


THE I n t e r b e h a v i o r i s t



A QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF
INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY

PUBLISHED AT KENYON COLLEGE
GAMBIER, OHIO

Volume 8, Number 1

Spring 1978

There are moments when we interrupt our own scientific operations and begin to wonder whether, without our knowledge, there are not strange remnants of the past also in our own thinking which calmly determine its course as much as do our most advanced principles.

W. Köhler, 1958. The nature of the organism. Gifford Lectures. Second series, Lecture 2.

THE INTERBEHAVIORIST

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The Agora

The Interbehaviorist begins its eighth volume (and ninth year of publication) with a new name and a "face-lift," but with no weakening in its resolve to scrutinize modern psychology in order to discover those "strange remnants of the past also in our own thinking which calmly determine its course" of which Wolfgang Köhler speaks in the cover quotation. The new editor has enjoyed reading the many comments from subscribers whose names have long been familiar to him but who now are known more personally. Especially appreciated have been the words of encouragement and best wishes received. I am impressed by the warmth and unity of the unique "community" of scholars subscribing to the newsletter.

* * *

Notes from that community:

Our past editor, Noel Smith, indicates that back volumes of the Newsletter/Quarterly are available at \$2 per volume for 1-7. Though all may not have the original face sheets, all will have the original content.

Paul Mountjoy wishes to announce his sabbatical leave from Western Michigan University for the 1978-79 academic year. He hopes to accomplish two things: one is to teach (at a place as yet unspecified) Kantor's interbehavioral system to students who don't know about his contributions. The other is to work on a book which will trace the history of Psychological Technology. More information on his proposed activities and accomplishments will be forthcoming.

Robert Lundin sends word that the second edition of his Theories and Systems textbook (editor's note: a very fine one) will appear in January, 1979.

William Verplanck offers the following encouraging observation:

Through more than half a century, the thinking of Robert Kantor has remained in the avant-garde, far ahead of the times. Now, it seems, the last quarter of this century is proving catch-up time, with many psychologists, of diverse backgrounds, asserting, in one vocabulary or another, viewpoints close to those of Interbehaviorism.

Professor Verplanck concludes with a hope that "The Interbehaviorist will be able to work well and effectively in developing interchange among these groups."

Professor Verplanck's concluding comment about the development of interchange provides an apt introduction to the next news item. In the last issue, mention was made of a new publication entitled Operant Subjectivity: The Q Methodology Newsletter, which has a close kinship with interbehaviorism in its orientation. The editor, Steven R. Brown, a political scientist at Kent State University, responded by including the following passage in the April, 1978 issue of his publication:

The most recent issue of Interbehavioral Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 4), which seeks to promote the views of J. R. Kantor, notes the appearance of Operant Subjectivity, and further notes that Stephenson's work is in "close kinship with interbehaviorism." (The same issue of the Quarterly also contains a brief communique from Stephenson concerning his relationship to the late Sir Cyril Burt and the latter's role in educational theory and reform.) Stephenson's The Study of Behavior is generously sprinkled with references to Kantor, who was instrumental in establishing the Psychological Record in which many of Stephenson's papers have appeared since 1960. In many respects, the Interbehavioral Quarterly, ably edited since its inception by Noel W. Smith, provided the inspiration for Operant Subjectivity. "Underground" publications such as these are often more stimulating than the cost-effective but otherwise ineffectual periodicals that grace dusty library shelves (and which some sage once referred to as "solar energy in captivity").

In the spirit of Verplanck's suggestion, it is hoped that interchange between readers of the two publications can be realized by means of common subscriptions.

Steven Brown also informs our readership of the establishment of the International Society of Political Psychology. An excerpt from its news release of February 24, 1978 follows:

Outstanding scholars throughout the world with an interest in political psychology are now inviting those involved in similar concerns to join them in the newly founded International Society of Political Psychology. ISPP was formed this fall by leaders in psychiatry, government, anthropology, psychology, sociology and political science. Its purpose is to improve communication among scholars with different scientific, geographic and political viewpoints. The founders thus hope to increase the quality and breadth of work done, as well as the quality of working conditions, by firming the ties among those who belong to this "invisible university" of interest.

The first meeting of the Society will be held on September 2-4 in New York, and the first issue of its official journal is scheduled to appear in the fall. Address inquiries to Jeanne N. Knutson, Executive Secretary Pro-Tem, ISPP, 10837 Via Verona, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

* * *

The 10th annual meeting of the Cheiron Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences will be held at Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts, June 2, 3, and 4, 1978. Information on local arrangements may be obtained from: Dr. Lorenz J. Finson, Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts 02181. For information on Cheiron membership write: Dr. Elizabeth S. Goodman, Department of Psychology, State University College, Fredonia, New York 14063.

* * *

In this issue, the editor offers his analysis of an excerpt from Aristotle's *de Anima* concerning the soul, and argues that purely grammatical considerations should not be allowed to obscure the naturalism of Aristotle's view and its similarity to the interbehaviorist's conception. Also in this first issue of 1978, a paper by Jacqueline (Farrington) Kinnie, a past contributor, is presented. It argues for a re-evaluation, from an organismic perspective, of the subject matter and constructs of the psychology of motivation.

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ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF THE SOUL
A GRAMMATICAL SOLUTION TO A METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM

Ronald G. Heyduk

...the soul will not be body; for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject and matter. The soul must, then, be...the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially...corresponding to the principle of a thing...we should not ask whether the soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and the impression are one, or in general whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one.

Aristotle: *de Anima*, Book II, Chapter 1,
412^a16, 22; b4. Translation
by D. W. Hamlyn. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968

Historical Background to the Excerpt

The relationship between "soul" and body (and thus the nature of what we now label "consciousness") was a subject of lively debate in fourth century B.C. Athens, much as is the "mind - body problem" in 20th century Western philosophy and psychology. In Aristotle's time, two views of the soul had been well articulated: the soul could be conceived of in the same material terms as the body (e.g., Democritus' atomistic monism), or else it could be viewed as an immaterial, supernatural entity (Plato's dualism). As Aristotle was able to discern, the apparent polarity of the two views is illusory. In each case, "soul" is conceptualized in structural terms: "it" is a "thing," although in one view that thing is of the natural, material world and in the other view it is immaterial and supernatural.

Analysis of the Excerpt

"...the soul will not be body;"

This short portion of the larger excerpt from Aristotle's *de Anima* would seem to support a common interpretation that Aristotle's view of soul and its relation to body is dualistic, much more in the spirit of Plato his teacher than of those philosophers such as Democritus who wished to naturalize the soul and thereby present a picture of a unified organism. Indeed, Aristotle's statement argues clearly for a distinction between soul and body, but a continued reading of the excerpt reveals that it is not at all the Platonic distinction that is being made. In fact, Aristotle probably found Plato's solution to the mind - body problem

as unacceptable as Democritus' arbitrary materialistic reduction of soul, since Plato separated thought and other functions of soul from a natural world to which Aristotle believed they belonged.

"...for the body is not something predicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject and matter."

Aristotle concluded that a satisfactory alternative to the materialistic and Platonic interpretations of soul rested upon the making of a grammatical distinction between the words "soul" and "body." If "soul" is viewed as the same part of speech as "body" (i.e., as a noun; as "subject and matter"), then one must conceive of soul either as a fundamentally different sort of "thing" than body (thus artificially bifurcating a whole organism), or else as the same sort of thing or substance as body (thus debasing thought, memory, and other attributes of the soul). Aristotle gained the freedom needed to reject both positions by arguing that the word "soul" could best be thought of as a verb, not a noun: it was, after all, a label given to a set of activities of an organism. Soul, then, is "something predicated of a subject," unlike the body, which "exists as subject and matter."

"...The soul must, then, be the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially...corresponding to the principle of a thing."

Once such a grammatical distinction between "soul" and "body" is made, an alternate metaphysical position becomes apparent: soul constitutes the set of functions of body, those accomplishments that distinguish a living body from one that is not. The brilliance of Aristotle's resolution dawns: simply by means of a grammatical reanalysis, Aristotle was able to reject the undesirable aspects of Platonic and materialistic conceptions while maintaining the best aspects of these views. Soul is, as Plato claimed, immaterial, and thus clearly distinguishable from and exalted in relation to the mere matter of which all living things are made. But soul is not an immaterial entity: it is "function," not "structure." Thus, unlike Plato's view and like Democritus', soul is perfectly natural, and clearly inseparable from (indeed, that which gives life to, "the first actuality of") a living body. As Aristotle summarized:

"We should not ask whether the wax and the impression are one, or in general whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one."

Reconciliation of Aristotelian and Interbehavioral Conception of Mind and Body.

The frequent appearance of the word "soul" in translations of Aristotle's writing, and particularly statements such as "...the soul will not be body," have justifiably led some to conclude that Aristotle's view on the mind - body problem has little in common with the aggressively anti-mentalistic, monistic position of the interbehaviorist. However, it would seem that linguistic problems aside, the two views are not easily distinguishable. Both Aristotle and the interbehaviorist believe that one should not, in speaking of thoughts, feelings, memories, etc., consider them as items contained within or comprising an entity localized in the natural (or supernatural) world. Aristotle and interbehaviorists agree, then, that there is no such "thing" as "soul," "mind," or "consciousness," but only activities of an organism in the natural world. The interbehaviorist,

however, thereupon eliminates terms such as "mind" and "consciousness" from his vocabulary, since their status as nouns in normal usage tends to encourage conceiving of what they stand for as entities. In contrast, "soul" remained an important word in Aristotle's vocabulary, and hence a source of confusion to readers, though it may be that the biases of Aristotle's translators are responsible for the word's persistent noun-like appearances in his writing. In the end, the interbehaviorist is taking a position quite similar (or identical) to Aristotle in rejecting the notion of mind or consciousness as a "thing" in the head (or anywhere else), without in any sense rejecting or debasing those acts of the organism that traditionally have been thought of as aspects or functions of "mind."

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THE INTERBEHAVIORAL APPROACH AND MOTIVATION

Jacqueline (Farrington) Kinnie

More than a half-century has passed since J. R. Kantor defined motivation as direct or indirect purposive behavior (Kantor, 1924). A third-century ago Kantor stated: "The psychology of motivation is in a chaotic state," and proposed that motivation might be defined as conditional actions "influencing other actions and conducting to their performance as preferential activities" (Kantor, 1942). Yet perusal of the psychological literature demonstrates little advancement toward Kantor's analysis, in spite of considerable support for his commentary upon the state of motivation studies. The uniqueness of the interbehavioral approach as proposed by Kantor appears to be largely ignored by social scientists interested in the "why" of behaviors of individuals and groups. While multiple factors are frequently enumerated in analyses, the imposition of cultural constructs upon actual events is still the norm. An understanding of the contribution of Kantor to the analysis of events could lead to fewer impositions upon, and greater understanding of, the chosen and preferred activities of the human animal, and the "whys" of their choice and preference.

An Overview of the Interbehavioral System

Kantor's approach guards against cultural traditions which have for centuries placed psychology apart from other sciences. Essential to the interbehavioral approach is the notion that theory must be derived specifically from the actual interbehavior of organisms with objects and events within particular situations. The event itself is of prime importance. Lest such a statement appear trivial, it is well to recall that psychological events are all too frequently and unfortunately confused with biological events and/or religious and philosophic constructions.

Inevitably linked with biological organisms, psychological events are different from biological occurrences. While psychological events necessarily evolve from previous biological evolutions, they develop within the total life span of the organism. It is the province of the psychologist to provide a descriptive model of the initiation and evolution of the organism's adjustments to things and events both up to and beyond the point of biological maturation.

In describing psychological events, Kantor posits no special entities such as soul, mind, tendency, nor indeed separate entities of any type. Such entities can be neither directly observed nor manipulated, and thus have no place in a naturalistic description. Equally to be avoided is the separation of the total organism into parts which operate individually. In

order to avoid such non-scientific methodology, the interbehavioral approach would have psychologists observe two simple rules (Observer, 1969):

1. "...the rule of specificity: no thing or event is something else, so each must be described as a field of its own specific factors.
2. "...the rule of natural limits: no confrontable event can be described as transcending the limits of observation and experimental manipulation."

Natural investigation which observes these procedural rules permits analysis of such events as recalling without the imposition of unreal constructs. Rather than conceiving of the organism as storing in a "mind" or "memory bank" information which may be pulled out for utilization at a later time, the act of recalling may be viewed as the interactions of the organism with a substitute stimulus which facilitates a new interaction with an event, object or situation.

The behavioral life of any organism is a continuum of events into which the investigator breaks in order to observe and record particular unique behavior segments within the total field of available events. "Psychological phenomena must be likened to a flowing stream rather than to barbs set side by side on a wire" (Kantor, 1933). Each behavior segment delineates one of the simplest units of an interactional event and consists of a single stimulus and its correlated response. While one may separate behavior segments by identifying the stimulus, neither stimulus nor response can occur independent of the other; that is, stimulus and response are reciprocal.

Within each unique behavior segment, the stimulus function is that action which is performed by the object with which the organism interacts. It is apparent that a stimulus object may develop multiple functions. The response is that action which the organism executes with respect to the stimulus object. Such are the beginnings of behavioral analysis. However, further analysis points to a complex set of units of action, "reaction systems" (Kantor, 1933), which constitute the response. While a single reaction system may make up the response, it is more probable that the response contains a "response pattern" (Kantor, 1933). Within the latter are a minimum of three reaction systems: attending, perceiving and performing of a final action unit. Response patterns consist of sequences of activities such as intra-organismic changes, movements, verbalizations, etc., organized in various ways. Every new combination of reaction systems makes up a different response pattern.

Kantor makes an important distinction between the stimulus object and its functions, unlike what is often done by those psychologists who are physiologically inclined. Unless a stimulus object has acquired a specific function or group of functions to which the organism reacts, that object is not considered to be within a psychological situation or interaction. For example, until a child has come into contact with a dog, that dog has no stimulus function as "to pet," "to talk to," or "to fear." Stimulus functions originate under varying conditions producing three types of functions: universal, individual and cultural. Universal stimulus functions are based upon the natural qualities or characteristics of things and upon the biological structures of the reacting organism and are generally established at the first contact between stimulus object and organism. An example is the "smoothness" characterizing the interaction with a river-bed stone. Individual stimulus functions do not depend upon the qualities of the object, but rather upon the previous experiences of reacting organism with the object. For example: the smooth texture of the river-bed stone may be liked. Through such previous experiences, referred to as the interbehavioral history or the reactional biography (Kantor, 1924), individual differences such as liking, disliking, loving, knowing, understanding, etc. are accounted for. The major characteristic of cultural stimulus functions are that

they are identical or similar for a particular group of persons, and they generally develop through institutional processes.

Because events cannot take place in isolation but rather occur in contexts in which particular and definite conditions may be observed, those conditions which provide the means for stimulation of the organism are a necessary concomitant of description. Without such a medium of contact as light, one cannot react to visual shapes or to color. Similarly, if an organism could live in a vacuum, it could not under such conditions react to sound vibrations. A medium of contact such as light is not to be confused with a stimulus; rather, it is one factor among many within the psychological behavior segment.

The environmental surrounding or "setting" is another important aspect of the psychological event: consider the differences in reactions of a falcon tethered to a post and the same falcon free of the post. Setting conditions are then an essential consideration in determining which of many possible correlated stimulus and response functions will operate at a given moment in time and space.

Perhaps of primary importance in the acquisition of stimulus and response functions is their historical evolution. The previous experience of the organism is the distinguishing characteristic between biological and psychological events. Such evolutions of functioning may be analysed either in terms of immediate or progressive types of action. First encounters between stimulus object and reacting organism are classified as immediate experiences, while social responses such as verbal usage of particular words or symbols are classified as progressive experiences. Psychological fields, then, are continually evolving fields.

"Most important, the field consists of confrontable real events. It is a field concerned with activity" (Kantor, 1924). Further, "it is advisable to look upon the field as the entire system of things and conditions operating in any event taken in its available totality" (Kantor, 1969). Only by observing and describing the entire system of factors available can the behavioral scientist obtain adequate description and explanation of events. As will be noted later in discussing motivation behavior and events, the total field description is of great import in complex investigations.

The psychological field is qualitatively different from the physical fields of physics and biology. The biological field generally localizes causative factors within the organism, utilizing internal principles of description such as neural functioning. Kantor believes that it is unfortunate that this model is so frequently followed by psychologists who neglect the essential data of psychological events. The study of the structure of the organism is the business of biology; such is not the order of business in psychology. Nor is the study of physical bodies and their movements, which is the undertaking of physics. In physics, objects are said to be characterized by a state of inertia. Though observation dictates that living organisms cannot be considered inert objects, psychology has long adopted and utilized such a model, positing drives, needs, forces and energies which set the inert organism into motion and direct behavior.

Although an attempt has been made to utilize a field approach in phenomenology, there are differences between Kantor's naturalistic approach to a concrete field of events and the internal and subjective fields of the proponents of phenomenology (cf. Bentley, 1935). Lewin (1935) considered that "objects which...form the goal of the process are to be regarded primarily as objects from which a force, a steering process, goes out." Relying heavily upon the physics model of forces, he attempted to represent these forces which determined behavior in diagrams of the "life space." As the psychological environment of the organism from moment to moment rather than the objective world, life-space represented the major

construct in Lewin's system. Objective stimuli played no role in behavior, but rather the individual's perception of the stimulus object determined action. Such a field was then not necessarily an actuality, but might be based solely upon hypothetical and subjective data. In this respect, Lewin's phenomenal field differs from Kantor's objective field.

An Interbehavioral Critique of the Psychology of Motivation

Perhaps there is no area of psychological investigation which better exemplifies the confusion of construct and event than that of motivation. Kantor (1942) surveyed the literature and pointed to the fact that most writers in the field do not adequately discriminate between events which are motivated and those which are not. Kantor succinctly pinpoints the source of the problem: "One of the primary bases for the unsatisfactory situation in the motivation field is that students...do not begin...by isolating unique behavior segments. Instead they start with the general interpretive assumption that actions require initiating or guiding forces or conditions." Such are the bases for not only drive and need concepts, but also for the instinct-rooted doctrines of motivation that have in recent decades begun to reappear in the literature (cf. Maslow, 1963; 1967; Rogers and Stevens, 1967).

It is likely that a linguistic problem underlies the failure of motivation psychologists to develop a naturalistic view. Kantor argues that man's "linguistic action and linguistic products exert their influence upon the discrimination, selection and patination of objects and events and...upon the style and efficacy of recording them" (Kantor, 1942). Few items frequently used in the psychological literature have as many meanings and implications as the word "motivation" (cf. English and English, 1958), and it is unfortunate that, in sum, the term connotes an inert organism. In fact, the behavioral scientist interested in motivation phenomena needs not to ask "why", but rather, "under what conditions" does a particular preferred activity occur. Kantor suggests that "motivation interbehavior presupposes a situation or field in which the component action functions have more than a momentary existence," and "to motivate an individual...is to place him in a particular field...in which he will more probably than not do some preferred action." It is at this point that the reader of "Toward a scientific analysis of motivation" may wish that Dr. Kantor had been more explicit. Instead, he leaves us to sort through his various other writings in an attempt to conduct our investigations in a more objective manner.

What specific differences may be noted in the interbehavioral approach to psychological events which may aid attempts to investigate motivation fields and events? Perhaps most significant is the enabling of the investigator to contend more comfortably with interrelationships of factors in the occurrence of psychological events. Using the interbehavioral approach also relieves the behavioral scientist of such cumbersome constructions as the "self," "mind," and consciousness and unconsciousness. When an investigator is interacting with events rather than constructions, he is freer to identify and to define "circumstances surrounding things and events before and after manipulation and description" (Kantor, 1959). Such unencumbered investigation is not easily attainable, but perhaps such an admission is necessary in the beginning of a search for more meaningful and objective investigation into human motivation.

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