of interpretations of the Kantian philosophy are made, but no more fruitful attitude toward it can be taken than to consider it as an attempt to establish the fact that experience is explainable only by experience. The Kantian philosophy is best looked upon as a conscious endeavor to evaluate the world in terms of the evaluation process. The evaluation process is the process of forming judgments, judgments which have their source in the facts of experience. The entire critique of pure reason may be taken as an exposition of the validity and invalidity of certain judgments. The sum of all the valid judgments would give a definite structure to the objects of our experience. The line dividing the valid from the invalid judgments would make the point of transcendence of experience. Kant's point in the critique is that our transcendence of experience must inevitably result in error and confused knowledge. Kant spoke in

terms of knowledge asking what were the criteria for the validity of knowledge. In his development of the problem the point comes out that in order that any philosophical attitude be valid, it must not overstep the limits of experience. Kant, as we ought to expect, brings <sup>serious</sup> previous limitations to his investigation by assuming the nature of experience and that of the judgment function. Kant departs very little from the current traditional views as to both these problems. Kant's great contribution lies in the fact that he made a conscious excursion into the problem of the relation of reality and experience. Kant has the advantage over Hume in this respect that the latter is answering with less awareness to the surrounding experience. Kant indicates a more active participation in the solution of his problem. Kant is a professional philosopher and it appears he looks at his problem with a greater <sup>2</sup> burden of responsibility. Kant feels keenly the necessity for establishing a basis for the natural sciences. Hume is indeed influenced by the scientific development of the time, but the effect is unknown to him. Kant sees the implications of science with a clearer eye. The difference between Hume and Kant might be stated as the difference between one who sees that all knowledge must be reduced to experience though it brings <sup>dire</sup> consequences, and one who cannot accept the consequences and thus examines the nature of experience. The way to this work is indicated by the accepted conviction that reality and experience are closely united.<sup>1</sup> Kant could not accept any such result as Hume did, relative to the <sup>aric</sup> consciousness of knowledge and experience. Kant's philosophic attitude is developed under conditions of rigid and <sup>precise</sup> social experience. The natural science aspect would naturally enough then have a more

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Kant, d. r. v. 2nd edition, Berlin, 1904, p. 105.

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weighty influence than was the case with Hume. This principle accounts also for the fact that Kant labors constantly with problems of the *a priori* and logical finality. The aim is to attain to a settled and inclusive attitude, an attitude which will be weighty and permanent. *He* This emphasizes therefore the constant problem of the limits of knowledge and experience.

The problem of formulating an attitude toward experience for Kant involved a statement as to the nature of experience. Kant attempted to account for experience and in general we find in his work a clearer recognition of what the philosophical problems are than was the case in Hume. In going from Hume to Kant we observe the change in attitude from a passive acceptance of the relation between reality and experience, and an active attempt to explain this relation. In making the fundamental basis of his work the nature of judgment Kant seems to appreciate much better the task that devolves upon the philosopher. One may come to the conclusion that Kant got no farther than Hume in the solution of his problem and yet may not be able to deny that in the better statement of the problem *he* there is considerably in advance in viewpoint. Kant makes himself extremely vulnerable to the criticism that his judgments are entirely too abstract and logical and that the material which they *synthesize* is too fixed and rigid. In spite of this he is reaching out for a basis for a viewpoint which is somewhat more satisfactory than was that of Hume. In making the judgment the primary principle of knowledge and experience, Kant gives a powerful impetus to the investigation of knowledge. We have not even yet gone beyond the attitude that our experience is organized into knowledge by means of judgments.

In Kant we find the *first* definite attempt to express the attitude towards the world of experience in terms of an evaluation process.



The valuation process is indeed subject to serious limitations in that Kant is imbued with a very strong logical tradition of a formal kind, but it is highly commendable as a pioneering movement. The undiminished fame of Kant may be attributed to the fact that he was of the first to realize the fact that a successful attitude towards experience must be closely allied to an adequate analysis of the experience process. Hume did not get the full force of the importance of experience from this standpoint. The progress in philosophical thinking consists primarily in understanding what the relation is between the reality of objects and the experience of them. Hume affirmed the relation but did not penetrate very deeply in its explication. In this respect one might say considering the barest philosophical development that Hume set Kant's problem. Kant deserves credit for appreciating the problem and attempting a solution. There must be constantly kept in mind the fact that the work of Hume and Kant is not a development upon lines of strict logical advancement but that the specific differences in the handling of the problem are due to differences in the social experience under the auspices of which the particular view is formulated.

The fact that Kant fully appreciated the problem of relating reality and experience is indicated by his formulating his table of categories. This table is intended to exhibit the concepts under which all experience may be subsumed. The list of categories indicates the limit of experience in that they are presuppositions of all experience. The categories are in a way classes under which are placed the various experiences by means of judgments. The judgments as functions of the understanding are synthetic functions which organize the manifolds of sense which are in the last analysis the material of

all knowledge. What Kant attempts to do in the analytic is to indicate the ultimate judgments which would organize the experience into an adequate scheme of knowledge. This is the work of the understanding, to bring order and system into the world of phenomena by means of judgments. Kant intended the judgments to be the essential synthesis of actual experience. The categories are the a priori contributions of the mind to the knowledge of any phenomenal object. We might say that up to this point Kant's work meant a considerable advancement in the development of philosophy. But Kant could not withstand the possible stigma of subjectivism. Kant was at heart a metaphysician and could not rest satisfied with a final reference of reality to experience. This brought him to the unhappy division of the world into the noumenal and phenomenal. Instead of making his world the organized experience of an individual in experience, Kant brought into his system the unknowable sources of the two end factors in the experience process, namely the thing in itself and the synthetic unity of apperception. When we consider this element of the Kantian philosophy we can well agree that he did not progress beyond Hume in the solution of his problem. Hume puts reality frankly into the flow of experience. This Kant does also and both give faulty description as to the nature of experience. Both borrow from the traditional metaphysics elements which make it evident that the reliance upon experience in each case is much overestimated.

Kant's notion of a category comes to be then a rigid and unchanging mold into which are thrown the sense material which are to be synthesized into objects. From this there rises all the Kantian difficulties of the connection between such little related factors of experience as the sense, data, and the categories. The sense

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material for Kant comes to be fixed elements which constitute a flux of qualities. The categories are unyielding molds of an entirely other sort. The difficulties that Kant knew were contained in his viewpoint are well exhibited in the analytic by his long and laborious schemes of connection. There is lacking in Kant that organic view of experience which sees in the categories elements to organize experience which were developed from previous experience. In general what Kant was endeavoring to explain was not the world of experience but a world which is an especial kind of experience. Kant was attempting to explain the world of physics and not our everyday world.<sup>1</sup> It is for this reason that Kant was so obsessed by the fear that his world would not be objective. There was not so much difficulty with universality. Were Kant dealing with the world which we ordinarily experience, its objectivity would have been a matter of no concern for as experience it is as objective as it is. No one who really identifies reality and experience need fear for the objectivity of reality, there never arises the necessity to overexert oneself to anchor it in any way. Experience is of itself objective just as it is everything else that one demands of one's world. Because Kant needlessly stressed this objectivity that is the fixity and durability features of his Weltanschauung, he made it lose its most essential characteristics, thus becoming artificial. The categories of Kant are then in the highest sense categories of an abstract philosophy not categories of experience. Kant himself denominates them a priori elements preceding experience. From the standpoint of actual experience they are unrelated elements of an isolated discipline, the realm of pure thought and as such detached from everyday experience

Kant was infected with the mechanical science of the time. He

Foot note -

was an ardent follower of Newton in the attempt to establish a firm basis for the objects of experience. This inclination toward the Newtonian science he acquired in his student period and never could relinquish. The mechanical ideal persisted as a subtle influence upon Kant's thinking throughout his life. The <sup>Kritic</sup> British show an undoubted influence of this sort. It is for this reason that Kant had to have absolute permanence and necessity as characteristics of experience. The Kantian philosophy deals with experience according to physics and not with experience in the broader way in which it actually does go on. It is no doubt in this spirit that Kant made the note quoted by Riehl "Ich beschäftigte mich nicht mit der Evolution der Begriffe wie Tetens (den Handlungen, dadurch Begriffe erzeugt worden) nicht mit der Analysis wie Lambert, sondern blos mit der objectiven Gültigkeit derselben,"<sup>1</sup> which indicates an extreme emphasis upon the objective validity of concepts. The historians of philosophy insist that Kant's formalism is due to his too close adherence to the formal logic of traditional times. Indeed we have evidences of this in the name of the principal parts of the Critique and still more in Kant's expressed belief of his affinity with Aristotle. The fact seems to be, however, that Kant's adherence to Wolf as Riehl points out and his clinging to the formal logic are interrelated conditions with his Newtonian mechanical ideas all of which are rooted in the peculiar general experience which Kant attitudinizes. That Kant appreciated his strong mechanical attitude is well indicated in his apparent chagrin at its limitations for he saw clearly what its difficulties were. The almost pitiful way in which in the third Critique Kant is forced to accept the teleological principles for the explanation of nature indicates how strong a hold the mechanical principles had upon Kant. Kant

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<sup>1</sup> Philosophisches Kriticismus.

realizes the gap which separated the Natural History of the Heavens from his Critique of Judgment. Kant could build a world but he was incapable of putting into it a single blade of grass. There could be no more certain evidence of the inadequacy of the Kantian viewpoint. There is in this circumstance clearly discernible the fact that the Kantian attitude toward experience with its foundation in the categories is an inadequate viewpoint. This is a point at which Kant might almost have seen that his scheme of knowledge was unable to give determination to experience. This defect in the Kantian formulation was of course obvious in his attempt to deal with the facts of the moral and religious life, but there the difference in kind of experience might be admitted as a justifiable ground for inadequacy. In dealing with the organic and inorganic there is only the continuous field of nature dealt with and still the same set of categories are unable to comprehend them.

Kant's justification might come in the fact that after all he is attempting to establish a ~~secure~~ basis for physics. In so far as that is true he is of course dealing with a particular aspect of experience, an aspect that may well be formulated in the most formal terms possible. There might be made then some specific objection or other. For example, it might be argued that time and space should be placed in the list of categories with quality, quantity and the others. The entire trend of the transcendental philosophy indicates that such a justification as is mentioned cannot constitute an adequate defence of the Kantian position. The underlying motive of the transcendental philosophy is to give an account of knowledge in such a way as to solve the problem of the relation of reality and experience. If this be the meaning of the Kantian philosophy it merits all the criticism of inadequacy and artificiality which is brought against it. There

is found in Kant the boldest severance of the experiences which the science of physics deals with from the other experiences which are just as real and just as important. The fault in the Kantian position is magnified by the attitude that the experiences of physics are the essence of reality. Kant was entirely absorbed with the idea which was current on the continent from the time of Descartes that genuine reality was found only in the domain of mathematics and the sciences which were based upon it. It was in this spirit that Kant denies to philosophy a place in the hierarchy of the pure sciences.<sup>1</sup> For Kant genuine reality is found only in the domain of the disciplines which deal with principles a priori. There is no question as to Kant's meaning with respect to the reality of experience. Unless an experience could be related and comprehended by means of principles a priori, there could be no certainty of reality. The criterion of objective validity is not satisfied excepting by an immediate dependence upon principles a priori. Kant was in mortal terror of anything that smacked of the subjective, as was pointed out. Kant's work in the last analysis results then in building up an impossible barrier between the actual experiences of an individual and those which for him constitute reality. The great fault in Kant is that he has little faith in the actual happenings which concern individual human beings or all human beings. The experiences must be distilled and sublimated until their essences are arrived at. In this connection it may be pointed out that Kant overlooks the fact that psychology as a science also deals with abstractions from experience and could very well be reduced to principles a priori.

The categories of Kant owing to his general attitude toward

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Architectonic of Pure Reason.

experience as reality, are not flexible and functional factors in the organization of experience. The categories of Kant are the most abstract concepts under which may be comprehended the kind of experience which the science of physics treats of. It is possible to conceive all experience being subsumed under those categories if space and time be added; but then experience would be hard and cold. No living pulsating being could recognize that experience as being what one lives through and is affected by. The philosophy of Kant comes to be an attitude toward experience which reduces it and destroys it, making it unrecognizable and in a genuine sense unreal. The categories of Kant cannot deal with the objects and persons that the human thinker actually is concerned with. The viewpoint of Kant is obviously ponderous and perverse. It is formulated as though the discipline of mathematical physics offered the only means of organizing the world of experience. The categories of Kant, it turns out, do not in any sense fulfill the promise they held out as factors in a self-conscious method of formulating experience. In the development and transpiration of experience the categories do not play any part. They may function in the special discipline in which certain aspects of experience are strictly formulated. The immediate successors of Kant made incisive criticisms of Kant because of the extreme limitations of the Kantian position. While we cannot sympathize too much with the tenor of their complaint we may remark upon the extreme vulnerability of those categories to the charge that they cannot adequately organize experience. Categories should give experience as it is and should not be limited to the intellectual experiences. The categories should be representative of all the happenings and conditions which go to make up the life of an individual or a group.

The functional nature of the Kantian categories lies not in their representation of experience as it is, in its essential nature. The foundation of philosophy had not reached in his time the appreciation of its own activity and significance. The functional nature of the categories in Kant is illustrated by the changes they have taken on, in order to portray faithfully the social background which gave them their origin. The categories of Kant indicate only a slight beginning in the development toward the point at which they will function as essential components of experience. This is indicated by the fact that the Kantian categories may be considered merely as essentials in the formulation of the physical description of experience. They will not carry over to the rest of experience. The conditions which brought about such a formulation as Kant's were the peculiar social and political experiences of the German people at the time. The formal and weighty attitude toward experience reflects a rigid and compact state. The Kantian philosophy was developed under political auspices which are well symbolized by the leadership of Frederick the Great. The German nation at this time was taking on a severe national unity. The German people were becoming miraculously efficient and organized. The preliminary steps in the establishment of a secure German <sup>Nation came with the rebirth of Prussia as an</sup> autonomous and consequential power. The attitude of vigorous and definite substantiality was a reflection of this new political condition. The categories of Kant functioning as essential components of his attitude are explained so far as their permanence and substantiality are concerned. The general attitude of Kant in placing so great a part of his experience on the side of the experiencing individual reflects the social conditions of this period which include religious liberty and freedom of thought. Frederick made the greatest efforts to bring culture and



learning to his regenerated kingdom. The greatest encouragement was given to science and industry. Under this king Germany became an industrial nation and the pursuit of productive occupations gave great confidence and power to the people. This social condition finds expression in the statement of Kant that man is the lawgiver of nature. The experiences of the people were greatly contributed to by their own natures as rational beings. The age of Frederick was a rationalistic age and the philosophy of the period was tinged a great deal with the Rationalistic attitude. As in previous history a solid and firm social organization gives rise on the philosophical side to a stern intellectualistic viewpoint. This was true in the case of Aquinas and the strongly organized social situation in his day. The Prussia of Kant's time was a model of order and regularity. The control of every phase of the common existence was known to the royal father and regulated. The result of contact with this sort of social organization could only be the development of an attitude which should be formal and abstract such as the philosophy of Kant was. The philosophy of Kant admirably reflects the social conditions of his time. It serves also as an excellent illustration of the fact that the values ascribed in the determination of experience are functions of that experience.

In the philosophy of Kant we observe two aspects which indicate clearly the transition place which Kant occupies in the history of philosophy. The consciously formulated category doctrine points back to the natural science development of continental thought. The category doctrine which is implied in Kant's philosophy reaches forward and forms the basis for German philosophy in the nineteenth century. In Kant there is distinctly discernible the conflict between the old and new viewpoints. Kant was not a traveller but he was a citizen

of the world. Kant was stimulated by Hume and Rousseau as well as by Wolf and Newton. The latter two gained the upper hand with him for Kant's philosophy reflects well the conditions of its formulation. The Kantian categories as the basis of his attitude and representing him in the philosophical domain are Newtonian and Wolfian. They might have been more in the pattern of the Hume and Rousseau influence, but the particular experience in which Kant the citizen and man partook, was a strong factor. The categories that Kant unconsciously uses as ground principles of his system indicate a more human formulation than he is usually credited with. That element of Kant was developed in answer to the new social conditions which came about in Germany in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The categories of Kant which he does not call by that name and which are essential for his system represent better what Kant signifies for the history of philosophy, than his own formulated set. Kant's own categories show us local conditions but not all the influences that made themselves felt. The formulated Kantian categories indicate the extreme political orientation but not the precise social conditions. The unformulated Kantian categories of the Third Critique and other writings are better representatives of the intrinsic social conditions. The formulated categories do not do justice to the Kant who claimed to bring about a Copernican revolution. The formulated categories do not reveal the presence of the pietistic element in the Prussian social economy. They do not reveal the religious zeal and fervor which was prevalent. As was remarked frequently Kant only caught a glimpse of the new attitude in philosophy. Kant did not carry out his professed stand that the world of experience is given as the judgments of a thinker. The extremely close connection between reality as experience and the

thinker who is aware of his experience, was overlooked by Kant.

The successors of Kant developed their attitude toward experience upon the basis of Kant's intentional and unfulfilled doctrine rather than upon the doctrine as he formulated it. Kant may be reckoned as the stimulant to the development of German Idealism but it could not develop on the basis of his extreme naturalism. The followers of Kant soon found grave objections to the category doctrine of Kant. They came to consider philosophy more and more as a system of logic and made more of the knowledge problem, although the categories themselves were conceived in a formal and abstract way. This type of thinking had its culmination in Hegel. The appeal that the Kantian philosophy had was due to the emphasis that was possible to be placed upon the individual. Fichte made the whole experience dependent upon the development of the Ego. The Fichtean philosophy is indicative of a social solidarity which has its inherent content in the nature of the individual. The social experience of Fichte's time called for a strong and secure state which is composed of free and developing individuals. The function of the state was to hold together and advance these individuals. The Greek state principle is reversed: the citizen does not acquire his standing by virtue of membership in the state, but the state becomes important because of the individuals who compose it. The disruption of Germany by the Napoleonic activities in Europe made this attitude stand out. The individual stands out more and more as the centre of experience. The philosophy of Fichte may be considered as an attempt to derive all experience from the nature of the individual. The method is describable as an attempt to interrelate and unify the total experience of an individual. The distinction between the moral and the natural was

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broken down. The departments of experience which Kant introduced the Idealists intended to eliminate. The division between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds was eliminated by making all experience the development of the <sup>eye</sup> ~~eye~~.

Schelling attempted to give a more thoroughly logical form to the type of attitude which Fichte was formulating. The general trend of German Idealism was toward the logicizing of the attitude toward experience. The impetus that was received in the attitude which made the objects of experience come out of a judgment process carried philosophy to the point of making the whole of experience reducible to a set of categories. In Hegel the whole of experience is composed of a set of categories which develop from one another by means of a dialectic process. Hegel's carrying out of the idealistic philosophy served the purpose of bringing external and objective certainty into the judgments of the experiencing individual. The immediate reaction of the Kantian successors was to carry out to the limit the individualistic aspects of the Kantian philosophy. The Romantic movement in philosophy was the extreme of individualism and subjectivism. In making the most of the individual experience the objective validity of the experience was forgotten. The mirage and the appearances were taken to be realities. It was this condition which Hegel determined to overcome. The changes which came about in the strict formulations of German Idealistic philosophy have close counterparts in the political conditions of Germany. The extreme idealism is an attitude that comes to light when the external props of the people seem to fade away. During the disruption and humiliation of Germany the Idealistic attitude was developed and carried out. The attempt to formulate a more rigid and permanent philosophy with a greater support of objective reality come

when the war of liberation was being fought and Germany was being regenerated.

The philosophy of Hegel meant to make the categories universal elements in the determination of experience. Hegel criticizes Kant for making the categories so important; they have no restrictions thought Hegel. Hegel remarks that there is nothing we can know so easily as the thing-in-itself.<sup>1</sup> Hegel meant to make the categories the experience itself and did not limit experience to sense material. Hegel overcame a serious defect in the viewpoint of Kant. Kant was afraid to make his categories thorough going in the determination of experience, he was afraid that would make them defective on the side of objective reality. Kant's categories were very seriously limited halting before the thing-in-itself and the objects of reason. Hegel intended to permit no such limitation to his categories. Hegel took Kant's attitude to be a degradation of reason to confine it to a mere transcendence of the finite. For Hegel the infinite involves an absorption of the finite, not a mere transcendence.<sup>2</sup> He intended the categories to comprehend every possible line of experience. Kant would have certainly hesitated to accept the Hegelian interpretation of the categories since their power in comprehending all experience arose from the fact that they were merely stages in the unfolding of an absolute. The objective validity of the Hegelian categories was assured because Hegel took the categories to be elements of objects. Hegel completely logicized experience and made it consist of thought elements in advancing stages of development toward the completion of an absolute which

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<sup>1</sup>Werke 1843, B. 6, S. 95.

<sup>2</sup>Werke 1843, B.6, S.96.

is all containing. There was for Hegel no question of objective validity of the categories, for they were all the objectivity there was. The categories were for Hegel of the stuff of experience. Hegel has brought to a systematic and standardized attitude the riotous viewpoints current after the Kantian formulation. Hegel is reducing to a systematic organization the judgments concerning experience. Coming after the Idealistic and Romantic attitudes he makes no discrimination against any type of experience but makes them all subject to determination by the categories.

The gravest criticism that can be made of Hegel's categories is that they are stilted concepts, abstract and empty. The categories of Hegel are incapable of representing experience or of being experience for they are fixed and destitute of life and power. The categories of Hegel are logical abstractions and have no connection with experience except by express attribution. They are not in their development what Hegel claimed for them, namely that they are experience. The categories have no existence in reality and exist only as concepts in the mind of a thinker. As categories developing according to the Hegelian formulation they are metaphysical entities belonging to an absolute which is a transcendence of any genuine experience. Hegel was gifted with an unusually keen insight into the ongoing of experience. He observed the fact that the experience process guaranteed its own objective validity. He observed also that experience in its entirety could be given in the form of judgments. The world of experience could be given in terms of a series of values or determinations which were the results of judgment processes. Hegel's mistake lies in giving an absolutely permanent existence and infinity to his experience. He errs also in making experience an absolutely given system of occurrences tending toward a goal fixed from all time. There is no freedom

and no spontaneity in the experience of Hegel. It lacks the very essentials which are constitutive of genuine experience. Hegel's forward step is breaking down the artificial barriers of Kant's judgment functions is vitiated by his essentially metaphysical attitude. The categories of Hegel are not of experience but would seem to be superimposed upon experience. They are obviously logical determinations to which actual experience is made to conform. <sup>They</sup> ~~They~~ are not determinations of experience which are developed in an experiential interaction of objects and events. Hegel thinks of his categories as being necessary elements of the process of experience. This can be true only if experience comes to be a metaphysical movement of abstract entities. Hegel had a keen sense for the movement of experience. He saw clearly the part played by the individual in the way of forming judgments. This difficulty came in ascribing such overwhelming validity to the objectivity of the judgments that the judgments were merely expressions of the reality of some phase of an Absolute. Hegel's experience, instead of being the indeterminate result of an indefinite series of preceding conditions became the absolute unfolding of an inevitable series of events the goal of which was determined from the beginning. Hegel did not then advance beyond Kant. He saw clearer than did Kant that the entire experience must be subject to the judgment processes of the experiencing individual. He was opposed to Kant's separation of experience into appearance and reality.<sup>1</sup> Hegel saw, also that experience must develop from other experiences. His mistake was in injecting an absolute necessity into those experiences and making

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Wallace  
 1Logic, p. 93.  
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them all tend toward some determined metaphysical goal. In so far as Kant merely described the process of judgment as he saw it and made it an essential element in thought, he avoided any harmful implications. In so far as he did not make these judgments and categories existential Kant avoided the metaphysical implications of Hegel. Both Kant and Hegel as representatives of a comparatively recent tendency in philosophy contribute much that is valuable to an understanding of the evaluation processes of experience, but both living under conditions very different from those prevailing now, have very unsatisfactory interpretations of the genuine significance of human experience.



Current Philosophical Attitudes.Analytical Table of Contents.

In Current philosophy there is an avowed appreciation of the fact that reality is to be sought for only in experience which consists of the actual conditions and events of everyday life.

Philosophy in the nineteenth century and after became at various times merely scientific or adopted an ethical or aesthetic attitude. The idea that reality should not be sought in a domain beyond the ordinary experience brought with it the additional consequence that philosophy could be reduced to a mechanical science.

A reaction to the naively mechanical interpretation of experience came in the form of a <sup>metaphysics</sup> which sought reality outside the domain of science. The ordinary knowledge processes which were functional in science were presumed to be inadequate for the investigation of reality.

There are now developing in philosophy two prominent attitudes toward experience which aim to correct the previous insufficiencies of philosophy. These two movements may be termed Neo-Realism and Pragmatism.

Neo-Realism assumes that real objects are independent of the evaluation process and the categories are elements inherent in real things. This results in a conception which makes of the categories abstract ontological elements. The Neo-Realistic position becomes a similar viewpoint to the rationalistic philosophy of the seventeenth century.

In Pragmatism philosophy arrives at the thoroughly basic principle that all reality must be sought only in the domain of actual experience. Pragmatists recognize that the categories of philosophy are

evaluations of the facts and conditions which actually occur in human experience. This attitude has led to the situation that it is considered that all evaluations of experience are those which the practical sciences produce. There is in this attitude an obvious omission of a great part of experience. There is overlooked all of that experience which falls without the domain of the special sciences.

To appreciate the functional nature of the categories there must be differentiated between the various motives and circumstances which call for the functioning of the evaluation process. Each realm of experience <sup>receives</sup> serves its own evaluations for the particular purposes which the specific situation <sup>S</sup> required.

The categories of philosophy in common with all other categories, are functional values given to the facts and conditions of experience in an effort to determine their most general and profound significance. These categories deal with actual conditions of experience just as the categories of ordinary experience and science do. The differences between these are functional, each type serving as an important instrument in the life of a thinker.

Current Philosophical Attitudes.

In current thought we have the more or less conscious recognition that the formulations of science and philosophy are attitudes taken toward experience. We have reached a stage in philosophical development in which the attitude toward experience is seriously criticized. It would probably be unfair to assert that any reputable thinker accept<sup>o</sup> overtly the existence of metaphysical reality although a belief in it is frequently the result of an apparently critical starting point. Current philosophy then is distinguished by the fact that it is aware of itself as an attempt to formulate the significance of the events and objects which constitute the experiential environment of the thinker. Philosophy may be said to be essentially concerned with the explanation of the ordinary phenomena of everyday life, and not with existences which do not, and cannot make themselves felt in or influence the thoughts and actions of human individuals. This attitude may be taken to be the criterion of valid philosophical thought and in so far as thinkers deviate from that pattern they fail to contribute to the solution of the philosophic problems of the present.

In all this the thesis we have been maintaining namely, that the attitude toward experience must be specifically influenced by that experience, finds especial confirmation in current thought.

Current philosophy even to the presumed rejection of it admirably reflects present conditions in the organization and activities of present day society. The categories with which experience are evaluated indicate clearly the trend of social conditions as they have developed out of previous activities and situations. These categories are the products of different conditions and so are different in their identity, and in their significance. They either are different values attached

to experience or they are similar values with added or altered significance. The categories which constitute certain formulations of attitudes toward experience are taken over directly from science. In other formulations the categories take on connotations from less critical attitudes toward experience. A special characteristic of present-day philosophy is that there is a violent antipathy toward categorizing the world of experience in intellectualistic categories. There is a general antipathy expressed in the published viewpoints to the evaluation of experience in terms of the cold abstract categories of the intellect. This antipathy has been carried to the correlated extreme of placing too great an emphasis upon the practical values of experience. There are decided tendencies to give experience a superabundant weight of activity. The Voluntaristic aspects of experience are stressed in an extreme way. Man has been classified as a doing animal rather than a thinking animal which, it is asserted, has been traditionally given as his <sup>essential</sup> characteristic.<sup>1</sup> Reality has been considered as entirely without the comprehending bounds of the intellect. The world has been considered as primarily a center and a source of activity. The intellectual functions are subservient to and derived from this Voluntaristic background. Reality is taken to be this eternal activity rather than any process or series of processes of intellectual relationships. Experience is frequently evaluated in aesthetic categories. The world is taken to be a marvellous work of art which is constantly being created and recreated.<sup>2</sup> The Voluntaristic and aesthetic movements in philosophy represent attitudes of protest against conceiving the world entirely in terms of mental construction. Those movements

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<sup>1</sup>Bergson - Creative Evolution, p. 139.

<sup>2</sup>Overtly in the Schellingian philosophy and implicitly in other systems since.

mean to emphasize the other elements which play prominent parts in experience.

An instructive characteristic of practically all recent tendencies in thought indicate an appreciation of actual experience as a basis or constituent of reality. The awareness of reality is assumed to be possible only by a study of the facts of concrete experience. This attitude implies a particular kind of experience background, it implies with respect to the longer aspects of life a stable social order. The history of attitudes toward experience indicates that when conditions have been such as to make man feel thoroughly entrenched in their place in the world a more or less certain attitude is adopted. Such attitudes as the naturalistic and positivistic dominate the thought of the period. In the less critical attitudes the facts of experience are taken for granted and the work of the thinker is to record them. Speculation becomes an object of suspicion and the attitude is taken that science is entirely competent to deal with all the facts of experience. The materialistic branch of this type of philosophy would attempt to evaluate all experience with categories borrowed from the abstract physical sciences. The whole of experience is classified as variations of mass and ~~nature~~<sup>motion</sup>. The prominent categories of such attitudes are force, energy, time, and space.<sup>1</sup> Under other conditions there may be a revolt against this type of attitude and experience may be characterized entirely in terms of consciousness. The ultimate category might be sentience or spirit of some sort or other.<sup>2</sup>

The understanding of the nature of experience is sometimes lost in the zeal to seize hold of it. The disposition to stake everything upon the proposition that reality is to be found only in experience

<sup>1</sup>Recent Positivistic and phenomenalist movements.

<sup>2</sup>Bradley.

sometimes results in serious error. There have been attitudes developed which deny that all experience has reality especially the more recondite and the less obvious aspects of it. The result is that experience is limited to some aspect or part and this is declared to be the entire realm of the knowable. What lies beyond this arbitrary enclosure is considered of no value. The world is divided into the practical and the speculative and since life is considered as an eminently practical thing whatever seems not easily attainable is deemed not worth striving for. The adherents of such attitudes miss much of reality because they lose interest in everything but that which is brought about by quick methods. These attitudes are born of conditions which make for self-satisfaction and completeness. Here is the presence felt of a power to dominate and control phenomena. These are periods in human experience in which practical affairs are exceedingly successful and men seem to be wresting the innermost secrets and powers from nature. Men seem to fairly wallow in the heart of experience. When thinkers under such conditions do take cognizance of experience which is not bare and obvious they formulate doctrines which make of men factors in the dynamic forces which actuates the whole of experience.<sup>1</sup> There is here as in other places evidence that the values assigned to experience are always functions of the conditions under which the evaluation of experience takes place. The sort of categories used and the significance they carry both depend upon the specific occasions of their development. A record of the categories with which recent thinkers have attempted to evaluate experience shows clearly what the experience which is evaluated has been. In general the most recent formulations of experience were developed under circumstances which gave great confidence in the capacity of men to comprehend and define his world. The categories used were then such as were derived from a successful

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<sup>1</sup>Bergsonism, for example - The method of philosophy becomes entirely other than that of science.

handling of some specific kind of experience. Philosophy becomes in general a part of the discipline of science. The real is taken to be entirely comprehended and covered by the descriptions and definitions of the scientific disciplines.<sup>1</sup> We have observed that this attitude may be carried to the extreme in which the most of experience and perhaps the best of experience is dissipated. The motive of philosophy which is to give any adequate evaluation to experience as such is lost. There is lost the extremely useful and valid distinction between philosophy and scientific categories, or between ethical or esthetic categories. There is the still more disastrous fact in the entire loss of the significance of the categories. The categories are not considered as elements in a thought process or an experience process but as attributes of reality whether existential or logical.

In more recent times there have been renewed activities in the way of making more definite the work of philosophy. There has been developed a philosophical attitude on a firmer basis than was the case since the scientific reaction to philosophy. Philosophers have become interested in pointing out the meaning of experience without accepting the dogmatic presuppositions of uncritical thought. There has been indicated also the tendency to avoid the restrictions of a dogmatic scientific attitude. Recent philosophical discussions are concerned more with the method of knowledge than was true during the reign of the dogmatic scientific attitude. The problem of knowledge is receiving more attention than was formerly true. This may be considered as a return to the Kantian attitude of investigating just what is involved in the experience process.

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<sup>1</sup>Spencerian Philosophy.

Two general types of viewpoint are becoming prominent in philosophy in answer to a demand for a complete faith in experience. These two are Realism which aims in some form or other to find reality in experience although it is independent of the experiencing process. Only in experience are objects met with, but they may exist whether they ever come into experience or not. The other which may be crudely called Pragmatism finds reality in experience because things are as they are experienced. Objects are dependent for their nature upon the experiencing process. The Realist builds up his Weltanschauung as a system of events or facts or terms in relation.<sup>1</sup> The Realist aims to establish the reality of the objects of experience by considering them as not depending upon the fact of experience for their being or being as they are.<sup>2</sup> The experience process for the Realist is a process of finding or discovering objects. The objects are not changed by entering the experience process with exception of taking on a new relation. The process of cognition and experience are merely relations.<sup>3</sup> The method of knowledge for the Realists reduces itself to a sort of logical determination of objects and a mechanical ordering of them into systems. The Realist reduces his world to an infinite system of simple and complex entities. The simple entities are logical constants and sense qualities. For the realist the things of thought as well as those of sense have ontological status.<sup>4</sup> Both types of things have absolute stability and continuity in experience. In general the realist tends to reduce so far as it is possible the distinction between the mental

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<sup>1</sup>Holt - New Rules, p. 366.

<sup>2</sup>A thorough-going realism must assert independence not only of thought but of any variety whatsoever of experience *whether it be perceptual*

<sup>3</sup>New Realism.

*Perry Philos, Trend. p 315*

*etc." Perry of Trends p 315.*



and the physical. In his attempt to preserve his world apart from any knowledge or experience of it, the realist makes experience an inter-relation of logical terms. Russell refers to this as a priori knowledge.<sup>1</sup> The realist claims to put reality into universals somewhat after the manner of Plato.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the great importance of the categories for any point of view there is little or no overt discussion of them by the Realists. It is clear, however, what the realistic categories are. For the Realist the categories are subsisting entities which enter into complexes such as the various objects and events of the world. For the Realist experience consists of these entities entering into particular relations. These entities, as was said, are logical reals and may exist whether there is experience of them or not. The categories for the realist are not categories of experience for they exist of their own right and prior and beyond any experience. For the realist the highest category is being<sup>3</sup> and being has no necessary connection with existence. When an object comes into experience the implication is that it combines with it another entity or attaches to itself another universal, or again it enters a new relation. Realism makes a great deal of its endeavor to escape any suggestion of anthropomorphism. It wishes to get at its world as it really is, without the disturbing intervention of an experiencing individual. There is much to be said in favor of this attitude. The world should not in any sense be considered as enjoying nothing more than a precarious existence. There is a sound instinct at the basis of an attitude which strives to release the world

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<sup>1</sup>Problems of Philosophy, p. 135 ff.

<sup>2</sup>Russell - Problems of Philosophy, p. 142 ff.

Neo-R., p. 35. *is in honor of*

Montague - Essay Wm. James, 113-114.

Marvin - First Book of Metaphysics, pp. 108 ff.

<sup>3</sup>Holt - Concept of Consciousness, p. 21.

from a degrading bondage. This commendable attitude loses its value and importance when it makes its world so independent and estranged from the experiencer who is so vitally concerned with it, that it loses all meaning. The world that the Realist describes might be conceived to be real but it cannot be thought as having any meaning in our experiences. The experiencing individual cannot possibly find such a world a fit or useful place for any purpose. The realist makes a most serious error in failing to investigate the nature of the categories he employs to evaluate his world. It is obvious that the realist gives values to his world of experience. Giving it such values as he does takes away from it the essential characteristics that are actually found in it. The realists follow much too closely the ideals of mathematics and abstract physics. It is extremely useful for those disciplines to make use of the abstract logical categories in determining their respective domains. The special sciences have certain definite functions and these functions are well carried out with such categories as they use. Philosophy has a different function and a different motive. It represents an autonomous phase of human experience. Philosophy aims to state the meaning and significance of experience. The categories required to make this evaluation must naturally enough be derived from experience. They should be values that mean something for experience, and should not be superimposed upon experience as ultimate and substantial elements of reality. Philosophy always aims to describe what comes to experience and unless reality is experienced it cannot be the genuine domain of philosophy. Even if we cannot prove that our experience is the only reality and even if we believe that reality is always beyond ordinary phenomena there can be no advantage in using such categories as the realist does. It must be evident that science and philosophy are attempts

to formulate the significance of experience and no possible worth can be found in evaluating experience as non-significant. This does not mean at all to fly to the opposite and just as irrational extreme and make all reality anthropomorphic. Logical philosophy *must* give to experience such categories as will be suitable and which will satisfy the aims and purposes of the categorization process. If the purpose is to give experience a system of abstract symbols as marks of representation, and this can be accomplished by means of categories which are *arbitrary* and unrelated to experience the work of the realist is justified. Some scientists assume that this is sufficient to mark the work of science. The point is to appreciate what the categories of philosophy are and are for. If the attitude toward philosophy is taken to be that of adequately determining reality or describing experience as the writer would hold, then the arbitrary construction of logical elements wont do. These two attitudes should represent two distinct phases of philosophical development. <sup>o</sup>New-Realism apparently belongs to the former type of philosophical theory, and finds its parallel in the past history of philosophy. In general the <sup>a</sup>new-realists seem to disregard the fact that it is the first requisite of philosophy to be aware of the nature of categories that the philosopher employs. This apparently is the reason that the neo-realist fails to observe the interpretation of experience as though reality consisted of certain things in themselves, or it might with equal propriety be said that experience is not interpreted at all.<sup>1</sup> Uncritical rationalism represents a state of experience in which the thinker finds himself more or less conditioned by external factors in experience. The thinker does not appear to realize the situation, however. In the second case whatever is stable and permanent in experience is preserved and also appreciated. The thinker

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Russell - Scientific Method in Philosophy, 1914.

is certain that objects cannot be produced by the thinker but the fact is never forgotten that there is an attempt to evaluate them or that the value of the objects is given as an attitude toward them. Not forgetting this there is more ingenuity and care exercised in making the attitude adequate. The degree in value of various philosophical attitudes lies in the fact that some are more conscious of being attitudes and thus have the possibility at least of being better attitudes.

Pragmatism developed as a reaction to the absolutistic attitude which dominated the philosophical world after the decline of the narrow naturalism and empiricism. Pragmatism is essentially empiristic but not in the sense that it takes the facts of experience as given. It rather considers the world of facts as developing and growing. For the pragmatist reality is not something ready made and fixed which becomes known to the experiencer. Reality is a condition of constant becoming. The world of objects is going through a series of constant changes each making place for the next change. Pragmatism means to point out the absence of the stable and the eternal in human experience. Pragmatism looks upon experience as essentially the happenings of human beings and this experience is inclusive of all the reality that the thinker can attain to.<sup>1</sup> This attitude is well summed up in the words of James in his <sup>realistic</sup> Pluralistic Universe, "I find myself no good warrant for even suspecting the existence of any reality of a higher denomination than that distributed and strong<sup>y</sup> and flowing sort of reality that finite beings swim in."<sup>2</sup> Correlated with this viewpoint the Pragmatic logic is instrumental and forms a connection between one experience and another.

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<sup>1</sup>Creative Intelligence, p. 55.

<sup>2</sup>p. 212.

er. It is not a self-subsisting activity indulged in for its own sake. Thinking is not merely formal activity, a sort of self-perpetual function or activity. Thought is purposive and makes for some end that is desirable or necessary. The criterion for the truth or error of any element of the thought processes is the fulfillment of some definite (finite) aim or purpose.<sup>1</sup> In general for the pragmatic attitude <sup>idea</sup> there are instruments of action.

The categories for the pragmatic attitude are values attributed to objects in answer to some definite need or purpose. In this attitude the nature of philosophy comes to be adequately recognized. We come finally to a stage of philosophical development in which the functional nature of the philosophical categories are appreciated. The categories become definite values given to the facts of experience in order to give determination to experience. We come to a period in philosophical development in which experience is considered not as some give series of objects and conditions or as collections of original stuffs whether rationalistic or sensationalistic. In so far as experience is taken to be the <sup>actual</sup> objects, actions, thoughts and conditions of human beings the instrumentalist has achieved an adequate viewpoint. Philosophy upon such a basis must signify something in its method and results.

The categories of philosophy which the instrumentalist allows come to be narrow and restricted in their functions. The pragmatist tends to deny the full implications of his doctrine. This is owing to the fact that this attitude still is influenced seriously by the conditions which originally <sup>fostered</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>the</sup> instrumentalistic attitude maintains its character as a negation of the absolute idealistic phil-

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<sup>1</sup>Moore - "Some Logical Aspects of Purpose" in Studies of Logical Theory 1903. Also Pragmatism and its Critics, p. 14-15.  
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, 1916; Creative Intelligence. 1917

esophy. The strain of denying that the function of philosophy is to be a speculative harmonization of a completed world leads the instrumentalist to compress it to the point of a <sup>§</sup>sever<sup>↑</sup> practicability. The instrumentalist stands very strongly committed to a doctrine of action and this also has resulted in straining the position. The instrumentalist denounces with admirable justification the idea that experience is a cognitive affair, but permits himself to be carried to the opposite and equally faulty extreme. He tends to deny the speculative interest its <sup>pr</sup>progress, place and <sup>a</sup>value in the ongoing of human experience. The instrumentalist is at fault in failing to consider that no matter how practical the categorization function is, there is practicability served in striving for the so-called theoretical end. The tendency of instrumentation <sup>1/18 m</sup> is to arbitrarily limit its notion of practicability to some definite conduct. The instrumentalist overlooks the fact that the theoretical life and activity are practical also, that is, as legitimate parts of experience. The Pragmatist never tires of pointing out that the functions of evaluation are constantly being used for practical ends. That is, the theoretical judgments are for the most part functioning in practical situations. The truth of this is clearly obvious but this truth does not at all obviate the fact of *occurrence* or value of the theoretical use of the evaluation function. It might be truly said that the development and use of strictly philosophical categories as recognized factors of experience the instrumentalist overtly denies. The instrumentalist has the tendency to deny the validity of so-called theoretical attitudes. This is not entirely true in practice for the Pragmatist considers the scientific work to be not entirely a discipline of practice. In general it is true that the idea of practice or the practical takes on an extremely limited and restrictive connotation. The instrumentalist position in actuality

does not exclude the world of pure science which has no immediate practical consequences. The instrumentalist lays himself open to much criticism respecting the extreme positivism of his position. The general attitude of the Pragmatists is attacked as anthropomorphic. It is charged that Pragmatism clings too closely to the attitude which adopts arbitrarily or instinctively the standpoint of practical belief which is a <sup>flexible</sup> fraction of <sup>dogmatic</sup> anthropomorphism.<sup>1</sup> The point is that the Pragmatic attitude is taken to revolve too closely about the individual experiences. The human individual plays too prominent a part in the formulation of the attitude toward experience. This may be taken to be very doubtful criticism. If one means by this that the instrumentalist takes his attitude to center around human activities and reactions to the world about him it is a very favorable observation. It indicates that the instrumentalist is dealing with actual happenings instead of with formal symbols of assumed events. For it is in fact true that in Pragmatism there is reached the stage in thought in which there is the most thorough going realization of the place the experiencing individual plays in experience. There is not found in Pragmatism any tendency to take experience for granted, the given in experience is reduced to an absolute minimum while insisting upon the position that reality is found in experience. The critics of Pragmatism are correct only if they show that the Pragmatist so strongly insists upon the place of the overt actions of the individual in experience that the other and larger parts of experience are lost. This criticism may be made because of the extreme insistence upon the practical nature of the categorization functions (logical processes, knowledge processes). The Pragmatist, it is said, overlooks the aspects of experience which are not clearly practical or dictated by some practical purpose.

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<sup>1</sup>Perry - *Philosophical Tendencies* p. 39.

Pragmatism has had the tendency to deny the value of such determinations of experience as are properly called philosophical. The anthropomorphic and subjectivistic criticism against Pragmatism were inspired by protests against the restricting tendencies of the movement. The subjectivistic charge was ably answered by Moore, which, however, still left the criticism of anthropomorphism.<sup>1</sup> Professor Moore refutes the charge of a private consciousness and the more recent literature satisfactory excludes any solipsistic interpretation, but the inclination to restrict the attitude to particular types of experience remains.

The instrumentalist position does not deny what is obvious namely that human experience consists of much besides the practical actions. The instrumental attitude in its essential position should not exclude such a discipline which occupies itself with those experiences. Much of the difficulty with the problem of the scientific and philosophical revolves around the conception of pure and practical science. The instrumentalist means to insist that philosophy has no other source of materials to work with than has science. There is an extreme desire to avoid any preconceived notions of reality, any theological implications. In aiming to keep entirely within the field of actual experience the Pragmatist stands for an admirable position. There must be, however, very clearly marked off the facts and interpretations within that field. With the insisting upon the exclusion from the evaluation of experience of ~~an~~ uncritical or dogmatic categories, the appreciation of the difference between the types of categories must be insisted upon also. This must be so because there are various motives in interpreting experience. The instrumentalist seems to confuse two different situations. In saying

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<sup>1</sup>Pragmatism and its Critics, 1910.



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that all intelligible questions as to causation are wholly scientific he correctly points out that it is nonsense to discuss ultimate origins and ultimate ends, questions which Professor Dewey admirably names *creational and eschatological*. The implication is that to discuss cause intelligently one must discuss conditions that occur in actual experience. This excellent observation becomes transformed in the thought of the instrumentalist until he comes to the idea that philosophy as science deals only with practical problems. Even to this point there is no serious objection to the position since it is taken to be a very practical occupation to formulate an attitude towards experience in general. *The* difficulty comes when the pragmatist apparently limits the practical to specific overt actions.

When the problem of philosophy is taken to be an evaluation of experience in general it is readily seen that cause as a category serves a different function than does the cause of science. Since we must stand upon the ground of actual experience in all our attitudes the difference in evaluation of experience must refer to a different motive or purpose. In the scientific investigation the cause of an event or condition is of value in bringing about some definite practical effect. This is the discipline of overt action. The inquiring into the causes of events and conditions from the philosophical standpoint finds its value in the motive which men have of understanding their experiences without a view to *bringing* about some special *change* or while realizing that no such *change* is possible. It is possible that men should be interested in knowing that these are many events and conditions in experiences which they cannot modify or change in any way.

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Dewey - Journal of Philosophy, p. 337 ff.

This interest is not an uncritical one, it is not a religious faith in the interpretation of things as one would have them. The philosophy<sup>ical</sup> motive and philosophical inquiry<sup>y</sup> are legitimate aspects of actual experience. Since the actual experience which is the field of both types of investigation is continuous there is obviously a continuity in the evaluations of experience. The philosophical and scientific categories as well as all others are elements in the evaluations of the same actual experience. Professor Dewey implies in the discussion of the subject matter of metaphysical inquiry that the one may prevent misconception in the other.<sup>1</sup> Regardless of what one may believe of the value of such inquiry Professor Dewey has pointed out in the article just referred to that there is a definite field for the evaluation of experience which does not necessarily imply any specific practical action in the ordinary meaning of that term.

The necessity for distinguishing between the different types of categories is an inevitable outcome of the fact that they are functional processes. The categories having certain definite functions it is obvious that those must be carefully attended to and clarified. The scientific function must be carefully distinguished from the philosophical functions just as there must be kept separate the esthetic, religious and economic categories even though these are all evaluations of different aspects of the same experiences. The reader of the pragmatic literature must come to the conclusion that the pragmatist does not keep his categories distinct. In fact, there is a good basis for believing that he does not generally admit the philosophical categories at all. The entire trend of the pragmatist's position is to conceive that all evaluations of experience are for the purpose of affecting some practical result. As was suggested above there could be no criticism

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<sup>1</sup>Journal of Philosophy. p. 337 ff.

of this if the term practical was not restricted to some overt action. The instrumentalist makes the statement also that pragmatic means that thinking is referred to consequences.<sup>1</sup> But there is very little room left in the pragmatic literature for such a consequence as an orderly notion of the significance of experience in general. There is little patience on the part of the pragmatist with the philosophical evaluations of experience. The pragmatist tends to reject the work of constructing a conscious attitude toward the whole of experience. The pragmatist tends to associate the philosophical functioning of the categorization process with the old metaphysics which aimed to dissolve a world of reality which lay beyond the present world of appearance. There is also found in Pragmatism the implication that philosophy is a diaphanous shadow which <sup>hovers</sup> ~~hovers~~ over the world of action. In speculating upon the motive for the extreme insistence upon the practical or consequential <sup>al</sup> ~~al~~ <sup>intervention</sup> for the evaluations of experience there is suggested the possibility that this indicates an extreme desire to make an immediate and final determination to the facts and conditions of experience.<sup>2</sup>

The categories of philosophy are evolutions given to the objects of experience in an effort to formulate the most satisfactory attitude possible toward experience. The motive for making this formulation is to attain to a view of reality which will make it most significant and approachable. The attitude of philosophy is theoretical in its function. The only practical purpose is to orient the thinker with respect to his surroundings. This includes the whole of experience so far as it can be made subject to experimental verification. That is, each aspect of the attitude must find confirmations in actual facts and conditions. In fact the philosophical attitude is merely the determinations of the significance of these facts and conditions.

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<sup>1</sup>Dewey - Essays in Experimental Logic, 1916, p. 330 ff.

<sup>2</sup>A quick result metaphysics in fact.

The philosophical attitude as against the scientific does not limit its evaluations to any specific series of facts. It oversteps the boundaries of the physical and mental, the organic and inorganic so far as the philosophy of nature is concerned. In the realm of social facts philosophy is not limited in its viewpoint by economic, political or ethical barriers. Philosophy does not limit itself to such a partial view, it aims to evaluate its objects from the largest standpoint possible. It is for this reason that philosophy may not be considered as national in character as Professor Dewey seems to imply.<sup>1</sup> A genuine philosophical attitude cannot be the reflection of happenings in a particular place. This has been the history of philosophical viewpoints. They have been expressions of limited experience, but that was before philosophy became truly self-conscious. It would be disastrous to a philosophical position to circumscribe it with such a programme. The thinker must orient himself not only with respect to the larger situation, especially since there is really no break between them. The limitation of philosophy to those aspects of experience which concern the thinker immediately does indefinite damage to the attitude. Philosophy must be at least ambitious to have nothing which concerns actual human happenings to be undreamed of by it. There is vastly more material of experience available to the thinker than that which falls immediately into one's particular sphere of action.

In pointing out the need for an adequate appreciation of the philosophical categories there might be mentioned another phase of the problem respecting the clarity of the categories. There is need not only to distinguish the philosophic categories from the scientific

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<sup>1</sup>Creative Intelligence, p. 67.

but also to correlate them with the categories of other attitudes. Experience to be complete, or adequately determined, must be evaluated in other ways than in the scientific and philosophic manners. If reality is actually given in experience it is evident that it is evaluated by other than the scientific and philosophic attitudes. In fact, if the scientific and philosophic attitudes are to possess any validity they must be continuous with the other and less critical attitudes. The categories of philosophy and science are merely more critical, and selective or creational values ascribed to the facts of experience. The various systems of categories or evaluations of experience are formulated in answer to some particular purpose. In the very lowest stages the attitude is not a cognitive one at all. It is a direct reaction to the immediately prevailing conditions in the surroundings of the individual. There is here the immediate reaction of an individual to the surrounding conditions. This is an entirely objective interaction of objects. This is a condition of experience in which no criterion of practical is functioning to evaluate the other objects with which there is contact. The criterion of the practical consequence of evaluating experience comes in as a factor when there is some realization of the nature of the situation. The evaluations of experience go beyond this stage of the practical when there develops the interest to appreciate the significance of the relative totality of experience. The evaluation of philosophy are the abstract formulations which are derived from the more immediate sorts of experience. They are refinements upon the experiences of a lesser degree of definition and of ascertained meaning.

A more careful study of the nature of the categorization function and of the product categories indicates the error of attempting to limit the determination of experience to a specific and exclusive type of

values. Pragmatism has apparently taken the attitude that the sole motive for the critical and conscious formulation of an attitude toward experience is the practical one. This attitude results in the construction of a methodology for the practical sciences. The practical sciences evaluate experience for some definite practical end which is immediately desirable and attainable. Philosophy which is the more theoretical science deals with ends which are not desired by everyone and which require a more abstract and removed attitude for its pursuit. While it is certainly <sup>well</sup> ~~time~~ that we must have intelligence to liberate and liberalize action, this does not preclude the necessity for an intelligence which will be able to appreciate the meaning of these action, and to relate them with other actions and conditions. It is a commendable insight which differentiates the various aspects of experience but frequently as was the case with Bergson this results in going over to a position similar to the traditional metaphysics. There are two pitfalls to be avoided. In the first place it must be recognized that there is genuine reality worthy of investigation and determination outside the realm of the practical sciences. In the second place it must be always kept in mind that this field although outside the domain of practical science is continuous with it. That is, there is no break in the continuity of experience. Correlated with this fact is the fact that the entire domain of experience is evaluated by the same functional process which is different in its specific activities only because of the variation of the circumstances and the motive of the thinkers. There is no knowledge process but the same creating categorization function which orders, develops and ascertains the significance of the happenings and conditions of human beings. Reality cannot be intuited, it must be subjected to the processes of the evaluation

function if it is to be reacted to, known, or dealt with in any way.

A brief survey of its history indicates that philosophy has now entered upon an era in which it realizes its own function. Philosophy recognizes that it is an attitude toward experience. It is clear in its awareness that it is a process of critical and conscious evaluation of experience for the purpose of orienting the thinker in his world. Philosophy appreciates now the fact that the world of experience in which the thinker finds himself is dependent upon the thinker only with respect to certain definite conditions. Philosophy as never before, enters upon a course of service and validity. It has only to guard against confusion and misinterpretation of the categories which it employs in its work. Philosophy assumes that its domain is entirely distinct from that dogmatic misinterpretation of experience whether called theological or scientific or which seeks reality beyond the confines of actual experience. Philosophy, to be valid, must avoid the dangers incident to miscalling all of reality that which is only a part, whether that part be the surface of things or the entire fact of a particular kind. Philosophy has a distinct domain of its own which, while absolutely continuous with the rest of actual experience, is still an autonomous part of it. Philosophy, while never transcending actual experience, is the freest creative function of all the categorization processes. It creates a perspective which guides experience in its development in the direction of freedom, appreciation and useful accomplishment.

The Functional Nature of the Philosophical Categories.

Abstract of a Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Arts and Literature  
In Candidacy for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
In the Department of Philosophy

By

Jacob Robert Kantor



## Thesis.

The Nature of Philosophy. In this dissertation the assumption is made that philosophy constitutes an intellectual enterprise which may be described as an attempt to arrive at a valid and systematic evaluation of experience. This evaluation constitutes a deliberate, theoretical, and practical orientation with respect to the objects, conditions, and events comprising the experiences of the individual and his group, insofar of course, as the latter can be historically traced out or inferred from observable data. Although this philosophical orientation is a critical evaluation of the actual human surroundings and circumstances of the thinker, that evaluation has as its criterion of criticism the significance of things rather than their bare existence. Not only does the philosopher not deal with transexperiential things, but also when he orients himself to existing things, he evaluates them in their own terms; so that he does not solve the problem as to what things exist and what their significance is prior to an actual investigation and description of those things. Furthermore, instead of evaluating things on the basis of their superficial appearances or their relation to him and his immediate interests, the philosopher seeks a more lasting and significant standpoint. In plainer words, philosophy from this angle is precisely the same sort of enterprise as natural science.

What then constitutes the difference between philosophy and science? Our answer is that the orientations of the philosopher are more critical, more concrete, and more general. More critical than science, in the sense that the natural scientist is interested in the evaluation of some specific fact; so that the solution of any immediate problem is satisfactory to him even though he may have made assumptions which will not be suitable or satisfactory from the standpoint of some other specific problem.

More concrete is the philosophical evaluation in the sense that no part of a fact is neglected in order to solve a specific problem. For example, the physicist necessarily and properly neglects qualitative features of a mechanical event for example, in order to get an abstract and mathematical statement, which from his specific standpoint and the standpoint of his particular problem is an actual description of the event. In doing so he is of course entirely justified. From a philosophical standpoint it very frequently happens, but not always, that the qualitative features of the event are exceedingly important for orientational purposes. Since obviously our actual human phenomena are continuous, naturally these two interests fuse at some points and become identical. Especially is this fact clear when we consider that philosophy is merely theoretical science.

More general is the philosophical evaluation, since it represents a free, orientational endeavour and consequently is not limited to the confines of particular problems. Probably the main function of philosophy is the criticism of conceptions, the attempt to limit solutions, to analyze situations, and to point out the limitations of scientific investigations.

Not only is philosophy continuous with science but it also may be considered along with science as an extension of actual human contacts with surrounding things and events. Sometimes in the course of such contacts scientific problems arise resulting in the refinements and specifications of the ordinary contact with things. In general, this scientific activity may be thought of as a more expert intercourse with surrounding things and events. Similarly, individuals develop the desire for and practice of more general orientational behavior toward their surroundings, and this we call philosophical activity.

The Nature of Categories. The means by which these intellectual enterprises are carried out we may name categories. A category we consider to be an intellectual tool, consisting for the most part of an evaluational function and differing with the uses to which it is put. Accordingly, categories of philosophy differ from categories of science and from those of everyday think-

ing. As much as these categories differ from each other, however, they are all common in the sense that they are objective instruments of evaluation and not the subjective reactions (ideas, conceptions) of specific individuals, although in every single instance they are directly and immediately derived from such specific human activities.

Development of Thesis.

Obviously, since human experiences are very different from individual to individual, from a specific group or society to other specific groups and societies, and from one period of history to another, we therefore find the records of philosophical thought filled with varying orientational statements, of experience. Each statement employs different sets of categories, whether named the same or not. Furthermore, in each period and philosophical system these categories carry different significances and functions as instruments for the carrying on of the intellectual orientational enterprise. Accordingly, the development of the thesis consists of an attempt to show how in different philosophical systems the categories have varied on the basis of different categorization conceptions. Under the following rubrics the outstanding periods of philosophical history may be indicated with the characteristic attitudes they reveal to us concerning the process and the problems of categorization.

(1) Attributive Categorization.<sup>1</sup> In the earliest recorded philosophical

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<sup>1</sup> These actual terms do not appear in the original dissertation; they are employed here for convenience in summarizing the material.

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periods the categorization process consisted mainly of the attribution by philosophers of governing principles or basic conditions for the source and development of phenomena constituting the world of facts. And so we find here categorization systems of limited range. One or a few categories suffice to attribute a cause or condition to things which amounts to a fairly naive reflection concerning the nature of the world at large. Here we have the Water (Thales), Air (Anaximenes), and the Boundless (Anaximander) categories. Whether we have the elaboration of some perceived material into a cosmic principle, or some mathematical ratios (Pythagoreans) made the ground of all things

In either case some name of a substance becomes for these early thinkers the sole category.

So far we may say there is no definite appreciation of the nature of the categorization problem. Thinkers do not exhibit any self consciousness with respect to the evaluation of experience. The attempt is made merely to isolate and define the fundamental principles of the world as the thinkers understood it. In the world of Heraclitus and Parmenides, in which insistence is made that perceived phenomena cannot be relied upon to give reality, we find the beginnings of an interest, although very primitive and crude, in the categorization problem. With the origin of the category of Being, the One and Many, as philosophical evaluations, the problem of categorization may be considered to have its birth.

(2) Predicative Categorization. In this period the process of categorization becomes fairly specific. The categories constitute particularized evaluations or predications of things. As a matter of historical fact this type of categorization process has its roots in problems which are to a certain extent transferred from the interest in cosmic phenomena, to problems involving human individuals and their relation to the society in which they live. In the discussion of the Sophists concerning men's duties and responsibilities to other men and society arose the necessity to pass specific judgments upon things and events. The need thus appears to identify and establish the character and origin of things and institutions. Typifying this procedure is the Socratic determination of the nature of virtue and other investigations of moral phenomena. As a consequence we have the discovery and fostering of universals, which come to be predictions, instruments, which when applicable to acts and conditions, may be said to constitute their reality. In the thinking of Plato the universals take on more stable characteristics and in the form of ideas lead to permanent evaluations in which can be summed up not only the totality of human experience but its cosmic grounds and conditions. With Plato the Pythagorean forms, which Socrates had made into descriptive functions, become predicates of reality.

When we reach the work of Aristotle, who for the first time offers a full fledged establishment of the categorization problem, we find a very deliberate development of the doctrine of predication. For Aristotle the categories become definite workable instruments for the identification and organization of all objects and conditions met with in the experience to which the philosopher attempts to orient himself. The Aristotelian categories, however, are unfortunately developed with too close a regard to language functions. Hence, they turn out to be descriptive elements according to grammatical forms. That Aristotle did not realize the specific nature of his categorization problem is clear from various facts. In the first place, he excludes from his category list some of the most important evaluations that he employs in his philosophical thinking, and in the second place, his categories are presumed to be predetermined and absolute symbols of the world of reality and not instrumental descriptions of evaluative elements.

The predication period in philosophical thought may therefore be looked upon as a very elaborate development of categorization, but on the whole the attitude is detached and formal. From this thought is excluded critical appreciation that the thinker is adapting himself to things and conditions falling within his own reflective purview. The attitude is taken, rather, that the thinker merely operates a method of organizing things on the basis of some absolute underlying reality constituting the ground and condition of things observable.

(3) Projective categorization. With the great change taking place in the countries where philosophical thought is fostered during the period from the reduction of the Greek states to the development of modern nations, we notice immediately a gradual departure from the strong rationalistic philosophy of Athens with its emphasis upon strict, objective conditions. Later, comes the development of a categorization process centered about personal and individualistic activities. In the Hellenistic period the Stoics, for example, allow the predicative functions to lapse from the position of instruments confidently used by the thinker in evaluating things. Instead, the categories again become cosmic evaluations, but different from the pre-Socratic categories in that the cosmos is

looked upon as a larger home for the individual than is possessed by a stable political society.

From the Alexandrian-Roman period, exemplified by Plotinus who brings a marked Eastern influence into European philosophy, may be traced out definite projective categorizations. It becomes the function of categories to evaluate the world according to the interests and desires of mankind. Lack of satisfactory contact with natural conditions induces thinkers to project their own individual needs in the form of a mystic interpretation of things. This view in the Roman-Christian period turns out to be, as in the case of Augustine, a total and complete evaluation of all phenomena in terms of a personalistic God. Throughout this whole period the process of categorization is not the work of evaluating and defining natural phenomena, but rather a preinvestigative determination of them in terms of prevalent, religious thought. With the early Scholastics, working in the period when the organization of the church exhibit a growing stability, the projective categorization procedure shows signs of a gradual waning. The late Scholastics, Thomas and Albert, for example, represent the final stages of the projective period in which we note a definite attempt to bring about a reduction of the projective attitude and to make philosophical evaluations develop in contact with actual human activities.

(4) Interpretative Categorization. In the Renaissance period, we find that through the development of social and political conditions new interest is taken in the concrete phenomena of every day life. Accordingly, the categorization function now becomes a process of more definitely interpreting what constitutes the nature of objective reality. As a result we find that so far as mystic projections are concerned there is an attempt to translate them into conscious substance, thought, or mind, which is correlated (Descartes) or made identical with (Spinoza) concrete facts, built up into mechanical systems of materialistic (Hobbes) or spiritualistic (Spinoza) things. Definite developed are categories that are designed to give descriptive significance to actual phenomena. In consequence, this is the period of methodology as illustrated by the work of Bacon and Descartes.

In addition we find present here a very highly developed appreciation of the categorization problem and how it is to be worked out. In such manner is initiated the definite orientation activity of the philosopher paralleling the exact work of the natural scientist. In this period, however, there is still emphasis upon a transcendent and universal reason, which it is thought can grasp or be identical with cosmic substance or the world whole.

(5) Evaluative Categorization. Philosophical thought in the 17th and 18th centuries became more distinctly humanistic and personalistic than had hitherto been the case. Accordingly, the evaluations and determinations of nature were made more in terms of human experience. Most definitely stated was man's orientational contacts with the world in terms of the individual who investigates problems concerned with the nature of the world of facts. This personal emphasis in philosophy is to be definitely contrasted with the emphasis upon the individual in the medieval period. For at that time the individual emphasis was decidedly a falling back on the individual as a last refuge because of an apparent degeneration of state and society, whereas in the present period the emphasis on the individual is a symbol of strength and confidence of the person in human affairs. This point is illustrated by the fact that Locke develops his primary categories in terms of mental states. Similarly, in the case of Leibnitz categorization involves primarily an emphasis upon individuality. Not only does he stress the monad as the primary center for all philosophical propositions but also he states reality in terms of a developing awareness in the human individual.

When we come to Kant in whom evaluative categorization culminates, we find a very definite elaboration of the categorization function in deliberate terms of judgments. In the Kantian philosophy is fully expressed the fact that philosophy is an attempt to state one's attitude to the world upon the basis of a concrete investigation of actual facts. As over against the earlier thinkers of the evaluative categorization period the Kantian position is based upon exact description of detailed, scientific facts as the natural scientist elicits them. It is in this spirit that Kant develops a detailed

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working out of a set of categories which are presumed to be the actual tools of critical scientific and philosophical thinking. As it happens, however, the categories are worked out in an exceedingly formal manner based upon purely mechanical science. In consequence, the Kantian categories are not generally serviceable in the description of any scientific phenomena.

(6) Instrumental Categorization. In current philosophy the work of the philosopher is definitely realized as an evaluation or categorization of actual facts. Here we have a clear and complete acceptance of the idea that philosophical work is primarily an attempt to develop an attitude toward the actual world in which the thinker finds himself. To be sure, philosophers disagree as to the limits of this world. Whereas some believe that our concrete world of fact is limited by the confines of the natural scientist, others believe that an unbroken continuity exists between the world amenable to the investigations of the scientist, and a larger realm which is variously described. On the basis, then, of an agreement that the work of philosophy is a process of investigation and instrumental categorization, philosophers group themselves in different schools of thought according to the various specific problems within the general movement. Two distinct attitudes may be indicated here. On the one hand, we have the realistic school which stands for the notion that in evaluating a fact of experience the philosopher must abstract entirely from his own interests and desires and evaluate things in a purely non-humanistic manner. As over against this realistic tendency may be indicated the pragmatic movement, the members of which are very much concerned with pointing out that philosophical work stresses the needs and activities of man. It is not meant, however, that these interests and desires should influence the actual categorization processes, but that the work of categorization has its limits set and its development indicated by the investigative thinker.

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