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FUNCTIONAL NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORIES

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THE FUNCTIONAL NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORIES.
Prolegomena to an Instrumental Interpretation of the History
of Philosophy.

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Preface.

This work aims to indicate the role of categories in some phases of the main current of philosophical development. It does not pretend to give exhaustive lists of categories used in the determination of experience. It is in no sense a history of philosophy. It aims only to point out that the various categories used are determinations of experience, and to indicate in some sense how the changes in experience bring about serious modifications in the categories or evaluations of that experience.

This work being based upon the hypothesis that the philosophical categories are a particular class of evaluations of the total experience. Whether or not the philosophers are aware of the fact, it does not in all periods discuss specific categories but refers to the mass of them as the general attitude of the thinker or period. In all cases the attempt is made to describe the kind of experience which on the ^{philosophical} physical side led to the appreciation that the categories are constituent factors of experience.

The appended analytical tables of contents are not intended to be indices of the material used but merely running guides to some of the outstanding arguments.

INTRODUCTION

Analytical table of contents.

The futility and bareness of philosophy is owing to a failure to appreciate its aim and purpose.

Philosophers do not fully appreciate the significance of the categories they are using. When categories are understood as evaluations of experience, which is a special case of experience, the problems of the thinker are kept definite.

When the nature of categories is attended to, the history of philosophy takes on a new significance. It cannot be longer considered as a record of abstract logical systems. A survey of philosophy indicates the relation of the abstract formulation to concrete experience and the changes in the formulation by the demand of the concrete experience.

The extreme value of category studies comes out in the consideration of recent philosophical attitudes. In recent times the value of concrete experience has become so prominent a factor in formulated attitudes, that these attitudes have stressed the surface aspects of experience to the neglect of some of the more significant features.

A study of the categories of philosophy will serve as an aid in distinguishing them from categories of science and religion.

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy from the earliest times has had to defend itself with great valor from its enemies. Philosophy, however, has suffered far more from its friends than from its enemies. In the earliest time Plato¹ found it necessary to protest against the condemnation of philosophy and to explain why it is attacked. This state of affairs has persisted from that time to this and philosophy still has to struggle to maintain its place as a legitimate discipline. The difficulty with philosophy has been a lack of appreciation of its functions and purpose. Thus we have today the statement of one of the most conscientious devotees of philosophy that philosophy has claimed more and achieved less than any other science.² This writer fails to afford philosophy any comfort because in common with those he criticizes, he mistakes the method and purpose of philosophy. Mr. Russel aims to reduce philosophy to a series of abstract and contentless propositions which have perhaps a remote if any connection with experience. The history of philosophy appears to be a series of futile attempts to solve the problem of knowledge and existence. In the earliest times philosophy aimed at discovering the ultimate facts of existence in the form of the stuff of the world. Later, with the growth of the ideas of man's importance, there developed the viewpoint that the problem of philosophy was really a problem of knowledge. In still later times the problem of philosophy was implicitly determined as an effort to explain the world in terms of human experience. It is only in very recent times that philosophy is beginning to make explicit to itself its function as an attitude toward actual human experience. These various

¹Theaetetus 174. Republic VI, VII. Euthydemus 307

²Russell - Our Knowledge of External World *a friend for Science' Method in Philosophy*

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philosophical formulations mark the stages in the empirical development of philosophy in its attempt to realize its purpose and the means for attaining it. In the consideration that this development of philosophy is entirely empirical is implied the question as to the futility of the previous philosophical formulations. To designate as futile all earlier stages of philosophy would be an error since each individual philosophical formulation is a definite function of the experience of the time. In assuming this attitude one precludes ipso facto the idea of complete error in previous systems, for that would imply an eternal and static standard. From the standpoint of any particular time it is possible to judge whether a philosophic attitude adequately represents the period. As an example there is suggested the extreme unsuitability of an absolute idealism or a ^{human} empiricism to interpret current experience. To formulate such attitude^s to day would be to develop false and futile philosophy. We may expect a philosophical position to be especially cognizant of the experience to which it is a formulated attitude. The futility of philosophy is best illustrated by the situation in which thinkers bring back into relief positions which were developed under other circumstances. It is quite an erroneous method to interpret experience with categories borrowed from quite other times and conditions. In current thinking ^{the} new realism appears as an attitude which attempts to interpret twentieth century experience with a method borrowed from the seventeenth. In every such case the pressure of the present experience forces a modification in the formulated attitude, but the attempt to make living experience fit into a dead shell bespeaks a lack of awareness of the philosophical function. The genuine futility of philosophy should be carefully distinguished from the apparent. There are two, entirely

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opposed situations here. The apparent futility of philosophy is explained by the fact that the critics of philosophy consider it as an absolutely rigid and permanent explanation of the world and man. The charge of futility made from this standpoint obviously has no merit. Philosophy is an attitude toward experience and naturally enough it changes with that experience. The genuine philosophical futility is found in the fact that thinkers fail to realize that philosophy is a highly conscious evolution of experience.

The problem of philosophy is to make a systematic and valid evolution of experience. This evolution is a conscious orientation with respect to the objects and condition which constitute the experience of the individual and the race. Philosophy is a highly conscious and deliberate determination of the nature of experience. Philosophy is a critical evolution of experience which stresses the essential significance of experience. The motives guiding the determination of philosophy all relate to the ultimate purpose of bringing about the definite orientation of the thinker in his world. The evolutions of philosophy are coincident with the general determination of experience. Where there is experience there is always this process of orientation. In fact experience in great part is nothing more than a determination of objects and conditions which constituted experience, for purposes of action and thought. The enrichment of experience is the further orientation among the objects and conditions determined in previous experience. In the more advanced and specialized kinds of experience this process is more familiar. The sciences all illustrate this process of determining experience for specific purposes. The orientation in the world of a particular kind of phenomena has its nature in a more or less definite need. Up to the point where the sciences

merge with philosophy this orientation for a specific purpose goes on. The difference between this and philosophy lies in the difference in motive. In method and material the work of philosophy is entirely continuous with that of all other disciplines which formulate the meaning of experience and point the way to further experience. The difference between philosophy and science is a difference in degree of criticism in handling the materials, a difference which is entirely plausible because of the contributing conditions in the respective situations. Between science and what may be called ordinary experience we find also a difference in degree. In the latter case we may name the difference expertness. The scientist deals with the same objects and conditions that the ordinary experience deals with, but there is present a vastly greater amount of expertness in handling the objects and conditions. To sum up, philosophy is an attitude toward experience, an attitude that is rigorously and critically formulated. Philosophy is an attempt to construct categories which will determine the nature and the meaning of experience. This work of determining and conditioning experience is a continuous process with the fact of experience itself. Experience is an act of determination of some kind or other whether the end of the experience or some act or knowledge, either as preparation for an act or some other end. This act of experience as determination may go on in terms which are not in any sense cognitive but as the interaction of objects, to one of which at least the action makes an appreciable difference. In the degree with which this experience becomes complex there emerges a series of determinations or categories which give definition to and a sense of control over the experience.

The categories of philosophy are more definite and usually more

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permanent evaluations of experience than we find in most of the disciplines. This is owing to the fact that the motive which guides the formulation of the philosophic attitude is an interest in the more permanent phases of experience, and in the more permanent experiences. Cause as a philosophical category has wider implications and a more permanent significance than cause as a scientific category. To insist upon this point brings out the relationship between the various forms of categories. The most damaging criticism that may be leveled at present day philosophy is a failure to appreciate the importance of the categories. To understand the nature of the categories is to appreciate the task of philosophy better and to exert by that fact a wholesome influence upon the solution of the philosophical problems. If the thinkers would appreciate the fact that philosophy is an attitude toward experience and that an attitude is a sublimation of experience, then the value of the categories which are the components of experience and the attitude alike, would be more appreciated. This would result in a greater agreement among philosophers and in a greater unity in philosophic thought. The charge of futility so often laid at the door of philosophy ^{would} tends to disappear. The historian of philosophy would have the task of accounting for the kind of experience which influenced a particular formulation. The type ^s of categories used to describe experience would be traced as far as practicable in the experience of the period in which they are formulated.

The history of philosophy as usually written is a record of system making. The histories describe the attitude which is taken toward experience at a particular time as a logical formulation. The conditions under which the particular system is developed are not brought out. There is a record of the categories used, whether the

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philosopher himself formulates them in a table or not, but the meaning of these categories as evolutions of experience is not discussed. With the appreciation of the value of the study of categories new light is thrown upon the development of the history of philosophy. The philosophical experiences are now brought into contact with the other kinds of experience. The determination of the philosophical attitude are found to be of a piece with those of the other sciences and all other phases of experience. The study of philosophy as a detached form of intellectual manipulation will lose its standing and justification among philosophers.

An adequate interest in the nature of categories must lead to the investigation of what the experience is which yields a certain kind of categorization system. The concrete experience which forms the background for any such system will be inquired into, and this will serve to throw much light upon philosophical pursuits. The history of philosophy indicates how in different periods the whole of experience is categorized in cognitive categories, at other times great stress is laid upon affective or volition categories. The experience at the basis of these forms of philosophy will be examined and the cause for this apparent misinterpretation of experience will be determined. Experience¹ is sometimes entirely neglected to ethical or mental or material categories and here also the basis in the actual experience of the time would be investigated. In fact there would be an interest awakened in experience itself as well as in the specific attitude toward that experience. The determination of experience in terms of a minute part of it will be exposed as a serious fallacy in philosophy. There will no doubt arise from this

¹In the history of philosophy use the term reality in place of experience; the thinkers are employed, of course, with reality.

a tendency to explain experience as far as possible in terms of itself rather than in some part of it.

A pragmatic account of the history of philosophy would indicate a progressive growth in the appreciation of the value of categories as elements in the evolution of experience. The importance of the categories follows the appreciation of the importance of experience in the determination of reality. We find thus in Kant ~~all~~^{an} attempt to formulate a doctrine of categories which should exhibit the nature of experience. Kant, however, did not succeed in his enterprise because experience for him carried too heavy a burden of ~~Wesent's~~^{Descartes} mechanical philosophy and Newton's science. The Kantian categories do not bear any noticeable resemblance to categories of genuine experience. From the standpoint of present day events we may criticize the Kantian attitude toward experience as entirely misrepresenting experience but allowance must be made for the fact that in a genuine sense he lived under different conditions and had different experience. The type of categorization doctrine that is formulated is symptomatic of the experience under which it is developed. There is thus a rational explanation for the difference between the Aristotelian and the Kantian tables. The tables of categories consciously formulated are integral parts of the general attitude toward experience and yield significant information as to the kind of attitude a thinker develops. The objective attitude of Aristotle toward experience is illustrated by his table of categories. It indicates the fact that Aristotle had not yet attained the conception of experience as the basis of reality. The realization of the extremely close connection between reality and experience was impossible in Aristotle's time. Philosophy for Aristotle was anything but an attitude toward experience. Aristotle and his time were not aware of

their own attitudes toward experience and only in proportion as a period is conscious of its own attitude, is there an appreciation of philosophy as an attitude toward experience. Where the realization of attitudes is at a minimum we find categories of an external kind. This is the case in the early philosophy of Greece in which the world is stated as objective substance of some kind or other. In the modern philosophical statements the categories are in terms of experience but, as was suggested in the case of Kant, experience is conceived in an artificial mechanistic way.

To consider the history of philosophy as a record of attitudes toward experience with reference to the experience which is being attitudinized, obviates the difficulties attendant upon considering ~~the history of philosophy~~ as a record of abstract, logical systems. This attitude toward the history of philosophy considers the successive doctrines as products of a process which attempts to evaluate human experience in its generality. This would include the social, political, economic, artistic, and religious experiences. The succeeding formulations have no logical development or evolution, they each represent a more or less critical attitude toward new conditions and new objects. Philosophy as doctrine is the most exact interpretation of these experiences. An investigation of any formulated doctrine would indicate then why a particular phase or other of experience is made basis and dominant in a specific attitude. The categories of experience for the philosophers are abstractions of the actions, beliefs, and attitudes of a certain time and place. The thoughts of the system are not born and carried on as thought, but ideas fundamental in any system find their origin in the life conditions of the time or place in which the system is formulated. The essential nature of any given experience

finds its expression in other attitudes than in philosophy. Philosophy is only one of many ways in which the life of a people may be interpreted. Philosophy is, however, the most deliberate and conscious of all the attitudes. It is the attitude which exemplified most what is being experienced.

The categories of philosophy no less than other categories are functional constituents of experience. The categories are symbols of the experiences come to realization as visible reality. The philosophical categories are functional products of the experience process. They are not subsistential entities which remain permanently in time. Because they are in a functional sense symbols and sublimations of experience, they arise, develop and perish with experience. The categories of philosophy are derived from the ordinary experiences of the thinkers who handle these categories. The most abstract categories of philosophy are derived from the conflicts and the collisions of ordinary human relations. They are gleaned from the sorrows and joys, the ^{trials} buttes and ^{defeat} droths of men and women. The evaluations of experience are elements in that experience and this fact accounts for the corresponding changes in the philosophical doctrines and the experience situations in which they are developed. Philosophy is rooted deeply and inevitably in the political, social, economic, and the other experiences of everyday life. Philosophy is, however, not a record merely of what goes on. It is a genuine and integral part of this experience. In fact, true philosophy is nothing apart from experience. It is experience worked over and condensed by way of appreciating the profound and intense significance of this experience. Philosophy thus is in its essential nature a relatively permanent aspect of experience which transcends the other phases of experience because the meaning

characteristic of their general philosophical attitudes are the barest logical symbols of knowledge and existence.

With the radical changes in human experience which took place with the downfall of the Greek civilization a more or less conscious attitude toward experience took place. The world began to be categorized more and more in terms of the inner experiences. Following the crusades and the rehabilitation of man in the scheme of human events, the world became categorized in terms of experience. From the days of the Renaissance to the present philosophy has become frankly concerned primarily with experience. The increased importance of the individual and the growing stability of the social order gave origin to the importance which was attached to the corresponding series of categories of thought and ^{expression} ~~expression~~, and nature and spirit. The extreme mobility of the civilization of the period finds its adequate expression in the prominence of the categories of ~~motion~~ ^{motion}, force and potentiality. As European civilization became more and more organized and standardized, and the security of the individual seemed to be attained by the development of the individual nations, the evolution of experience in terms of nature, law, and mechanics became a prominent phase of philosophic thought. Each new development in the social and political conditions brings with it a new kind of formulation of those conditions. The important place which such categories as substance, essence, cause, and attraction took in the determination of reality in the early modern philosophy reflects a definite condition of social experience. The changes in the meanings of older categories take place in answer to the same general conditions. The fact of attempting to establish a formal doctrine of categories in-

dicates also definite conditions of the development of social experience.

The work of Kant in attempting to set up in a table the fundamental conditions of experience is symptomatic of a situation in which the freedom and value of the human individual gains recognition. The Kantian categories at once indicate an established social order, strong and independent; and a pietistic emphasis of the privacy of the inner life of the individual. There is thus the phenomena which represent all there is of reality so far as it can be experienced but there is still remaining the things in themselves which can never be known. The philosophy of the early nineteenth century in Germany clearly indicates how the struggles and strains of a disrupted nation to find itself brings out a categorization of the world which stresses volitional and affective categories. The world is somehow determined as depending upon the individual in the way of creation or appreciation. In the same period the chaotic national conditions gave rise to a category which has played a tremendous part in the philosophy of the nineteenth century and later - the Absolute. In the latter half of the same century there came a settling down after the revolutions. The various nations of Europe became more and more solid and the world took on a more certain aspect than it had possessed for some time. In the world of philosophy the attitudes began to reflect this experience by the formulation of positivistic and materialistic viewpoints. The categories with which the world was evaluated were of a more external nature than in the previous period. Matter became an important category in the evaluation of experience. With the development of experience social and scientific, the categories became altered and transformed, and energy became a prominent category for the evaluation

of experience. The movement which is being delineated finds a parallel development in the other attitudes. The political, religious, aesthetic and scientific attitudes all are changing and developing in a very similar process. In the ^{particular} period under discussion there exists an exceedingly close connection between the categories of the several attitudes toward experience. In fact, the connections becomes so close that there is a marked tendency to confuse the various categories.

At the present time in the predominance of mechanical achievement and the supreme success of commercial and industrial efficiency there is a tendency to determine reality as essentially mechanical and external. The changes which have come about through progress in scientific applications have given impetus to the inclination to evaluate all experience in some scientific form or other. At the beginning of this tendency there was current the attitude that a formula could be devised which would comprehend all reality.¹ Evolution as a prominent category in such a formula at first seemed to open the way to the most hidden secrets of existence. With the development of this attitude as a consequence of greater awareness of experience, the inadequacy of this category as a total evaluation of experience became emphasized. As a reaction to this attitude of categorizing experience entirely from the standpoint of so-called science, there have arisen viewpoints which have attempted to take account of the more complex experience which the mechanical attitudes seemed to leave unaccounted for. There have been persistent references to those aspects of organic phenomena such as to shake thoroughly the belief in any crude mechanistic solution of important problems. Various forms of spiritualism have been developed to take the place of the crass mechanistic doctrines.

¹The Synthetic philosophy of Spencer is an illustration.

Evolution has been reinterpreted and made creative rather than mechanical. So far has this reaction to the mechanistic philosophy gone that the authors have placed themselves dangerously on the side of an uncritical philosophy.

The conflict of the cross naturalistic viewpoint with the attitude which stresses an extreme spiritualism brings into sharp relief the importance of the categories which are used in formulating an attitude toward experience. When the categories used are consciously attended to these are brought out at once the demerits in the polemics of those who take such opposed stands toward phenomena as the vitalists and the mechanists do. The bitter quarrels which center about their issues can resolve themselves readily when the function of the categories as evaluations of experience are clearly held in mind. In the world of physics the problems raised by the relativists do not offer such insoluble situations, when they are approached with an attitude which critically regards the function of the categories used in the determination of phenomena. When the categories are seriously studied, the evaluation of the phenomena involved will not be taken as a description of absolute reality. The categories themselves will also not become for the thinker transformed from determination more and more approaching reality (because of the greater classification of the immediate situation) to elements of a fixed and rigid reality. In general the various aspects of any problem, the ontological and the experiential may be held apart and considered with especial reference to the best solution of the problem at hand. The phases of the problem which are particularly observational or interpretative may likewise be held apart, the confusing of issues which result from

confounding the two aspects would be avoided in a strict study of the categories involved when a problem is faced.

A critical study of the nature of categories not only brings clarity to the thinker in the solution of problems, but in a general way enables him to definitely locate his problem. The confusion of the philosophical attitude with the scientific and religious is also avoided. There has been manifest in recent thinking the tendency to consider some experimental viewpoint or other as the only scientific one. Philosophy was taken to be concerned with some sort of spiritual reality which lay beyond the realm of science. Its material could not be manipulated nor its findings verified. The conflict here arose from the fact that the experimental scientist seemed to leave untouched a vast range of actual experience which appears important. This experience can easily be lost sight of in the extreme emphasis that is placed upon surface aspects of happenings. With the same vigor that the philosophic experience was denied reality its champions declared it to be the only genuine reality. The ordinary facts of life were considered as the shadows or appearances of reality¹. This attitude could only lead to the result that philosophy becomes in some sense or other a refuge for the disappointed hopes and unrealized ambitions of a hopeless humanity. Life and reality become disjointed and disparate to accommodate themselves to such as cannot face the actual facts of ordinary life. A more critical attitude toward experience than either of these views indicate would find no such dysfunction in experience. The proper appreciation of the categories used would prevent the confusion of the aspects of problems and the problems themselves. The

¹Dewey and Moore in Creative Intelligence.

Realization of the significance of the categories is an extreme necessity for adequate thinking. Thinking as a highly conscious method of orientation in the world of experience can never succeed in its work unless the marks which guide its progress are entirely visible and clear.

The history of philosophy illustrates in a very instructive manner the efforts of philosophy to understand its function. As the realization of the function of the philosophic categories becomes clearer and clearer the historical problems of philosophy take on a new aspect. The specific systems of philosophy as attempts at the solutions of the problems of the significance of experience became understandable in terms, of the experience which is being stated by the particular thinker. The categories of philosophy are found to be functions of critical thought derived from experience which give meaning and determination to experience, and which facilitate the approach and adjustment to the process of experience. A careful study of the function of categories indicates the place of philosophy in the experience of humanity and reduces the necessity for a constant defense of its method and results.

The Pre-Athenian Period.

The early Greek philosophy shows us a stage in reflection in which there is a projection of attitudes that may be looked upon as uncritically naive. This is, to be sure, a reflective naivete for where we have philosophy we must posit a considerable amount of awareness in dealing with problems. The activity called reflection begins when there is some understanding of the existence of a problem. The differentiation in this understanding comes through the adeptness in handling the problem. The feature which most of all distinguishes the stages in reflection is that of expertness. The problem of the logician is such by nature of the superior technique which he brings to bear upon his problem. There is a difference in degree between the work of the logician and ordinary reflection. The early philosophers of Greece took a naive attitude toward the world. There was as yet no clear recognition of the nature of the problem. There was an attempt to state what the world was, but the apprehension of the nature of the processes by which these determinations were made, did not come out as a problem until a later period.

The experiences of these people, in a political and economical way and their temperamental equipment both favored this type of attitude. The world as such is taken to be the object of investigation. In this period there is no realization of man and his needs. Speculation is at this period not the formulation of assumptions critically made with reference to an intimate human problem. The result of such speculation as the Pre-Athenians indulge in cannot be brought into close relation to their actual needs. It might be well to point out here that the statement just made would have little force could one transport oneself en-

ably into the Ionian milieu. Their experience was such as to make their philosophy seriously neglects the essentially human aspects of man, perfectly plausible. To consider only the political experiences man was throughout the whole of the Hellenic period in complete subordination to the State. As in proportion the experiences of the Greeks change so as to give man a more important place in the general experience so does his place in the philosophical expression of his time become more important. But even in Plato and Aristotle the genuin humanness of the individual fails to appear. The most fundamental category of the ancient Greeks was that of Physics.¹ The problem that came to the Ancient Greek was as to the determination of nature. The question they asked related to the nature of the world.

This nature is therefore assumed as a whole. Nature is taken to be the whole of reality; it is an immediate complete experience. The further development of this process of experience is a specific determination of what this nature is. Thales found his determination in water. This was a definite category to account for the ultimate nature of reality. This effort to state the underlying principle of nature is an advanced stage in intellectual development. There is probably no stage in human development/^{at} which the act of attitudinization does not take place. We might indeed make this criterion of overt attitudinization the line of demarkation between those who are and those who are not consciously aware of their experiences. The attitudes that go to make up the content of Greek philosophy formulation are very definite attitudes though, the Greeks had no definite awareness of them as attitudes. The awareness of attitudes comes only with the

¹Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 27.

approach to the problem of knowledge. When the problem of knowledge becomes a source of troubles to the reflective mind, there is an appreciation of the presence and meaning of ones determination and evolution of experience. Throughout the whole history of Greek philosophy there is no true appreciation of the nature of experience. The process of experience is never inquired into. Aristotle himself never rises to a correct consideration of the nature of experience nor even approaches it to the extent such as the Kantian philosophy does.

The determination of the nature of reality by Anaximander illustrates the immediacy of the attitude expressed. Reality for him is the ἀπείρον, the boundless something. There is an indetermination determination. The experience there is evaluated but the valuation is vague and indefinite. It seems that a determination must be made, an attitude must be expressed, although it is hardly adequate enough to be descriptive. In this formation we see the powerful effort to give determination to the world. There is a vigorous attempt to give a value to experience. There is an unmistakable effort to give expression to the attitude towards the world, but there is no definite attitude. There is an expression of the belief that there must be a source for all the materials of the world. If any of the visible materials of the world which are in opposition to each other were infinite, the opposites would long have ceased to exist. And if none of them is infinite then the ultimate stuff of the world is not known.

Another predicate applied to this boundless was God or the divine (τὸ Θεῖον). This predicate is probably the expression of the most exalted quality of the material thus described. With the Greeks at this period the most precious stuff was called divine. This is well brought out by Burnet in the passages quoted from Hippocrates.

"I do not think that any disease is more divine or more sacred 26 than others..... I think that those who first called this disease sacred were men such as there are still at the present day, magicians and purifiers (καθαῖται) and charlatons and imposters. They make use of the godhead (τὸ Θεῖον) to cloak and cover their own incapacity." — "The Sacred Divine."

"Nothing is more divine or more heroic than anything else, but all things are alike, are all divine." — "Air, Water and Sites".

A third philosophy^{new} coming from the same city as the two mentioned, was Anaximenes. He accepted the idea of Anaximander that the real was infinite. He made a definite determination of this infinite and called it air. Anaximenes did not find it necessary to think of the infinite as being different from the material which is separated out of it, since diversite^{IN} must be due to a greater or lesser quantity of the substance in a given space. Anaximenes drew an analogy between the human processes and the cosmic processes; this gave him support for the particular determination of the real. "Just as our soul^I, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the world." We see in this form of philosophy an expression of an attitude derived from a more or less superficial observation of some obvious experience.

The investigation of the probable influences which yielded the kind of attitude the Milesians express in their natural philosophy finds some suggestions in their general conditions. A question of importance in this connection is this: Why has the birth of what we call Greek philosophy taken place in Miletus, an Ionian colony in Asia? The answer to this question throws some light upon the fact that the Milesians expressed the particular attitudes with which they are accredited. Miletus became the favored place for the growth of philosophy because it was saved the fate of the other Ionian colonies when Alyattes^S and Croesus subjugated those cities. Thus as long as the Lydian kingdom

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~~Kingdom~~-lasted Miletus was a safe and settled city where science and commerce could flourish. The Milesian tradition comes to an end with the capture and destruction of the town by the Persians in 494 B.C., after the battle of Lade. The freedom and the security held by the more cultured citizens of such a town would give occasion for the abstract formulation of an attitude toward experience.

That any formulation should be made of the experiences requires no explanation. It is a fundamental aspect of human experience to be expressed. The human element in it means precisely that it has meaning and significance and this meaning cannot entirely fail of expression. There is necessary only the stimulus to this expression and there were probably many of these in the particular situation. There is some warrant for asserting that material prosperity is a prerequisite for the development of philosophy and this has played its part here. In order to have the expression in the form of deliberate formulation of the meaning of the experiences it is necessary only to have the complex conditions of a balance between an assertive personality and experiences favoring assertions.

The naturalness of the attitudes of the Milesians toward experience is indicated both in the questions they asked and in the answers they gave to these questions. To inquire for the nature of the Real without a prior inquiry as to the possibility of the discovery of the Real is an indication of an extremely naive attitude. To answer with the particular determinations of the Real as the Milesians did is to be little aware of the gravity of the problem. On the whole the determinations of the nature of the Real as the Milesians made them indicates an immediate reaction toward experience. The attitudes of the Milesians reveal a reaction that is direct and hardly sophisticated. The importance that attaches to their attitudes lies in the fact that

They state them in a scientific way. The Milesians are of importance in the history of thought on that account. The Greek scientific tradition may be characterized not as an entirely ~~actual~~ ^{critical} attitude but rather as a serious one. The Milesians were serious in their attempt to formulate a definite idea of the nature of reality.

To the critical student it must be obvious that the Milesians were not making entirely new determinations of reality. To suggest that would be to posit a discontinuity in experience. This would be a total misinterpretation of what actually took place. We must posit that the Milesians were assuming a more critical attitude toward experience than was formerly the case. They gave up telling tales, as Professor Burnet puts it. That the determinations were naive indicates the naive nature of their experience. The Greeks at this time were living in a comparatively simple world, their experiences were not fraught with the complexities of modern life.

The simplicity of the Greek formulations as to the nature of the Real is manifest also in the fact that the connections between the determinations of the real and the experiences that bring them out are so obvious. There can be traced a continuity between the categories the Greeks used in their scientific determinations and the categories of their mythical and religious periods. It is thus that a connection may be found between the water that Theles suggested as the real and the Oceanus which the Homeric poems speak of and the ^{ὕδρα} ~~Manos~~ which the Hesiodic poems mention.¹ The Anaximandrian Boundless can be placed into correlation with the Hesiodic chaos. The attempts to state experience on the part of Homer and Hesiod must be taken as expressions of the period and indicate the immediacy of attitude towards experience.



¹Von Hartmann "Geschichte der Metaphysik, s. 2.

There is a continuity of attitude in the expression of the poets and early philosophers. This brings out the close connection between the categories of the various experiences.

There is not as yet developed an attitude categorizing reality as something beyond the immediate external objects. There is not yet brought to consciousness the idea of the real as residing in a principle not immediately available to the perceptual experiences. The Boundless of Anaximander, while sometimes taken to indicate the view that he struck upon a metaphysical doctrine, does not really warrant such an interpretation. There seems to be a genuine connection between the Boundless of Anaximander and the Oceanus of the Homeric poems. It is not a far fetched explanation to point out a connection between such a determination of reality as Oceanus and water; and the fact that the Greeks lived close by and derived much of their experience from the sea.

This continuity between the formulation of the philosophers and the poets indicates that at this period there was no fundamental differentiation between the philosophic and the less critical attitudes. There is no sharp differentiation between the various expressions of the attitudes toward experience. The philosophers do not ask any pointed questions as to the nature of knowledge and experience as a true philosophy must do. The fact that the entire experience is being categorized in simple, nature categories is also evidence of the immaturity of the Ionian philosophy.

The history of Greek philosophy indicates that not until there come sharp conflicts between the direct determinations of experience, is there developed a critical attitude toward the process of experience. A critical attitude is not developed until the categories are considered with a view to their adequacy. To accept a category from the tradition of mythology or religion is not critical and is essentially not philoso-

phical.

It is not intended to draw an absolute line between what is considered philosophical and what is mythical and religious. No such absolute line exists. Even in the most highly abstract thinking there are definite traces of attitudes derived from other aspects of experience. Experience is a united whole and all sharp divisions must be considered as entirely arbitrary. At this period of Greek philosophy the attitudes toward experience were so direct and simple that all the attitudes were intermingled. As an illustration may be taken the close parallelism among the Greeks of the doctrines as to the number of Gods and number of worlds.

With the change in general orientation in the world of experience Greek philosophy takes on a slightly different complexion. The attitude taken and expressed reflects the new happenings. The philosophy of ^{with} Protagoras introduces the new motives and the history of philosophy absorbs a series of new experiences, and categories which give them expression. With Pythagoras begins the tradition which categorizes experience in ^{things} ~~them~~ that are not entirely perceived. The attitude of Pythagoras takes on a mathematical trend and the Pythagorean finds the reality of things in number. The Pythagorean attitude does not represent a complete change from the earlier traditions. It is in truth merely a traditional attitude, for numbers do not mean for Pythagoras what they signify to a modern mathematician. Aristotle points out that the numbers of the Pythagorean constitute the actual content of ordinary objects.¹ In Pythagoras and his school, then, we find from the side of categorizing experience, the source of a slightly more independent attitude. The school of Pythagoras in adopting numbers

¹Metaph. A. 5.

as the essence of reality give more standing to the act of determining experience and incidentally make way for the problem of One and Many. The development of this problem is influenced by the concept of harmony which the Pythagoreans fostered. This notion of harmony with its peculiar connection with the number concept is derived to a great extent from the Pythagorean reformation of the Orphic religion.¹ There is no doubt a very close connection between the attitudes which look upon the world with the veiled eye of mysticism, and with the implicit faith in the reality of unseen things.

It is quite probable that the Pythagoreans, because of their belief in the possibility of the One evolving into the Many, stimulated the criticism of Xenophanes who was perhaps the first to insist emphatically upon the oneness of Reality.

The problem of the One and Many means to the philosophic consciousness a development of extreme importance. It stimulates the discussion of problems which advance philosophic history by the projection of new attitudes. The early Ionians accepted without criticism the unity of the world seeking merely a precise determination of it. So little did this speculation seem related to the concrete experiences of their period, that no very sharp conflict was encountered from the polytheistic mythology. When the Ionian civilization broke down and different experiences had to be correlated, the issue became localized. The problem of One and Many became a live topic for thinkers. The advance it brought into the philosophy of Greece is symbolized by the fact that the problem stood for a genuine appreciation of the experiences of the period.

The Pythagorean traditions above all stands for philosophical

¹cf Cornford, "From Religion to Philosophy", p. 194 ff.

progress in that the fundamental determinations of reality ³²
it makes, are somewhat more independent of the unreflective categories
of religion and mythology. The need for harmonizing the various ex-
periences which became problematic led to the projection of categories
which, because they are less direct are more adequate as determinations
of experience. So far as formal doctrine is concerned Pythagoras
probably harks back to Anaximander. For Pythagoras there was also
a Boundless from which all things were derived, but Pythagoras con-
ceived this in a mere abstract though more definite way. The lim-
itation of the unlimited gives origin to things and thus Pythagoras
finds reality in a realism critically determined. The superiority
of Pythagoras and his school in this instance is that they set up
in a highly conscious manner a set of principles which give deter-
mination to reality. This marked a stage in the development of the
Greek philosophy which ended in the emphasis of the attitude toward
experience which was stated in knowledge terms by Plato and Aristotle.
The Pythagorean philosophy in a genuine sense is a transition movement
between the Ionic and Athenian viewpoints.

The Pythagorean attitude toward experience is derived from a
series of happenings quite in contrast to those of the previous periods.
On the political side we find Ionia brought under the cloud of the
Persian invasion. This results in a series of migrations which brought
the Ionians into contact with new attitudes and new experiences. The
growing power of the Persians and the breakdown of the Ionian civili-
zation brought such reactions and interactions into the culture of the
period as to bring to consciousness new problems and new methods of
solution. On the social side we find that the increasing importance
of the Orphic religion brought about new attitudes by way of com-
bating its polytheism. Xenophanes and his work stand as examples

of the protest that was made against Ionian culture in general and their polytheism in particular.¹

Whether Xenophanes was the father of Eleaticism or not he belonged to the general tradition which made the problem of the One an important factor in Greek philosophy at this period. At this time it became a genuine problem and was established in a conscious way. As the herald of the tradition which placed reality in a domain beyond the region of the senses Xenophanes' insistence upon the oneness of the world is an important advance beyond his predecessors. This is true in spite of his own expressions which gave a theistic turn to his statement.²

In the conflict of the Heraclitean and Parmenidian viewpoints we observe the advance of Greek thought to the stage in which the work of the thinker plays an increasingly important role. Heraclitus and Parmenides both place reliance in Reason as a means for the discovery of reality although in neither philosopher can we find a total departure from the naively objective attitude of the Milesians. In both of these philosophers there is an advance in attitude both with respect to the interpretation of reality and the assigning of the value to the interpretation of experience.

With respect to the problem of One and Many these thinkers have arrived at a higher plane of explanation which is worth noting. The viewpoint of Heraclitus seems very sophisticated when compared to that of the Milesians. Whereas Anaximenes finds it necessary to posit rarefaction and condensation to overcome Anaximander's theory of injustice as a cause of the ^{many} monomers of the one, Heraclitus

^{cf}
¹See Bury, History of Greece 1911, p. 319 ff., Diels fr. 11,15,16,17.

² See Aristotle Met. A. 986 b 24.

considers the ^{changes} charges as perfectly normal conditions of reality. 34

Heracleitus has found himself able to profit by the discoveries of the Pythagoreans. Their theory of harmony made it impossible to accept the too naive attitude of the early Ionians. Heracleitus despises also the mythical and mystical views of the Pythagoreans. This led him to categorize reality as fire which took him not too far from observable phenomena. In fire Heracleitus found a substance which could account rationally for the multiplicity in unity and still avoid a mythological doctrine. The ceaseless flux of things and the movement from one to many and vice versa could all be explained by the conception of fire. "There is a way upward and a way downward, a constant movement of things from fire and a return of all things to fire." With this conception Heracleitus maintained a connection with actual things and yet found reality in a realm dependent upon reason for its discovery. Reality for Heracleitus is ultimately to be found in the harmony of opposites. This harmony is a divine law, a right which rules the entire world. All things are governed and prevented from overstepping their limits by this right (Dike). With this conception Heracleitus aimed to overcome the difficulties in the problem of the One and Many. The world can be both one and many, the unity of the world is not precluded by the oneness nor the manyness. The changes which take place are merely expressions by the one of the underlying harmony which is the genuine reality.

In Heracleitus we find a crystallization of the attitudes that manifested themselves in the Greek thought. There is found in Heracleitus a subtle mixture of popular belief which is controlled by a desire to be scientific and above the level of mysticism. This all results in bringing to consciousness attitudes that make for a more obstructive significance of the categories as the determinations

of experience.

This crystallization of the determinations of experience came as a result of the social interaction of the time. The determination of experience as one or many has in its underlying motives the quarrels of a religious nature involving the criticism of the approved polytheism. Xenophanes in his criticism of the polytheism of the period developed a doctrine of the unity of reality. The purpose of this doctrine and the supporting evidence offers a vulnerable ground for the critical faculty of Heraclitus. The world is one but this need not be taken as a denial of the reality of the many. Change and motion became components of reality. To deny their reality on the basis of sense perception is to show the extreme unreliability of the senses as capable of giving knowledge. Heraclitus indicates to us the beginning of the more abstract formulation of experience. The direct connection of the philosophical attitude of Heraclitus with the religious ideas indicates that we have as yet only a beginning of the really critical attitudes of philosophy.

With Parmenides there begins a clearer emphasis upon the creative aspect of the philosophic attitude. The attitude as attitude stands out clearer than it has done in the previous stages of Greek history. This attitude is of course put entirely into terms of reason. That is, Parmenides presses more and more the idea that reality is to be known only through reason. As a matter of fact Parmenides argues that thought and reality are one. Parmenides carried the One and Many problem to the stage of logical abstraction. Parmenides goes farther than any of his predecessors in formulating a non-perceptible category of experience. Parmenides gives origin to the

category of Being which is made to fuse completely with the category of the One. The One is here in a more conscious way offered as a category of reality. The One of Xenophanes finds here its most thorough going development. Parmenides in a very decided sense presages the advent of the problem of knowledge as the Sophists developed it.

The poem of Parmenides indicates a definite argument in favor of the particular determination of reality that he makes. In spite of what the senses tell us reality is, and is not passing away, nor has it come to be. It is not many but one for otherwise it could not be. This argument is based upon the truth that it is inconceivable that we should think that which is, is not. Parmenides holds it to be absolutely true that what cannot be thought cannot be, and what is not cannot be thought. The entire Parmenidean argument is one of thought as against the report of the senses. Parmenides goes much farther than Heraclitus in giving power to the reason in cognizing reality. Parmenides arrives at the abstract thought, not very sophisticated conception of existence. For Parmenides existence is still external material, it is corporeal, it is spread out in space. What Parmenides has done has been to consider ordinary sense material at its lowest terms. The reality of sense material, which is all material, lies not in the fleeting qualities that our senses inform us of, but in the fact that it is, that it exists. This is the ultimate determination of experienced objects for Parmenides, for his criterion is conceivability. Nothing or non-being can be an object for thought, for all thought must be thought of something. Further, if reality must be something, it must also be one for otherwise it cannot be thought of as being. Oneness is than a specific determination of reality, it is one of its char-

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characteristic features. The two fundamental categories of reality are Being and One.

Parmenides has reached a stage in the attributes of character to reality which places him far and beyond his predecessors. The attitudes toward experience which Parmenides expresses has become much more self-conscious and aware of itself. Parmenides brings to bear such an argument for his determination as to all but precipitate the problem of determination itself. In all of his argument Parmenides seems to be suggesting that he is making determinations of experience on some basis that is different from that of unreflective observation. Parmenides has reached a higher type of determination from the standpoint of Greek philosophy. His determination is not higher in the sense of more adequately describing experience. On the contrary it may well be said that he totally denies the reality of all immediate experience. The world of everyday experience is a delusion for Parmenides. Parmenides' determination of experience is higher in that he sought in a more definite and determined way to discover what reality is. The determination of reality by Parmenides is more deliberate and cautious than is that of his predecessors even though he did not attain to a truer conception of reality. We may see in Parmenides the development in the history of thought of attitudes which though they are immediate functions of the experience of the period still represent more adequately that experience. It may be readily agreed that Parmenides appreciates more profoundly the experience of his period although from our present standpoint he has a meagre understanding of the course of human happenings.

The philosophy of Parmenides seems a fitting expression of the experiences of the Greek world in his time. The period of the foreign oppression served to bring a compactness and a unity which foreshadowed imperial Athens. From the side of the experience of a

people the establishment of the One as a fundamental category of reality becomes easy to explain. The identification of Being with this category finds its explanation in the development of a more critical method of determining the nature of reality.

The solution of the problem of the One and the Many reached a peculiar status with Parmenides. The argument of Parmenides, especially with the support of the disciple Zeno, was unanswerable. And yet all the following philosophers were Plur²olists. The philosophers were not yet able to grasp the significance of an attitude which put reality so far from sense experience. The Greek mind at this period was naively objective. Reality had to be external so it could be grasped by the senses. For the Greek the fundamental kind of knowledge process was the the visual sensation. The knowledge/ processes so far as they were problematic for the Greeks at this period were considered from the standpoint of visual data. The pluralists who took up the philosophical problems directed almost entirely their energies to explaining change and permanence. The problem of the Oneness of reality was not further developed until with the change of social experience the technique of reasoning and knowledge was prepared to further handle it.

Philosophy for a time still remained content to explain experience upon the basis of sense perception. The Greeks were not yet ready to investigate reality in a realm far removed from their constant and ordinary activities. Even when these activities led later to an emphasis of the knowledge process as against nature, human experience did not go far in modifying the study. The Greek thinkers had not yet attained that personal independence which is essential for a constructive attitude toward experience. In the

circumstances in which the thinkers found themselves they could not have the independence of the immediate social surroundings, to categorize reality in humanistic terms.

A modification in the attitudes of the philosophers at this point is manifested in the lessened energy given to the categorization of the ultimate substance of reality and greater effort directed toward an explanation of how it operates. The impetus to this is found certainly in the controversy of Heraclitus and Parmenides with respect to change and permanence even though the particular contention of Heraclitus that reality is change did not stimulate it. The philosophers of this period were interested in discovering a means of reconciling the Parmenidian denial of generation and becoming, with the Heraclitian emphasis of these phases of experience. The categories representing the ultimate of experience for these philosophers refer to the controlling forces of the changes in experience. We have the Love and Strife of Empedocles and the Nous of Anaxagoras. Empedocles the physician finds the permanence of things in the four roots which the early Ionians took to be the ultimate sources of reality. Changes in things were brought about by the two principles of Love and Hate. These are for the most part just such material as the four roots. They are not incorporeal forces; the concept of force as distinct from substance had not been arrived at as yet. The two categories Love and Strife ^{derived from} Empedocles / the observations of a physical kind which he was of course in the habit of making. There are many points of similarity between the Love and Strife of Empedocles and the rarefaction and condensation of Anaximenes, but with Empedocles these two principles have very much clearer functions. With Empedocles these have become almost guiding principles separated off from the material which they

effect. With Anaxagoras the separation is more complete although even there the Nous is not a totally different kind of material from the stuff of the world.

The determination of Nous as a fundamental category marks a turning point in the development of philosophy. Anaxagoras points the way to a new direction which the attitudes of the Greeks took. From this time on we shall see that the attitudes toward experience take on a more problematic aspect. The process of determination of experience reaches that stage of consciousness that impels it to consider its own attitudes. The formulation and expressing of attitudes becomes a problem in itself. This intellectual movement parallels a growing interest in one's own experience. The Greeks of this generation are led to find an absorbing interest in their own personalities. The Greek begins to become aware of himself more and more, owing to his contact with the Persian. It is in this period that Aeschylus speaks of the Greeks as men who had "never been called the subjects or the slaves of any one." This is the period when individualism began to be the keynote of Greek civilization. This is the beginning of the period when Athens assumed the leadership of the Greeks. The struggle of Athens with Sparta for the leadership of Greece typifies the growth of individualism and the supremacy of the intellect. It was no coincidence that the NOUS should come to be a fundamental category of experience, for Anaxagoras is the first philosopher of Athens.

The Athenian Period
The Platonic Phase,
 Analytical Table of Contents.

In the Athenian period the problem of One and Many becomes an essentially logical one. There is brought out the fact of predication rather than that of existence.

The entire philosophical attitude changes from a study of external nature to an interest in human conduct. This results in bringing out the interest in the essentially human problems. With the change of experience that is found in Athens, the thinkers arrive at an interest in the attitude toward experience and do not stress as all important the assumed objects of knowledge.

The individualistic experiences of the fourth century lead to a change in the philosophical viewpoint so as to bring out the emphasis upon knowledge.

Through the sophistic tradition the problem of the validity of knowledge came to the front. In making valid the knowledge process Plato develops the doctrine of participation which originates with Pythagoras until it becomes a highly conscious doctrine of prediction. The categories which Plato formally names are, however rationalistic abstractions and not methodological evolutions. The general categories of Plato are ontological entities and are not functional determinations of experience. As such there is an unmistakable limitation of Plato's viewpoint to a fixed metaphysical reality.

With Aristotle there is an advanced methodological viewpoint developed. It appears that Aristotle arrives at an admirable attitude with respect to the relation of knowledge and experience. Aristotle

stresses the necessity for studying actual conditions, and facts of experience. He develops a logic to deal with those facts. Aristotle is the first to set up a conscious table of categories.

The apparent confidence and worth that Aristotle placed in experience is vitiated by an entirely erroneous conception of the nature of experience. Aristotle no less than Plato considers the world of experience as a pseudo-reality if not actual illusion. For Aristotle the two worlds exist in quite as emphatic a manner as for Plato.

The categories of Aristotle do not form elements in any actually experienced process but are formal aspects of a transcendent reality. So far as they apply to actual phenomena they are elements of expression, grammatical forms.

The Greek philosophy in general is an extremely externalistic attitude toward experience, and even when it develops a highly methodological technique it still remains far removed from actual experiential conditions.